I’m not sure I understand the cryptographer’s constraint very well, especially with regard to language: individual words seem to have different meanings (“awesome”, “literally”, “love”). It’s generally possible to infer which decryption was intended from the wider context, but sometimes the context itself will have different and mutually exclusive decryptions, such as in cases of real or perceived dogwhistling.
One way I could see this specific issue being resolved is by looking at what the intent of the original communication was—this would make it so that there is now a fact that settles which is the “correct” solution -, but that seems to fail in a different way: agents don’t seem to have full introspective access to what they are doing or what the likely outcome of their actions is, such as in some cases of infidelity or making of promises.
This, too, could be resolved by saying that an agent’s intention is “the outcomes they’re attempting to instantiate regardless of self-awareness”, but by that point it seems to me that we’ve agreed with Rosenberg’s claim that it’s Darwinian all the way down.
What am I missing?
As far as I can tell, I agree with what you say—this seems like a good account of how the cryptophraher’s constraint cashes out in language. To your confusion: I think Dennett would agree that it is Darwianian all the way down, and that their disagreement lies elsewhere. Dennet’s account for how “reasons turn into causes” is made on Darwinian grounds, and it compels Dennett (but not Rosenberg) to conclude that purposes deserve to be treated as real, because (compressing the argument a lot) they have the capacity to affect the causal world.Not sure this is useful?