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Utility

TagLast edit: 17 Dec 2015 0:59 UTC by alexei

In the context of value alignment theory, ‘Utility’ always refers to a goal held by an artificial agent. It further implies that the agent is a consequentialist; that the agent has probabilistic beliefs about the consequences of its actions; that the agent has a quantitative notion of “how much better” one outcome is than another and the relative size of different intervals of betterness; and that the agent can therefore, e.g., trade off large probabilities of a small utility gain against small probabilities of a large utility loss.

True coherence in the sense of a von-Neumann Morgenstern utility function may be out of reach for bounded agents, but the term ‘utility’ may also be used for the bounded analogues of such decision-making, provided that quantitative relative intervals of preferability are being combined with quantitative degrees of belief to yield decisions.

Utility is explicitly not assumed to be normative. E.g., if speaking of a paperclip maximizer, we will say that an outcome has higher utility iff it contains more paperclips.

Humans should not be said (without further justification) to have utilities over complicated outcomes. On the mainstream view from psychology, humans are inconsistent enough that it would take additional assumptions to translate our psychology into a coherent utility function. E.g., we may differently value the interval between two outcomes depending on whether the interval is framed as a ‘gain’ or a ‘loss’. For the things humans do or should want, see the special use of the word ‘value’. For a general disambiguation page on words used to talk about human and AI wants, see Linguistic conventions in value alignment.

On some construals of value, e.g. reflective equilibrium, this construal may imply that the true values form a coherent utility function. Nonetheless, by convention, we will not speak of value as a utility unless it has been spelled out that, e.g., the value in question has been assumed to be a reflective equilibrium.

Multiple agents with different utility functions should not be said (without further exposition) to have a collective utility function over outcomes, since at present, there is no accepted [ canonical way to aggregate utility functions

link loudness problem
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Pin­point­ing Utility

[deleted]1 Feb 2013 3:58 UTC
94 points
156 comments13 min readLW link

Se­quence overview: Welfare and moral weights

MichaelStJules15 Aug 2024 4:22 UTC
7 points
0 comments1 min readLW link

In­creas­ingly vague in­ter­per­sonal welfare comparisons

MichaelStJules1 Feb 2024 6:45 UTC
5 points
0 comments2 min readLW link

Solu­tion to the two en­velopes prob­lem for moral weights

MichaelStJules19 Feb 2024 0:15 UTC
9 points
1 comment27 min readLW link

Types of sub­jec­tive welfare

MichaelStJules2 Feb 2024 9:56 UTC
10 points
3 comments18 min readLW link

Utility is not the se­lec­tion target

tailcalled4 Nov 2023 22:48 UTC
24 points
1 comment1 min readLW link

Gra­da­tions of moral weight

MichaelStJules29 Feb 2024 23:08 UTC
1 point
0 comments10 min readLW link
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