Does anyone have an informed comment about the use of gauge theory in decision theory?
Eric Weinstein just gave a controversial econophysics talk [edit: link added] at the University of Chicago about “geometric marginalism”, which uses geometric techniques from Yang-Mills theory to model changing preferences.
If this can be used in economics, it can probably be used in decision theory in general, and I see at least one example of a physicist doing this (“decision process theory”), but I don’t know how it compares to conventional approaches.
arxiv now carries a “response to economics as gauge theory”, by a physicist turned ML researcher, known for co-authoring a critique of Weinstein’s unified theory of physics, earlier this year. As with the physics critique, the commentary seems pretty basic and hardly the final word on anything, but it’s notable because the critic works at Deep Mind (he’s presenting a paper at NeurIPS this afternoon).
Does anyone have an informed comment about the use of gauge theory in decision theory?
Eric Weinstein just gave a controversial econophysics talk [edit: link added] at the University of Chicago about “geometric marginalism”, which uses geometric techniques from Yang-Mills theory to model changing preferences.
If this can be used in economics, it can probably be used in decision theory in general, and I see at least one example of a physicist doing this (“decision process theory”), but I don’t know how it compares to conventional approaches.
arxiv now carries a “response to economics as gauge theory”, by a physicist turned ML researcher, known for co-authoring a critique of Weinstein’s unified theory of physics, earlier this year. As with the physics critique, the commentary seems pretty basic and hardly the final word on anything, but it’s notable because the critic works at Deep Mind (he’s presenting a paper at NeurIPS this afternoon).