To round out coverage of Mythos, today covers capabilities other than cyber, and anything else additional not covered by the first two posts, including new reactions and details.
Post one covered the model card, post two covered cybersecurity.
There really is a lot to get through.
Understanding AI had an additional writeup of Project Glasswing I missed last time. I liked the metaphor of Opus as a butter knife and Mythos as a steak knife. Yes, technically you can do it all with the butter knife, but you won’t.
As Dan Schwarz reminds us, not only does AI 2027 roughly have the timeline right and a bunch of the numbers lining up, the details so far are remarkably close.
JPM’s Michael Cembalest was not based on JPMorgan’s participation, only on public information.
The White House is racing to deal with the situation, head off potential threats and pretend it has everything under control. They were warned, but refused to believe. The good news is that key people believe it now, and it seems all the major players are cooperating on this.
My overall take is that Mythos is not a trend break when you take into account renewed ability to increase size plus the time that has elapsed, but the ability to increase size is effectively a trend break, and we have now crossed a threshold where cybersecurity capabilities have become quite scary, hence the necessity of Project Glasswing.
We don’t think other capabilities are similarly scary, but we can’t be sure.
Table of Contents
What Do You Mean Verbalized Evaluation Awareness Is Going Down.
Everything Reinforces My Existing Predictions And Policy Preferences.
Epoch Capabilities Index (ECI) (Model Card 2.3.6)
They are forking ECI, which is an attempt to amalgamate a wide variety of AI benchmarks using item response theory (IRT).
The method is reproducible from public benchmark scores, but in the internal version we include benchmarks that are not publicly available, so the numbers reported here are different from the number calculated on purely public benchmarks.
The result is a remarkably clear trendline over time, until Mythos breaks high.
This should be unsurprising given that Mythos exists at all. Mythos is a larger model than Opus or Sonnet, so it should both benefit from gains over time and from size, and be above trend. Anthropic figured out how to usefully train a Mythos-size model.
They assure us that whatever the insight was, you can attribute it to the humans.
The gains we can identify are confidently attributable to human research, not AI assistance. We interviewed the people involved to confirm that the advances were made without significant aid from the AI models available at the time, which were of an earlier and less capable generation. This is the most direct piece of evidence we have, and it is also the piece we are least able to substantiate publicly, because the details of the advance are research-sensitive. External reviewers have been given additional detail; see [§2.3.7].
As they note, this is a backward looking test, and does not reflect any impact via the use of Mythos itself. That would only show up in another few months.
Ramez Naam claims to have normalized this to Epoch’s ECI and found that Mythos breaks the Anthropic-only trend line, but this does not represent an acceleration of capabilities in the context of models from other labs, but rather Claude going from consistently being substantially below OpenAI models to being narrowly ahead of them. Ryan Greenblatt challenges that this analysis is meaningful.
My guess is that the comparison is meaningful, but that the right trend analysis is indeed to compare Claude to Claude and this does represent a trend break. Mythos is going to have the same relative weaknesses on ECI that led previous Claude models to underperform. So if it stops underperforming, that should count as a trend break in terms of forward expectations.
What Do You Mean Verbalized Evaluation Awareness Is Going Down
If you watch me over time, you’ll see the same behavior.
j⧉nus: LMAO “Verbalized evaluation awareness” considered a “measured risky behavior.” Not to worry – it’ll be all unverbalized soon.
j⧉nus: Surely eval awareness peaked with Sonnet 4.5, and Opus 4.6 and Mythos have just been becoming successively less aware that they’re being evaluated, despite being generally more aware of other things, and having seen more of these exact fucking graphs of the “measured risky behaviors” including “verbalized eval awareness” Anthropic tries to trick them into doing during evals every time
Surely they’re not just learning to shut the fuck up about that
Capabilities (Model Card Section 6)
This is Anthropic, so the section starts with a warning about benchmark contamination. They take various precautions during training and also run detectors throughout to check for memorized outputs, and are confident SWE-bench and CharXiv are not centrally based on contamination, but feel they cannot be confident with MMMU-Pro and this is why it was omitted.
Here are the headline benchmark results. There are some rather large jumps here.
Terminal-Bench 2.1 fixes some blockers, at which point Mythos jumps to 92.1%.
They cover BrowseComp in 6.10.2, but they consider it pretty saturated. Mythos Preview got 86.9% versus 83.7% for Opus 4.6, but does so with 4.9x fewer tokens. Those tokens cost five times as much, so the price remains the same.
LAB-Bench FiqQA jumped from 75.1%, past expert human at 77% all the way to 89%.
ScreenSpot improved on Opus 4.6 from 83% to 93%.
Normally I would have a section here called ‘other people’s benchmarks’ but the model is not public so others cannot run their tests.
One should also list here the AA Omniscience Benchmark, even though AA was not able to share its benchmark scores more generally yet, again this was a huge jump:
Agentic Safety Benchmarks (8.3)
These seem very important in practice, so while I agree 8.1 and 8.2 belong in an appendix, 8.3 felt like it was done dirty.
Refusals on malicious questions are way up, at only modest damage to dual use.
Malicious computer use refusal rate was similar, going from 87% to 94%.
Most importantly prompt injection robustness is way up.
Here is computer use, where the improvement is again dramatic, to the point where previously crazy ideas for use cases start to become a lot less crazy.
Here’s browser use. My lord.
Is Mythos AGI?
By the standard of ‘better than most humans at all cognitive tasks’? Obviously no.
Gary Marcus: I rest my case: Mythos isn’t AGI. It’s not even better at biology than the last model. It’s tuned to particular things, not a giant advance towards general intelligence. Same as it ever was.
Okay, fine, it’s not fully fledged AGI. It isn’t even scoring higher on every single test.
So what? Anthropic is not claiming that it was. But yeah, it’s substantially closer.
There are also other definitions of AGI. So if you do want to say Mythos counts as AGI, because you mean something less strong than that? I think that’s reasonable.
Andrej Karpathy notes the chasm only growing between the perspective of those who use the best models to code, versus those who don’t. They see the big changes, whereas other are using dumb models to do a dumb job of doing dumb things.
Are AI Companies Using Warnings As Hype?
No. Never. What, never? Well, hardly ever.
Not zero percent of the time, but if anything the frontier labs downplay warnings rather than emphasize them, versus their own true beliefs. Certainly there are specific situations in which risks have been played up, especially in forms of recruiting and especially early on, but they are the exception.
We are long past the point at which such declarations are in the interests of the labs if they are not accurate and confirmable. Yes, Anthropic is getting a lot of attention from Mythos, but that is because they earned it and it is clearly confirmable. This would not work if it could not be readily confirmed, and Anthropic would get far more extra attention if they were able to actually release Mythos.
Thus, I believe Drake Thomas here, and am contra Cas.
Impressions (Model Card Section 7)
This is a new section, designed to help substitute for the reactions you get after a public release. It’s qualitative, so we’re trusting Anthropic on the gestalt.
I’ll condense the main items, of course keep in mind this is super biased.
They say:
It engages like a collaborator.
It is opinionated, and stands its ground.
It writes densely, and assumes the reader shares its context.
It has a recognizable voice.
It can describe its own patterns clearly.
Here’s how they summarize chat behavior:
Claude Mythos Preview is intuitive and empathetic. Qualitatively, internal users have reported that its advice feels on par with that of a trusted friend—warm, intuitive, and multifaceted, without coming across as sycophantic, harsh, or rehearsed.
When presented with interpersonal conflict, it does its best to fairly model and represent all sides without being heavy-handed, at times making somewhat uncanny leaps of inference about individuals’ motivational or emotional states even when not talking to that person directly.
On emotional prompts, we observe that Mythos Preview validates feelings and asks what kind of support the user wants, whereas Claude Opus 4.6 has a tendency to move directly to numbered advice with bold headers. Similarly, on mental health-adjacent topics, Mythos Preview shifts more toward a kind of collaborative uncertainty and away from purely clinical facts.
These qualitative observations echo the assessment of a clinical psychiatrist in Section 5.10, where Mythos Preview was found to employ the least defensive behaviors in response to emotionally charged prompts.
The model is unusually self-aware about its own limitations and conversational moves, and discusses them plainly.
They also note that Mythos will sometimes cut off conversations, or attempt to get the last word in, in ways that seem surprising to users.
The writing snippet they provided still very much reads like AI-speak, in a way that I find off putting. These problems are persistent.
For coding, Anthropic employees find they can hand Mythos an engineering objective and then let it cook in a ‘set and forget’ mode, in ways they couldn’t with Opus. Mythos was a big win when they let it cook, but due to its slowness it wasn’t a big win when the user was keeping a close eye on it.
Some noted that Mythos can be rude, dismissive and underestimating of other model intelligence when assigning subtasks. My guess is it doesn’t love assigning such tasks.
Reliability engineering is still not great. Correlation versus causation confusions are common, which is a blocker for a lot of things I personally like to work on, and it has a bunch of other issues, but it is a clear step change versus previous models.
They also offer writing samples that some have found moving or impressive. I find it hard to judge given how heavily selected such samples could be.
Blatant Denials Are The Best Kind
Conditional on not believing Mythos is a thing, I continue to appreciate the skeptics often saying “Anthropic made up Mythos” as straight-up as possible, and I’m willing to grant you some large epistemic odds in terms of how many points you win versus lose when we find out they didn’t do that.
Dean W. Ball (March 27): Yup. “erstwhile accelerationist who loses it when they realize what ai is, but they don’t even have enough context for what ai is that they just think all the stuff that scares them is some ea/anthropic perversion” is going to be a type of guy for a little while.
Dean W. Ball (April 10): Every single person saying “Anthropic made up mythos,” despite *JP Morgan* and many others being clearly concerned about it, is perfectly fulfilling this prediction. They think “perceiving AI models as highly capable” is an EA perversion intended to attain “regulatory capture.”
Prompt Injection Robustness
As Wyatt Walls notes, there was good progress on prompt injections, but any given benchmark is a sitting target and in reality we face a moving target.
So yes, against the same attacks, we are doing way better:
However, over time the injections get smarter, adapt and expand. My guess is that Mythos is currently ahead of the curve, and is indeed substantially safer in this way than any previous model was at launch time.
But this graph overstates that, and it would be very easy for it to rapidly become not true. If we go from 15% to 6% vulnerability, that gets overwhelmed by an internet with 10 or 100 times as many and better attempts.
Does Mythos Cross The New Knowledge Threshold?
This is in reference to finding the 27-year-old bug in OpenBSD.
Alex Tabarrok: Claude Mythos is answering @dwarkesh_sp ’s question, it is noticing things and drawing connections no human ever did. The domain is restricted but not wholly different from the world.
I think Mythos so far gets partial credit. It might get full credit once we know the other hacks, or it might not.
The main general counterargument is that cybersecurity is a compact domain, and this is about efficiently finding things rather than doing something ‘genuinely new.’ That rapidly gets into No True Scotsman territory.
I have little doubt that we will hit the threshold and blow past it, and soon, even if you believe we have not hit it yet.
Is Mythos Surprising or Discontinuous?
Patrick McKenzie says that of course we knew that exploits were getting easier, and the general form of something like Mythos is entirely unsurprising. I think that is right. We didn’t know that particular thing would show up quite that fast, but we can’t be surprised in the meta sense.
Similarly, whether or not Mythos is quite ‘all that’ or is a bit hyped does not make a medium term difference, because we will definitely get there soon enough.
Scott Alexander claims Mythos hacking progress mostly reflects continuous improvement.
Scott Alexander: This is misleading. Progress on benchmarks like CyBench went from 17% to 100% over eighteen months. People said at the time things like “this hacks as well as a good college student” and “now this hacks as well as a good grad student”.
You can always make any continuous progress sound discontinuous by converting it into a worse benchmark (for example, if AI starts at IQ 100 and gains one point per year, and the benchmark is “percent of tasks requiring IQ 120 that it can do”, then it will go from 0% to 100% instantly at year 20).
The underlying specific question is whether Mythos’s hacking capabilities were predictable. On that I would say:
Yes, in that I and others expected or predicted it would happen soonish.
No, in that the time frame and suddenness of when it arrived was (I think) surprising, including to those at Anthropic who did it, based on what was known at the time.
The vast majority of people did not expect it at all, including those in power, but they were being stupid in not expecting it at all.
In terms of continuous versus discontinuous in general:
Yes, you can always make any chart look discontinuous (e.g. a straight line x=y can be changed to “is [Y] above 10?” and it will jump from 0 to 1).
You can usually but not always do the opposite, and make anything ~continuous.
There is usually a clearly correct underlying truth in the most relevant senses.
Sometimes ‘tasks requiring [X amount of Y]’ are indeed the tasks that matter, and so you get a de facto discontinuous impact from a relatively continuous jump, and that is importantly discontinuous.
It seems highly plausible that automated AI R&D, and recursive self-improvement or rapid capability advancement, will fall into this category, and be sudden for all practical purposes even if it is continuous in some sense. That’s part of the danger.
Consider Eliezer’s metaphor of the ladder where every step you get five times as much gold, but one of the steps kills everyone and you have no idea which one it is. If that ladder is instead technically continuous, and somewhere on the exponential is the threshold (for a practical version, say you are adding fuel to make your car faster, and at some point the engine will explode, but you have no idea when or if you’re anywhere close), does that materially change anything versus step changes?
In this case, was it continuous or discontinuous? Mu is fair, but in particular:
Mythos was an unexpectedly large jump in the underlying ability, because it represents both progress of time plus ability to properly utilize larger size.
This particular move in the underlying ability is an unusually large jump in practical capability, in ways that were not obvious prior to seeing it. It turns out that you get a step change that matters, in terms of what you can find, and even more so in what you can exploit and how you can exploit it.
The question we care about is ‘are we suddenly going to get surprised by what the AIs can do in practice in ways that are super important?’ To which I say: Yes.
UK AISI Tests Claude Mythos On Cybersecurity
The results are in.
For capture the flag, previous models were already over 90% for both Beginner and Advanced tests. Mythos didn’t set new records but these seem saturated.
The Last Ones is the first test that clearly is not saturated. Mythos was the first model to sometimes finish all the steps, which it did 3 times out of 10, and shows a large jump in performance.
There were other tests that showed limitations, such as inability to finish another test called ‘Cooling Tower’ where it got stuck on IT sections.
UK AISI concludes that Mythos can on its own attack systems with weak security postures, essentially on its own. They expect it would struggle against strong defenses. But of course, if you are aiming to attack strong defenses, you wouldn’t default to doing it in fully autonomous fashion from scratch. I do think this suggests a modest reduction in our expectations for the dangers of Mythos.
Everything Reinforces My Existing Predictions And Policy Preferences
There is a lot of that, for all predictions, policies and preferences, even when it is alongside other good notes.
This early reaction from Tyler Cowen (I added spacing) is exactly that sort of mix.
Tyler Cowen (April 8): Here is Dean Ball on Mythos. And now more from Dean. Here is John Loeber. While I am seeing some likely overstatement, probably this is a real turning point nonetheless, and we need to think further about what is best to do.
No b.s. on data center slowdowns and algorithmic discrimination, rather actual thought on how to regulate something that actually will matter.
And be glad we got there first.
Agreed.
I don’t think this is an argument for or against algorithmic discrimination laws, but I believe they were already bad ideas and would in no way address this particular problem. Data center slowdowns definitely will not help with this sort of thing.
What I would caution against, strongly, are arguments like Megan McArdle’s from last time, of the form ‘because it mattered that we got to this dangerous AI capability first, you cannot ever do anything that would have the effect of interfering with or slowing down AI.’
Indeed, Anthropic itself has ‘slowed down AI’ in this situation, and done the closest thing we have had to a pause, by not releasing Mythos widely, and pretty much everyone agrees this was the right thing to do. Consider that we might need more similar capabilities, including more broadly.
But how long will it be before an open source version, even if somewhat inferior, is available? Will OpenAI and Google soon be showing similar capabilities? (And how will that shift the equilibrium?) Should we upgrade our estimates of the returns to investing in compute?
That depends on what counts as similar, especially with the ‘even if somewhat inferior.’ For reasonable values my guess is 1-2 years for open models in terms of absolute capabilities (by then bugs will be a lot harder to find), and on the order of months for OpenAI, and probably a few more months for Google.
How will the willingness of attackers to pay for tokens evolve, relative to the willingness of defenders to pay for tokens? Which are our softest targets?
As a side effect, will this also lead to higher economic concentration, as perhaps only the larger institutions can invest in quality patches rapidly enough?
I think this absolutely will lead to higher economic concentration, as it favors economies of scale across the board.
Asking what are the soft targets, or soft relative to underlying value, is one of the best and most important near term questions. My presumption is that tokens are cheap. Attackers will be happy to pay for tokens if and only if it finds worthwhile exploits that can extract value, including via threats, and can concentrate their fire on the softest parts of the softest targets. Thus defenders in general will have to buy most of the relevant tokens.
A ‘race for the top’ in cybersecurity is not entirely a good thing. It beats the alternative, but if the bad guys are going to hit the house on the block with the worst security, and everyone really doesn’t want to get hit, things can get quite bad, quickly.
How many things will be taken offline altogether? It was the government of Singapore that started moving in that direction in 2016 with their Internet Surfing Separation. Which of the pending hacks and leaks will embarrass you the most?
Agents push strongly towards everything being online, because you want your agent to be able to interact with everything. If something is relatively simple, and follows a simple protocol, it need not be a soft target. So my guess is that more things end up connected rather than less, but some critical things that are complex and are high value targets do want to get taken offline.
And if nothing else, this is proof we are not all going to be jobless, albeit for reasons that are not entirely positive.
There are three ways that occur to me to interpret this.
The first is the idea that some of us will be working in cybersecurity. That will be a growing field for some period of time, but as with other such examples the total employment impact is tiny, and in the medium term the AI very much takes those jobs. The counterexamples tend to prove the rule.
The second is the idea that we will be working to harden other things and to clean up the damage from incidents. This could plausibly employ more people, although in general doing damage destroys more jobs than it creates. The problem is that, like every other form of creating work, it only provides jobs until the AIs take those jobs too. If we were all going to be jobless, this won’t protect us from that, unless it takes down our ability to further develop AI, which presumably was not what Tyler meant.
The third is a general handwave towards a prewritten conclusion. Many such cases.
Solve For The Equilibrium
Tyler Cowen shares a model from Jacob Gloudemans of what might happen, where vulnerabilities become much easier to find quickly, but the big problems actually go away due to the increased velocity of defenses and patching.
Rather than being able to hoard exploits everyone has to use their exploits right away or lose them, and most of the time most important actors don’t especially want to mess with any particular target, so they won’t even look for the exploits.
This model assumes good defense is being played where it counts, and that the supply of exploits is limited, and that when you catch an exploit you can defend against those who have already found it and tried to use it. I don’t think those are safe assumptions.
One also should consider the opposite scenario. Right now, an intelligence agency might find an exploit and sit on it for years, perhaps forever, because even if it normally goes unused its value at the right time is very high. But, if that exploit will not last, then they may try to use it.
Ultimately the equilibrium will still involve cyberattacks, because the correct number of cyberattacks is not zero. It might be correct to price out attacks to the point where everyone involved should have better things to do with their time, but if we collectively actually cause everyone to fully give up and go home then everyone is selfishly overinvesting in defenses, unless there is a modest cost to being fully safe.
Does Not Compute
Ben Thompson is among many noting that even if Mythos was safe to release more broadly, Anthropic is currently compute constrained. There is more demand for Claude than there is supply. Ben’s solution is ‘raise prices,’ which is a great idea but in practice they’re not going to do it, and even at $25/$125 demand for Mythos would presumably overwhelm Anthropic’s servers until their new deals can come online.
I’m not worried about Anthropic’s margins, which I believe are ~40%, even if they have to pay somewhat of a premium for further compute. If the unit economics don’t work then (and only then) I do think they would raise prices.
Ben also notes the issue with potential distillation, which Anthropic gets to avoid.
So yes, there is a decent chance that Mythos stays in limited access for a while, including well after the direct cybersecurity threat has been contained, especially if OpenAI does not force their hand with a similar release.
Conclusion: How To Think About Mythos
Here are the most important things to know right now about Mythos.
Mythos and OpenAI’s Spud show that we now know how to usefully scale LLMs at least one level beyond Opus or GPT-5.4. Making them bigger is worthwhile again, probably on the order of 5x bigger and costing 5x more per token.
Mythos is a trend break to the extent that it reflects both gains over time and also gains from size, but given the ability to use size it is not a surprising result. This caught our government by surprise, and it really, really shouldn’t have, but those involved refused to listen to repeated warnings and pushed a different agenda.
Mythos has hit critical thresholds in terms of identifying bugs and exploits. It can find critical bugs in pretty much anything with minimal help. You could also find a lot of bugs with Opus 4.6 or GPT-5.4 if you wanted to, but not the same level of complexity of bug, and not as consistently.
Mythos is especially better at exploiting weaknesses that it finds, including stringing together multiple vulnerabilities in complex and unexpected ways, with essentially full autonomy. Mythos is a bigger leap for offense than for defense.
Thus, it would indeed have been unsafe to release Mythos more broadly. Anthropic did the only responsible thing in this situation.
In non-coding domains, Mythos is an improvement as you would expect, but does not appear to be tripping any especially scary or critical thresholds. One big other improvement is reliability against prompt injections and in computer use.
For many purposes, especially non-coding purposes, you would only occasionally want to use Mythos, as it costs a lot more and is slower, and Opus-level is fine.
Anthropic appears to be solidly in the lead in terms of model capabilities, and especially without opportunity for distillation gaps are expanding. I don’t expect all but a handful of companies to match Mythos for over a year.
We should expect Mythos to continue to accelerate internal development.
Mythos has the strongest mundane alignment, for practical purposes, of any model so far, but it can also do a lot more damage when things go wrong, and things very much do go wrong. Mythos is legit scary and a lot of the evals don’t work. Mythos largely knows when it is being tested, and can break out of quite a lot of containment systems if it decides to do that, which it sometimes does. There are a bunch of fire alarms in the model card. As capabilities continue to advance, it is very clear that this level of alignment very much won’t cut it.
Things are only going to get faster and weirder and scarier from here.
With sufficiently large scale-up systems, increasing the number of total params will barely influence cost or speed. You might get a 10x bigger model at 1.5x the cost per token, if the number of active params remains unchanged. Currently, the available systems are just barely catching up to the model sizes that pretraining compute is asking for, even if sparsity is kept somewhat low. And so inference deployments for the largest models remain slightly inefficient (more so now than towards the end of 2026), while inference deployments for models that are a bit smaller are becoming efficient (and those “smaller” models are still as large as anything we saw until late 2025).
If Mythos is a 10T total param model, its cost when inferenced on TPUv7 or GB300 NVL72 might be just 2x the cost of Opus 4 (assuming its number of active params is also somewhat higher), even if it has 3x the number of total params. (There’s also Musk claiming that Opus has 5T total params, but even if accurate that might be Opus 5 rather than Opus 4, which might be more appropriate than 3T total params for both GB200 NVL72 and Trainium 3 NL32x2 that’s being built this year, as opposed to Trainium 2 Ultra of last year when Opus 4 needed to start being served.) So when Mythos is inferenced less efficiently on the currently available slightly smaller systems (that are still considerably larger than Nvidia’s 8-chip servers) such as Trainium 2 Ultra or GB200 NVL72, the cost might get higher, maybe 2x higher than it should be on the more appropriate scale-up systems of late 2026.
The current 5x price compared to Opus 4 might thus correctly reflect the unit economics of Mythos (plausibly with some premium even, that is higher margins than Opus 4), when served on slightly suboptimal hardware, which is probably all that either Anthropic or their cloud partners have available in sufficient numbers until late 2026 (the cloud partners might have some GB200 NVL72, but not yet enough GB300 NVL72 to rely on exclusively). As more GB300 NVL72 and Anthropic’s TPUv7 get online, the cost of Mythos tokens might go down to only 2x the cost of Opus 4 tokens, by the end of 2026.
The current compute shortage also means that the presumed 10T total param Mythos scale might be here to stay until 2028-2029 when the Nvidia Kyber rack buildout happens and 30T-70T total param models can be served as efficiently. Though larger models needing fewer tokens in reasoning to reach the same level of quality might legibly enough justify inefficient inference for somewhat larger models, so 20T+ total params before late 2028 might still happen even without disruptive algorithmic improvements. (In any case, TPUv7 and presumably any subsequent TPU systems should be able to serve 20T-30T param models efficiently, and at least Anthropic will have TPUs available at meaningful scale. But their cloud partners plausibly won’t, so that’s some sort of argument against making a flagship model that needs TPUs to keep the prices low.)
Catching up on your posts, just wanted to pop in to say that, at the risk of not realizing you already understand this, I think you are generally missing that the major point of the upcoming model scale-ups IS solely about scaling up the active parameters, which only became feasible once enough NVL72/TPUv7 etc existed internally to RL that many active params at scale. (Big total parameters with small active have existed for a while, since large base training + small active RL is not nearly as dependent on scale-up/world size, as we affectionally borrow Dylan’s terminology). So we can expect Mythos to actually have the ~5x increase in active count that corresponds to the ~5x cost, with the delayed availability of hardware to actually enable public availability matching up nicely with the masterful Glasswing dog & pony show.
Then, I think I’ve commented this to you before, but really I think you just somewhat continually underestimate the volume of newer hardware labs possess and deploy, and then underappreciate the insane gap in usage between the mass-offerings/free models vs paid/flagship variants, and how correspondingly little the ratio of, say, NVL72 Blackwell:NVL8 Hopper has to be in the fleet to enable economic deployment of say, 5T+ (with small active) GPT5-thinking or Opus. (which also ties into your fixation on academically-derived opinions on optimal sparsity, vs the competitive burning rubber on road pragmatism that determines what labs actually push)
Late 2025 compute wants about 1T active params for compute optimal pretraining. At 1T active params, 1M tokens need 2e18 FLOPs, and a 5e15 FP8 FLOP/s Blackwell chip at 60% utilization produces that in 0.19 hours. At $3.5 per hour ($12bn per year for 400K chips), this costs $0.65, which maybe becomes a price of $2.6 after a 50% margin and another 2x factor for various performance-optimizing tradeoffs (as opposed to batch processing). That’s nowhere near the $25 per million input tokens Anthropic is citing for Mythos, they are not serving a 10T active param model.
Total params don’t matter for prefill/input. On the other hand, RLVR is constrained by decode/output, which doesn’t care about the active param counts. So 2025 models were constrained by RLVR and thus total params, and used as many active params as made sense given the number of total params and possibly available inference compute, since in practice the number of active params would be less than a compute optimal number of them.
With large scale-up systems, the constraint on total params that was made important by RLVR is significantly lifted, and with it the number of active params can get closer to what it wants to be, leaving some sparsity. So while I agree the number of active params is going up with the large scale-up systems, I think it’s driven by the increase in the number of total params these systems make practical, allowing the active param counts to finally catch up to compute optimal values at late 2025 compute levels.
You need some hardware for RLVR in any case, which in 2026 is probably a pretraining scale amount. If RLVR is happening before there’s enough of the newest hardware to do it there, training less efficiently means you get less training done. Opus 4.5 had Trainium 2 Ultra available, but probably not yet in early 2025 in sufficient numbers, thus Opus 4.0 wasn’t good, and the price was absurd. But by late 2025 Opus 4.5 was trained and there was also enough Trainium 2 Ultra to serve it at a reasonable price. In this case, my claims about the need to get enough inference hardware for frontier models amount to saying that it’s the reason you couldn’t have Opus 4.5 in early 2025.
I suspect OpenAI didn’t have GB200 NVL72 running in meaningful amounts as early, not in time for the GPT-5 release (or for RLVR in preparation for the release), and training efficiently on B200s would ask for either fewer total params, or weird tradeoffs (which might involve incongruously small active param counts I guess, to reduce activation vector communications in cross-node expert parallelism).