Perhaps part of the reason rationalists can’t be “aimed” at certain charities even by our self-chosen objects of admiration is that we consider their instructions overrideable without moral cost. If Random Catholic X believes that the Pope delivers the infallible will of God, then anything Random Catholic X does that disobeys the Pope—regardless of his specific situation, assuming the Pope doesn’t explicitly exclude people in that situation—is wrong. It’s not necessarily that Random Catholic X is thinking occurently about the possibility that he will go to Hell for disobeying, it’s that he has no avenue out.
Whereas Random Rationalist Y—I present myself as an example—admires other rationalists for at least partially cognized good reasons. If I have better reasons for doing something other than that which is recommended to me by Eliezer or Dawkins or whoever is making requests of me, than I do for listening to the person in the first place, I am unlikely to follow the suggestion. After all, I don’t believe any such person was chosen by God, I don’t believe they’re infallible, and I also think that there are many individual features of my situation which are relevant and of which such people are generally ignorant. In short, if I have reasons to aim myself differently than the leaders of the rationalist community would like to aim me, I can override their authority without feeling bad about it.
For in-person meeting, can I suggest the vehicle of the Ethical Culture Society? If the idea is benevolent output, the fact that its primary shtick isn’t rationalism shouldn’t matter. The trouble is there aren’t very many chapters; I can’t attend one although I want to, because they’re all too far away. But they already exist, and more could be started.
(As a side note, I recommend Kiva for efficient charity. It’s a microloan site instead of a direct donation, so you can recycle the same contribution indefinitely after you get paid back or even withdraw it if you have to. It also contributes in a way that allows long-term sustainability instead of just throwing beans and rice at a population, because the recipients of loans have businesses that they expand and then use the income therefrom to return the money. And paying anything to the overhead of Kiva itself is explicit and optional.)
Individual rationalists simply CAN be aimed at charities. Action with incomplete information IS possible or you would never do anything and the analyses that many rationalists routinely give are far better information than most people normally act upon.
Perhaps part of the reason rationalists can’t be “aimed” at certain charities even by our self-chosen objects of admiration is that we consider their instructions overrideable without moral cost.
Absolutely. People who consider themselves their own highest authority are a nuisance like that!
Perhaps part of the reason rationalists can’t be “aimed” at certain charities even by our self-chosen objects of admiration is that we consider their instructions overrideable without moral cost. If Random Catholic X believes that the Pope delivers the infallible will of God, then anything Random Catholic X does that disobeys the Pope—regardless of his specific situation, assuming the Pope doesn’t explicitly exclude people in that situation—is wrong. It’s not necessarily that Random Catholic X is thinking occurently about the possibility that he will go to Hell for disobeying, it’s that he has no avenue out.
Whereas Random Rationalist Y—I present myself as an example—admires other rationalists for at least partially cognized good reasons. If I have better reasons for doing something other than that which is recommended to me by Eliezer or Dawkins or whoever is making requests of me, than I do for listening to the person in the first place, I am unlikely to follow the suggestion. After all, I don’t believe any such person was chosen by God, I don’t believe they’re infallible, and I also think that there are many individual features of my situation which are relevant and of which such people are generally ignorant. In short, if I have reasons to aim myself differently than the leaders of the rationalist community would like to aim me, I can override their authority without feeling bad about it.
For in-person meeting, can I suggest the vehicle of the Ethical Culture Society? If the idea is benevolent output, the fact that its primary shtick isn’t rationalism shouldn’t matter. The trouble is there aren’t very many chapters; I can’t attend one although I want to, because they’re all too far away. But they already exist, and more could be started.
(As a side note, I recommend Kiva for efficient charity. It’s a microloan site instead of a direct donation, so you can recycle the same contribution indefinitely after you get paid back or even withdraw it if you have to. It also contributes in a way that allows long-term sustainability instead of just throwing beans and rice at a population, because the recipients of loans have businesses that they expand and then use the income therefrom to return the money. And paying anything to the overhead of Kiva itself is explicit and optional.)
Individual rationalists simply CAN be aimed at charities. Action with incomplete information IS possible or you would never do anything and the analyses that many rationalists routinely give are far better information than most people normally act upon.
Absolutely. People who consider themselves their own highest authority are a nuisance like that!