I feel at home with physical materialism and I like the way it’s simultaneously simple, self-consistent and powerful as a theory for generating explanation (immediately: all of science). Yet there are some interesting issues that come up when I think about the justification of this world view.
The more complex hypothesis that there is ‘more’ than X would be favored by any evidence whatsoever that X is not completely self-contained. So then it becomes an argument about what counts as evidence, and “real” experience. The catch-22 is that any evidence that would argue for the metaphysical would either be rejected within X as NOT REAL or, if it was actually real—in other words, observable, reproducible, explainable—then it would just be incorporated as part of X. So it is impossible to refute the completeness of X from within X. (For example, even while QM observations are challenging causality, locality, counterfactual definiteness, etc., physicists are looking to understand X better, and modify X as needed, not rejecting the possibility of a coherent theory of X. But at what point are we going to recover the world that the metaphysicists meant all along? )
So the irrefutability of physical materialism is alarming, and the obstinate stance for ‘something else’ from the majority of my species leaves me interested in the question. I have nothing to lose from a refutation of either hypotheses, I’m just curious. Also despairing to some extent—I believe such a questions are actually outside definitive epistemology.
This is completely backwards. It’s non-materialism that irrefutable, pretty much by definition.
Suppose we allow non-materialistic, non-evidence-based theories. There is an infinite number of theories that describe X plus some non-evidential Y, for all different imaginable Ys. By construction, we can never tell which of these theories is more likely to be wrong then another.
So we can never say anything about the other-than-X stuff that may be out there. Not “a benevolent god”. Not “Y is pretty big”. Not “Y exists”. Not “I feel transcendental and mystical and believe in a future life of the soul”. Not “if counterfactually the universe was that way instead of this way, we would observe Y and then we would see a teacup.” Nothing at all can be said about Y because every X+Y theory that can be stated is equally valid, forever.
Whatever description you give of Y, with your completely untestable religious-mental-psychic-magical-quantum powers of the mind that must not be questioned, I can give the precise opposite description. What reason could you have for preferring your description to mine? If your reason is in X, it can’t give us information about Y. And if your reason is in Y, I can claim an opposite-reason for my opposite-theory which is also in Y, and we’ll degenerate to a competition of divinely inspired religions that must not be questioned.
Bottom line: if the majority of the species believes in “something else”, that is a fact about the majority of the species, not about what’s out there. If I develop the technology for making almost all humans stop believing in “something else”, could that possibly satisfy your private wonderings?
This is completely backwards. It’s non-materialism that irrefutable, pretty much by definition.
Non-materialism is irrefutable within its own framework, agreed. So then we are left with two irrefutable theories, but one is epistemologically useful within X and one is not. Materialism wins.
Nevertheless, just to echo your argument across the canyon: reality doesn’t care what theories we “allow”, it is what it is. We might deduce that such-and-such-theory is the best theory for various epistemological reasons, but that wouldn’t make the nature of the universe accessible if it isn’t in the first place. Just reminding that ascetic materialism doesn’t allow conviction about materialism.
reality doesn’t care what theories we “allow”, it is what it is.
It is what X is. That’s the definition of X. Whatever is outside X is outside Reality. Materialists don’t think that “something outside reality” is a meaningful description, but that is what you claim when you talk about things being beyond X.
We might deduce that such-and-such-theory is the best theory for various epistemological reasons
No. We deduce that it’s the best theory because it’s only uniquely identifiable theory, as I said before.
If you’re going to pick any one theory, the only theory you can pick is a materialistic one. If you allow non materialistic theories, you have to have every possible theory all at once.
Well, dunno. To be fair, for the sake of argument, I guess one could maybe propose Idealistic theories. That is, that all that exists is made up of a “basic physics of consciousness”, and everything else that we is just an emergent phenomenon of that. One would still keep reductionism, simply that one might have the ultimate reduction be to some sort of “elementry qualia” plus simple rules (as strict and precise and simple as any basic physics theory) for how those behave.
(Note, I’m not advocating this position at this time, I’m just saying that potentially one could have a non materialist reductionism. If I ever actually saw a reduction like that that could successfully really predict/model/explain stuff we observe, I’d be kinda shocked and impressed.)
For the sake of argument, thank you. Yet I would guess that the theory you propose is still isomorphic to physical materialism, because physical materialism doesn’t say anything about the nature of the elementary material of the universe. Calling it an elementary particle or calling it elementary qualia is just a difference in syllables, since we have no restrictions on what either might be like.
Yet you remind me that we can arrive at other unique theories, within different epistemological frameworks. What I thought you were going to say is that a metaphysicist might propose a universe X-prime that is the idealization of X. As in, if we consider X to be an incomplete, imperfect structure, X-prime is the completion of X that makes it ideal and perfect. Then people can speculate about what is ideal and perfect, and we get all the different religions. But it is unique in theory.
By the way, the epistemology used there would seem backwards to us. While we use logic to deduce the nature of the universe from what we observe, in this theory, what they observe is measured against what they predict should logically be. That is, IF they believe that “ideal and perfect” logically follows. (This ‘epistemology’ clearly fails in X, which is why I personally would reject it, but of course, based on a theory that ordinates X above all, even logic.)
Suppose you believe a theory such as you described. Then I propose a new theory, with different elementary qualia that have different properties and behaviors, but otherwise obey the meta-rules of your theory—like proposing a different value for physical constants, or a new particle.
If the two theories can be distinguished in any kind of test, if we can follow any conceivable process to decide which theory to believe, then this is materialism, just done with needlessly complicated theories. On the other hand, if we can’t distinguish these theories, then you have to believe an infinite number of different theories equally, as I said.
I’m perfectly happy with the idea that there could be stuff that we can’t know about simply because it’s too “distant” in some sense for us to experience it; it sends no signals or information our way. I’m not sure anyone here would deny this possibility.
But if that stuff interacts with our stuff then we certainly can know about it.
But is there any reason to favour this more complex hypothesis?
I feel at home with physical materialism and I like the way it’s simultaneously simple, self-consistent and powerful as a theory for generating explanation (immediately: all of science). Yet there are some interesting issues that come up when I think about the justification of this world view.
The more complex hypothesis that there is ‘more’ than X would be favored by any evidence whatsoever that X is not completely self-contained. So then it becomes an argument about what counts as evidence, and “real” experience. The catch-22 is that any evidence that would argue for the metaphysical would either be rejected within X as NOT REAL or, if it was actually real—in other words, observable, reproducible, explainable—then it would just be incorporated as part of X. So it is impossible to refute the completeness of X from within X. (For example, even while QM observations are challenging causality, locality, counterfactual definiteness, etc., physicists are looking to understand X better, and modify X as needed, not rejecting the possibility of a coherent theory of X. But at what point are we going to recover the world that the metaphysicists meant all along? )
So the irrefutability of physical materialism is alarming, and the obstinate stance for ‘something else’ from the majority of my species leaves me interested in the question. I have nothing to lose from a refutation of either hypotheses, I’m just curious. Also despairing to some extent—I believe such a questions are actually outside definitive epistemology.
This is completely backwards. It’s non-materialism that irrefutable, pretty much by definition.
Suppose we allow non-materialistic, non-evidence-based theories. There is an infinite number of theories that describe X plus some non-evidential Y, for all different imaginable Ys. By construction, we can never tell which of these theories is more likely to be wrong then another.
So we can never say anything about the other-than-X stuff that may be out there. Not “a benevolent god”. Not “Y is pretty big”. Not “Y exists”. Not “I feel transcendental and mystical and believe in a future life of the soul”. Not “if counterfactually the universe was that way instead of this way, we would observe Y and then we would see a teacup.” Nothing at all can be said about Y because every X+Y theory that can be stated is equally valid, forever.
Whatever description you give of Y, with your completely untestable religious-mental-psychic-magical-quantum powers of the mind that must not be questioned, I can give the precise opposite description. What reason could you have for preferring your description to mine? If your reason is in X, it can’t give us information about Y. And if your reason is in Y, I can claim an opposite-reason for my opposite-theory which is also in Y, and we’ll degenerate to a competition of divinely inspired religions that must not be questioned.
Bottom line: if the majority of the species believes in “something else”, that is a fact about the majority of the species, not about what’s out there. If I develop the technology for making almost all humans stop believing in “something else”, could that possibly satisfy your private wonderings?
Non-materialism is irrefutable within its own framework, agreed. So then we are left with two irrefutable theories, but one is epistemologically useful within X and one is not. Materialism wins.
Nevertheless, just to echo your argument across the canyon: reality doesn’t care what theories we “allow”, it is what it is. We might deduce that such-and-such-theory is the best theory for various epistemological reasons, but that wouldn’t make the nature of the universe accessible if it isn’t in the first place. Just reminding that ascetic materialism doesn’t allow conviction about materialism.
It is what X is. That’s the definition of X. Whatever is outside X is outside Reality. Materialists don’t think that “something outside reality” is a meaningful description, but that is what you claim when you talk about things being beyond X.
No. We deduce that it’s the best theory because it’s only uniquely identifiable theory, as I said before.
If you’re going to pick any one theory, the only theory you can pick is a materialistic one. If you allow non materialistic theories, you have to have every possible theory all at once.
Well, dunno. To be fair, for the sake of argument, I guess one could maybe propose Idealistic theories. That is, that all that exists is made up of a “basic physics of consciousness”, and everything else that we is just an emergent phenomenon of that. One would still keep reductionism, simply that one might have the ultimate reduction be to some sort of “elementry qualia” plus simple rules (as strict and precise and simple as any basic physics theory) for how those behave.
(Note, I’m not advocating this position at this time, I’m just saying that potentially one could have a non materialist reductionism. If I ever actually saw a reduction like that that could successfully really predict/model/explain stuff we observe, I’d be kinda shocked and impressed.)
For the sake of argument, thank you. Yet I would guess that the theory you propose is still isomorphic to physical materialism, because physical materialism doesn’t say anything about the nature of the elementary material of the universe. Calling it an elementary particle or calling it elementary qualia is just a difference in syllables, since we have no restrictions on what either might be like.
Yet you remind me that we can arrive at other unique theories, within different epistemological frameworks. What I thought you were going to say is that a metaphysicist might propose a universe X-prime that is the idealization of X. As in, if we consider X to be an incomplete, imperfect structure, X-prime is the completion of X that makes it ideal and perfect. Then people can speculate about what is ideal and perfect, and we get all the different religions. But it is unique in theory.
By the way, the epistemology used there would seem backwards to us. While we use logic to deduce the nature of the universe from what we observe, in this theory, what they observe is measured against what they predict should logically be. That is, IF they believe that “ideal and perfect” logically follows. (This ‘epistemology’ clearly fails in X, which is why I personally would reject it, but of course, based on a theory that ordinates X above all, even logic.)
I don’t see how that contradicts what I said.
Suppose you believe a theory such as you described. Then I propose a new theory, with different elementary qualia that have different properties and behaviors, but otherwise obey the meta-rules of your theory—like proposing a different value for physical constants, or a new particle.
If the two theories can be distinguished in any kind of test, if we can follow any conceivable process to decide which theory to believe, then this is materialism, just done with needlessly complicated theories. On the other hand, if we can’t distinguish these theories, then you have to believe an infinite number of different theories equally, as I said.
I’m perfectly happy with the idea that there could be stuff that we can’t know about simply because it’s too “distant” in some sense for us to experience it; it sends no signals or information our way. I’m not sure anyone here would deny this possibility.
But if that stuff interacts with our stuff then we certainly can know about it.