Suppose you believe a theory such as you described. Then I propose a new theory, with different elementary qualia that have different properties and behaviors, but otherwise obey the meta-rules of your theory—like proposing a different value for physical constants, or a new particle.
If the two theories can be distinguished in any kind of test, if we can follow any conceivable process to decide which theory to believe, then this is materialism, just done with needlessly complicated theories. On the other hand, if we can’t distinguish these theories, then you have to believe an infinite number of different theories equally, as I said.
I don’t see how that contradicts what I said.
Suppose you believe a theory such as you described. Then I propose a new theory, with different elementary qualia that have different properties and behaviors, but otherwise obey the meta-rules of your theory—like proposing a different value for physical constants, or a new particle.
If the two theories can be distinguished in any kind of test, if we can follow any conceivable process to decide which theory to believe, then this is materialism, just done with needlessly complicated theories. On the other hand, if we can’t distinguish these theories, then you have to believe an infinite number of different theories equally, as I said.