I think I’ve found the source of our disagreement encapsulated in something you just said:
”The overt appearance of any statement is one of being told the truth”
I counter that the overt appearance of any statement depends on common context.
Your statement only holds insofar as you ignore (or deny the legitimacy of) the role of context and non-verbal communication in determining the overt meaning of a statement. To start with an easy example, a sentence said in an exaggerately sarcastic tone has the overt appearance of being untrue; if sarcasm is a commonly understood device, then I think it should count as “part of the language”, as a legitimate operator over a sentence that overtly inverts its meaning just as the word “not” operates over a predicate to explicitly invert it.
If you can accept that sarcasm is a legitimate lingusitic device, now consider that sarcasm can also be clearly and unambiguously conveyed without the use of non-verbal tone at all, for example by using a phrase in a context that forces a sarcastic interpretation of said phrase, e.g. Person 1: “Do you think you have a good chance at being promoted to treasurer?” Person 2: “Considering the top requirements are trustworthiness and integrity, I expect my dense criminal record makes me a top candidate”.
If you wouldn’t deny that the latter sentence is overtly jestful, then please take some time to also consider how many different silent operators, of which sarcasm is but one, can be overtly conveyed only through something like a mutual understanding of context and its proper use.
On the other hand, if you would deny that it is overtly jestful, then I have the impression you’re operating under the notion that grammar is supreme in determining the overt meaning of a statement (but I’d venture that you even interpret the word “statement” as an inexorably grammatical concept). I think that’s a wishful oversimplification, but not one that holds when we consider what language really is, de facto and fundamentally: not a system of dictionary words, but of signs; and to qualify as a sign, a behavior need not be verbal, just mutually understood.
I have not heard about Carlson’s and Maddow’s cases. But in principle, I would agree with their defences insofar as their audiences did in fact understand the proper extent to which the reporters were being unserious—that’s all good faith requires to me. If, on the other hand, some people in the audience did take the reporters’ comments seriously enough to count as defamation, well then that throws into question whether the reporters’ signs of “not being serious” were commonly enough understood by the target audience, and therefore whether it really was just “good-faith entertainment” after all. But in any case, the (or at least a) real determiner of overt meaning remains that which is commonly understood, not just that which a grammatical parser understands.
But why does “having to explain it more” make it less likely? It seems like your argument would only appeal to an intuition which has already accepted and internalized the very simplicity bias which Solomonoff induction is trying to justify.