I really like this framing of the market as a subsidization!
To your confusion, both outcomes are indeed subsidized—the observed asymmetry comes from the fact that the theft outcome is subsidized more than the non-theft outcome. This is due to the fact that the return on the “rack stolen” credit is a 100x profit whereas the “rack not stolen” credit is only a 1.01x profit.
If instead the “not stolen” credit cost $0.01 with a similar credit supply you would expect to see people buying “not stolen” credits and then not just deciding not to steal the rack but instead proactively preventing it from being stolen by actually bolting it down, or hiring a security guard to watch it, etc. Different cost ratios and fluctuating supply could even lead to issues where one party is trying to steal the rack on the same day that another party is trying to defend it.
Sidenote (very minor spoilers): this reminds me of a gamble in the classic manga Usogui, in which the main character bets that a plane will fly overhead in the next hour. He makes this bet having pre-arranged many flights at this time, and is thus very much expecting to win. However, his opponent, who has access to more resources and a large interest in not losing the bet, is able to prevent this from occurring. Don’t underestimate your opponent, I guess.