It stands to argue however that the belief in an undetectable monster or a celestial teapot on the one hand does not add to an individual’s fitness while the belief in Christianity, Islam or the Jewish faith on the other hand does. Religions increase an individual’s fitness by allowing for the development of groups larger then what can be evolutionary stable by sheer face to face monitoring by creating internalized restraints in their followers and thereby increasing the likelihood of sticking to a shared moral code.
Stefan:
It seems to me that you are saying:
P1) large, stable groups are good (presumably because they minimize total violence?)
P2) a large stable group can be formed if the members share internalized restraints
P3) one method of creating internalize restraints is religion
C) therefore, religion must be good.
So, consider that this chain also allows for substitutions, which would not have the same conclusion:
P1) small, stable groups are good (maybe because they tend to be formed along familiar structures, and thus maximize commitment between group members?)
P2) a large stable group can be formed if the members share explicit restraints, and P3) government based on a social contract enables the members to share explicit restraints
P3) one method of creating internalized restraints is a shared belief in the value of the scientific method
All of the conclusions have many effects, and not all of these effects are positive. Religion can easily devolve into fundamentalism; small groups tend to fight between themselves; governments can oppress people; a belief in the scientific method can prevent the imagination of non-physical concepts; etc. It could be argued that these negative side-effects are not all equally negative, and that the argument which leads to the least-negative side-effect should be the one that is accepted.
But to summarize, whenever we argue for some condition on the basis of evolutionary fitness, we need to consider two things:
1) Most evolutionary fitness arguments do not exclusively mandate the condition which is being argued.
2) A condition is not necessarily desirable simply because it increases evolutionary fitness. The contexts in which that condition tends to occur must also be considered.
Best, rela
I don’t know if you’re still looking for this, and if this would be an appropriate place to post links. But:
Primary Evidence:
temperatures increase over the last 2000 years as estimated by tree ring, marine/lake/cave proxy, ice isotopes, glacier length/mass, and borehole data. figures S-1, O-4, 2-3, 2-5, 5-3, 6-3, 7-1, 10-4, and 11-2 are probably the most useful to you. Surface Temperature Reconstructions for the Last 2,000 Years. Committee on Surface Temperature Reconstructions for the Last 2,000 Years, National Research Council ISBN: 0-309-66144-7, 160 pages, 7 x 10, (2006)
anomalies in combined land-surface air and sea-surface water temperature increase significantly 1880-2009. Global-mean monthly, seasonal, and annual means, 1880-present, updated through most recent month. NASA Goddard. [GISS Surface Temperature Analysis][http://data.giss.nasa.gov/gistemp/)
Other Supporting evidence:
earlier flowering times in recent 25 years, with data taken over the past 250 years. Amano, et. al [A 250-year index of first flowering dates and its response to temperature changes] (http://rspb.royalsocietypublishing.org/content/277/1693/2451.full). Proc. R. Soc. B 22 August 2010 vol. 277 no. 1693 2451-2457
Contradicting evidence:
extremes of monthly average temperatures in Central England do not appear to match either a “high extremes after 1780s/1850s only” or “low extremes before 1780s/1850s only” hypothesis. Manley. [Central England temperatures: Monthly means 1659 to 1973] (http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/qj.49710042511/abstract). Quarterly Journal of the Royal Meteorological Society. Volume 100, Issue 425, pages 389–405, July 1974
Hope that’s helpful.