Because I’ve seen the Sun rise on thousands of previous days.
Ah… but why do I believe the future will be like the past?
Even if I go past the mere surface observation of the Sun rising, to the apparently universal and exceptionless laws of gravitation and nuclear physics, then I am still left with the question: “Why do I believe this will also be true tomorrow?”
The Problem of Induction, first published by David Hume in 1739, is potentially a longstanding crack in the foundations of science. From LessWrong’s tag:Induction page:
Modern views of induction state that any form of reasoning where the conclusion isn’t necessarily entailed in the premises is a form of inductive reasoning [...] “The sun has always risen, so it will also rise tomorrow”. [...] Contrary to deduction, induction can be wrong since the conclusions depend on the way the world actually is, not merely on the logical structure of the argument.
There has historically been a problem with the justification of the validity of induction. Hume argued that the justification for induction could either be a deduction or an induction. Since deductive reasoning only results in necessary conclusions and inductions can fail, the justification for inductive reasoning could not be deductive. But any inductive justification would be circular.
Where Recursive Justification Hits Bottom, Eliezer Yudkowsky
Dissolving the Problem of Induction, Liron
One of these maybe?
Not what I meant. You’re talking about the problem of induction. I’m talking about arguing yourself into believing falsehoods.