Not following what you think I’m misunderstanding or what this has to do with the things I say. I grant, of course, that the average returns are higher if you’re disposed to one-box in transparent Newcomb. So if you’re just looking at timelessly beneficial dispositions, those are the same across transparent and opaque Newcomb. But the entire dispute is about whether those perfectly match up with rational choice.
But the entire dispute is about whether those perfectly match up with rational choice.
It is a rational choice between what and what? Between honestly two-boxing, honestly one-boxing and fooling the Predictor into believing that you’ll one-box, then two-boxing? The problem’s point is that the Predictor isn’t THAT stupid
For what you should do in the problem. No one thinks you’ll fool the predictor. What we think is that it is irrational to take some action if, at the time you take it, you know it will simply result in you having less money than if you took a different action. We’re not under the illusion that such people on average leave with more money or that you should precommit to two-boxing or any such things.
it is irrational to take some action if, at the time you take it, you know it will simply result in you having less money than if you took a different action
I lean towards thinking you shouldn’t pay, but I’m somewhat uncertain about that. I lean causal, but am sympathetic both to EDT and some third undiscovered theory.
Not following what you think I’m misunderstanding or what this has to do with the things I say. I grant, of course, that the average returns are higher if you’re disposed to one-box in transparent Newcomb. So if you’re just looking at timelessly beneficial dispositions, those are the same across transparent and opaque Newcomb. But the entire dispute is about whether those perfectly match up with rational choice.
(Let me know if I got your point right).
It is a rational choice between what and what? Between honestly two-boxing, honestly one-boxing and fooling the Predictor into believing that you’ll one-box, then two-boxing? The problem’s point is that the Predictor isn’t THAT stupid
For what you should do in the problem. No one thinks you’ll fool the predictor. What we think is that it is irrational to take some action if, at the time you take it, you know it will simply result in you having less money than if you took a different action. We’re not under the illusion that such people on average leave with more money or that you should precommit to two-boxing or any such things.
Suppose, alternatively, that you and another person (or even an optimizer for entirely different values) are both given a chance to pay $1 so that the counterpart received $2. Does it become rational to pay or not to pay?
I lean towards thinking you shouldn’t pay, but I’m somewhat uncertain about that. I lean causal, but am sympathetic both to EDT and some third undiscovered theory.