Your view here sounds a bit like preference presentism:
For instance, if I choose to bring one more person into the world, by having a child (which, incidentally, we just did!), that decision is primarily about what kind of life I want to have, and what commitments I am willing to make, rather than about whether I think the world, in the abstract, is better or not with one more person in it.
Compare:
Apart from comparativists, we have presentists who draw a distinction between presently existing people and non-existing people (Narveson 1973; Heyd 1988); necessitarians who distinguish between people who exist or will exist irrespective of how we act and people whose existence is contingent on our choices (Singer 1993); and actualists who differentiate between people that have existed, exist or who are going to exist in the actual world, on the one hand, and people who haven’t, don’t, and won’t exist, on the other [...]
You would be in good company. Scott Alexander sympathizes with presentism as well, and according to the latter source also Peter Singer (though not according to the SEP quote above). Eliezer Yudkowsky also flirts with it.
Your view here sounds a bit like preference presentism:
Compare:
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/repugnant-conclusion/#:~:text=apart from,on the other
You would be in good company. Scott Alexander sympathizes with presentism as well, and according to the latter source also Peter Singer (though not according to the SEP quote above). Eliezer Yudkowsky also flirts with it.