Imagine a second agent which has the same preferences but an anti-status-quo preference between mushroom and pepperoni.
This would be exploitable by a third agent who is able to compare mushroom and pepperoni but assigns equal utilities to both. However the original agent described in the OP would not be able to exploit agent 2 (if agent 1′s status-quo bias is larger than agent 2′s anti-status-quo bias), so agent 3 dominates agent 1 in terms of performance.
Over multiple dimensions agent 3 becomes much more complex than agent 1. Having a status quo bias makes sense as a way to avoid being exploited whilst also being less computationally expensive than tracking or calculating every preference ordering.
Assuming agent 2 is rare, the loss incurred by not being able to exploit others is small.
Imagine a second agent which has the same preferences but an anti-status-quo preference between mushroom and pepperoni.
This would be exploitable by a third agent who is able to compare mushroom and pepperoni but assigns equal utilities to both. However the original agent described in the OP would not be able to exploit agent 2 (if agent 1′s status-quo bias is larger than agent 2′s anti-status-quo bias), so agent 3 dominates agent 1 in terms of performance.
Over multiple dimensions agent 3 becomes much more complex than agent 1. Having a status quo bias makes sense as a way to avoid being exploited whilst also being less computationally expensive than tracking or calculating every preference ordering.
Assuming agent 2 is rare, the loss incurred by not being able to exploit others is small.