When society acts, it tends to benefit most when it acts in what I would call the Planning model of winning, where reward is a function of the accuracy of beliefs and the efficacy of explicitly reasoned plans
I’m not sure I agree with this. In fact I’m not quite sure what it means altogether. (What would I believe if I did in fact disagree with it?)
Could you try and clarify the contrast you’re drawing here?
What would I believe if I did in fact disagree with it?
That society doesn’t get rewarded according to “the accuracy of beliefs and the efficacy of explicitly reasoned plans”.
For example, if there were a God that rewarded (with e.g. prosperity, security and ease of living for all) all and only societies that were compassionate towards their lowest and worst off members, then the statement would be false.
The reason is that in that case, the rewards (e.g. prosperity, security and ease of living for all) came without an explicitly reasoned out plan to get them, but nevertheless they are tied to what the society does.
I’m not sure what it means for society to be rewarded, or for society to benefit: I don’t think of “society” as a reward-seeking agent.
Societies persist, change, sometimes disappear. There is a class of beliefs and plans which have had large effects on societies—influencing their persistence, enacting large changes—and that is the class of scientific and technological beliefs.
Perhaps it would be more useful to say that scientific and technological beliefs have large effects on how societies fare, but smaller effects on how individuals fare. I’m not sure how true that is, but it sounds more testable.
I’m not sure what it means for society to be rewarded, or for society to benefit: I don’t think of “society” as a reward-seeking agent.
I think that the point is that the creators of LW/OB implicitly take that stance, that there is such a thing as a “better” outcome for the whole human race or the whole country, and that we ought to have better institutions to achieve these outcomes. And if you do take that stance, you end up with planning-esque rationality, because “scientific and technological beliefs have large effects on how societies fare, but smaller effects on how individuals fare”
I’m not sure I agree with this. In fact I’m not quite sure what it means altogether. (What would I believe if I did in fact disagree with it?)
Could you try and clarify the contrast you’re drawing here?
That society doesn’t get rewarded according to “the accuracy of beliefs and the efficacy of explicitly reasoned plans”.
For example, if there were a God that rewarded (with e.g. prosperity, security and ease of living for all) all and only societies that were compassionate towards their lowest and worst off members, then the statement would be false.
The reason is that in that case, the rewards (e.g. prosperity, security and ease of living for all) came without an explicitly reasoned out plan to get them, but nevertheless they are tied to what the society does.
I’m not sure what it means for society to be rewarded, or for society to benefit: I don’t think of “society” as a reward-seeking agent.
Societies persist, change, sometimes disappear. There is a class of beliefs and plans which have had large effects on societies—influencing their persistence, enacting large changes—and that is the class of scientific and technological beliefs.
Perhaps it would be more useful to say that scientific and technological beliefs have large effects on how societies fare, but smaller effects on how individuals fare. I’m not sure how true that is, but it sounds more testable.
I think that the point is that the creators of LW/OB implicitly take that stance, that there is such a thing as a “better” outcome for the whole human race or the whole country, and that we ought to have better institutions to achieve these outcomes. And if you do take that stance, you end up with planning-esque rationality, because “scientific and technological beliefs have large effects on how societies fare, but smaller effects on how individuals fare”
Thanks for this comment, Morendil, your rephrase makes the point very clearly: