The current internet censorship is unproblematic. The proposed internet filter would have been problematic, but the legislation is dead in the water.
We have some fairly arbitrary socially conservative “nanny state” policies. None of them get in the way a great deal, but they do stick in the craw a little.
The political climate in Australia is intensely pragmatic. Voters are stone cold to principle—they think almost exclusively about the effects legislation will have on their lives. This means that people will support a policy that they think means their children won’t be able to view porn on the internet, as they perceive this as a problem. On the other hand, it makes it very difficult for astro-turf organisations to convince people to vote against their interests. That’s why we have a decent minimum wage, single payer health care, etc.
You’re starting one premise back from where the post is jumping off from.
The post assumes as a premise that we have some goals, and there’s an empirical question about what cognitive strategies will best achieve those goals.
One strategy is to use our intuitions. We have some built in software for doing quasi-Bayesian analysis, and our heuristics perform to an acceptable standard in many contexts.
The other strategy is to use more formal analysis. The post argues for this second strategy, pointing out predictable failure points for our intuition heuristics.
Which one maximises your chances of achieving your goals is an empirical question. It’s possible that as bad as our heuristics are, we’re just incapable of the metacognition to do it formally. Maybe all we end up doing is giving ourselves tools for rationalisation. Most of the people in this community don’t believe that, but it’s not a philosophical question.
You go one premise back, to the point where we’re choosing a strategy. Sure, you can reject rationality altogether. Then it doesn’t make sense to talk about deciding on a cognitive strategy. But if you accept as axiomatic that you have some goals, and you want to figure out how to further them, then we arrive at this interesting empirical question: what’s the most effective methodology for human decision making? It’s not a contradiction to say “I’m going to rationally decide that the best strategy is not to engage in this kind of metacognition, as all it does is lead me astray”.