? The second is already open-access, and the third both works in SH & GS (with 2 different PDF links). Only the first link fails in SH. (But what an abstract: “I also argue that if future generally intelligent AI possess a predictive processing cognitive architecture, then they will come to share our pro-moral motivations (of valuing humanity as an end; avoiding maleficent actions; etc.), regardless of their initial motivation set.” Wow.)
Huh, I tried the first and third in SH, maybe I messed up somehow. My bad. Thanks!
I still am interested in the first (on the principle that maybe, just maybe, it’s the solution to all our problems instead of being yet another terrible argument made by philosophers about why AIs will be ethical by default if only we do X… I think I’ve seen two already) and would like to have access.
I can see how that would work. The author needs to be careful, though. Predictive processing may be a necessary condition for robust AGI alignment, but it is not per se a sufficient condition.
First of all, that only works if you give the AGI strong inductive priors for detecting and predicting human needs, goals, and values. Otherwise, it will tend to predict humans as though we are just “physical” systems (we are, but I mean modeling us without taking our sentience and values into account), no more worthy of special care than rocks or streams.
Second of all, this only works if the AGI has a structural bias toward treating the needs, goals, and values that it infers from predictive processing as its own. Otherwise, it may understand how to align with us, but it won’t care by default.
Those articles are all paywalled; got free versions? I tried Sci-Hub, no luck.
? The second is already open-access, and the third both works in SH & GS (with 2 different PDF links). Only the first link fails in SH. (But what an abstract: “I also argue that if future generally intelligent AI possess a predictive processing cognitive architecture, then they will come to share our pro-moral motivations (of valuing humanity as an end; avoiding maleficent actions; etc.), regardless of their initial motivation set.” Wow.)
Huh, I tried the first and third in SH, maybe I messed up somehow. My bad. Thanks!
I still am interested in the first (on the principle that maybe, just maybe, it’s the solution to all our problems instead of being yet another terrible argument made by philosophers about why AIs will be ethical by default if only we do X… I think I’ve seen two already) and would like to have access.
I can see how that would work. The author needs to be careful, though. Predictive processing may be a necessary condition for robust AGI alignment, but it is not per se a sufficient condition.
First of all, that only works if you give the AGI strong inductive priors for detecting and predicting human needs, goals, and values. Otherwise, it will tend to predict humans as though we are just “physical” systems (we are, but I mean modeling us without taking our sentience and values into account), no more worthy of special care than rocks or streams.
Second of all, this only works if the AGI has a structural bias toward treating the needs, goals, and values that it infers from predictive processing as its own. Otherwise, it may understand how to align with us, but it won’t care by default.