Sounds awesome! A meatspace group would be great, I’m sure. One of my issues with self-study is having nobody to go to when I have questions or don’t understand something. Having an empirical goal can also tell you if you’ve succeeded or failed in your attempt to learn the art.
Noah Topper
Karma: 201
Well, I tend to throw them onto my general to-read list, so I’m not entirely sure. A few I remember are Godel, Escher, Bach, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, Influence: Science and Practice, The End of Time, QED: The Strange Theory of Light and Matter, The Feynman Lectures, Surely You’re Joking Mr. Feynman, Probability Theory: The Logic of Science, Probabilistic Inference in Intelligent Systems, and Player of Games. There’s a longer list here, but it’s marked as outdated.
I don’t have a wonderful example of this insta-feedback (which definitely sounds ideal for learning), but I’ve gotten annoyed lately with any math book that doesn’t have exercises. Some of the books on MIRI’s Research Guide list are like this, and it really boggles my mind how anyone could learn math from a book when they don’t have anything to practice with. So I’m getting more selective.
Even some books with exercises are super hard, and really don’t have any kind of walkthrough process. AI: A Modern Approach is a critically-acclaimed textbook, but has little to no build up in the difficulty of its exercises, and little to help you if you get lost. Right now I’m reading How to Prove It, which is *super* good. The whole book is one big walkthrough on mathematical proof, down to how to organize your scratch work. It has tons of exercises with varying difficulty, with some answers and hints. It’s much better feedback, and is helping me a lot more, although the material is comparatively simple.
I think you need to fix the days listed on the application form, they say August 17th − 20th.
I’d like to note that Texas is passing strong restrictions on abortion. They’ve passed a “heartbeat bill” banning abortions after six weeks, and it seems likely that they’ll pass a trigger bill outlawing abortion almost entirely, contingent on the Supreme Court overturning Roe v Wade.
I’m not a Supreme Court expert, but I know people who are sincerely worried about Roe v Wade being undone. This would be a pretty big deal breaker for my fiancée (and by extension myself). From what I read, the Supreme Court will make a Roe v Wade ruling in the middle of 2022.
Does this factor into your considerations? I feel like this would be a pretty big deal for the rationalist community at large.
From what I understand, it’s difficult enough to get an abortion as it is. Clinics are rather rare, insurance doesn’t always cover it, there may be mandatory waiting periods and counseling, etc. I don’t think it would be impossible to still get one, but the added inconvenience is not trivial. At minimum, a big increase in travel time and probable insurance complications. But if someone here knows more than me, I’d very much like to hear it.
Orlando, FL – ACX Meetups Everywhere 2021
Hey all, organizer here. I don’t know if you’ll automatically get notified of this message, but I don’t have emails for everyone. I just wanted to give some parking info. You can get a daily parking pass here: https://parking.ucf.edu/permits/visitor-permits/. You can get a virtual pass and they’ll check by plate. It’s $3. I’d recommend parking in Garage A or I. Hope to see everyone there!
I think I might actually be happy to take e.g. the Bellman equation, a fundamental equation in RL, as a basic expression of consistent utilities and thereby claim value iteration, Q-learning, and deep Q-learning all as predictions/applications of utility theory. Certainly this seems fair if you claim applications of the central limit theorem for probability theory.
To expand a bit, the Bellman equation only expresses a certain consistency condition among utilities. The expected utility of this state must equal its immediate utility plus the best expected utility among each possible next state I may choose. Start with some random utilities assigned to states, gradually update them to be consistent, and you get optimal behavior. Huge parts of RL are centered around this equation, including e.g. DeepMind using DQNs to crack Atari games.
I understand Eliezer’s frustration in answering this question. The response to “What predictions/applications does utility theory have?” in regards to intelligent behavior is, essentially, “Everything and nothing.”
ACX/LW Meetup
Eliezer, do you have any advice for someone wanting to enter this research space at (from your perspective) the eleventh hour? I’ve just finished a BS in math and am starting a PhD in CS, but I still don’t feel like I have the technical skills to grapple with these issues, and probably won’t for a few years. What are the most plausible routes for someone like me to make a difference in alignment, if any?
What do you think about ironically hiring Terry Tao?
I’m curious about what continued role you do expect yourself to have. I think you could still have a lot of value in helping train up new researchers at MIRI. I’ve read you saying you’ve developed a lot of sophisticated ideas about cognition that are hard to communicate, but I imagine could be transmitted easier within MIRI. If we need a continuing group of sane people to be on the lookout for positive miracles, would you still take a relatively active role in passing on your wisdom to new MIRI researchers? I would genuinely imagine that being in more direct mind-to-mind contact with you would be useful, so I hope you don’t become a hermit.
Hm, I worry I might be a confused LWer. I definitely agree that “having a utility function” and “being a utilitarian” are not identical concepts, but they’re highly related, no? Would you agree that, to a first-approximation, being a utilitarian means having a utility function with the evolutionary godshatter as terminal values? Even this is not identical to the original philosophical meaning I suppose, but it seems highly similar, and it is what I thought people around here meant.
I meant to convey a utility function with certain human values as terminal values, such as pleasure, freedom, beauty, etc.; godshatter was a stand-in.
If the idea of a utility function has literally nothing to do with moral utilitarianism, even around here, I would question why in the above when Eliezer is discussing moral questions he references expected utility calculations? I would also point to “intuitions behind utilitarianism“ as pointing at connections between the two? Or “shut up and multiply”? Need I go on?
I know classical utilitarianism is not exactly the same, but even in what you linked, it talks about maximizing the total sum of human happiness and sacrificing some goods for others, measured under a single metric “utility”. That sounds an awful lot like a utility function trading off human terminal values? I don’t see how what I’m pointing at isn’t just a straightforward idealization of classical utilitarianism.
None of what you have linked so far has particularly conveyed any new information to me, so I think I just flatly disagree with you. As that link says, the “utility” in utilitarianism just means some metric or metrics of “good”. People disagree about what exactly should go into “good” here, but godshatter refers to all the terminal values humans have, so that seems like a perfectly fine candidate for what the “utility” in utilitarianism ought to be. The classic “higher pleasures” in utilitarianism lends credence toward this fitting into the classical framework; it is not a new idea that utilitarianism can include multiple terminal values with relative weighting.
Under utilitarianism, we are then supposed to maximize this utility. That is, maximize the satisfaction of the various terminal goals we are taking as good, aggregated into a single metric. And separately, there happens to be this elegant idea called “utility theory”, which tells us that if you have various preferences you are trying to maximize, there is a uniquely rational way to do that, which involves giving them relative weights and aggregating into a single metric… You seriously think there’s no connection here? I honestly thought all this was obvious.
In that last link, they say “Now, it is sometimes claimed that one may use decision-theoretic utility as one possible implementation of the utilitarian’s ‘utility’” then go on to say why this is wrong, but I don’t find it to be a knockdown argument; that is basically what I believe and I think I stand by it. Like, if you plug “aggregate human well-being along all relevant dimensions” into the utility of utility theory, I don’t see how you don’t get exactly utilitarianism out of that, or at least one version of it?
EDIT: Please also see in the above post under “You should never try to reason using expected utilities again. It is an art not meant for you. Stick to intuitive feelings henceforth.” It seems to me that Eliezer goes on to consistently use the “expected utilities” of utility theory to be synonymous to the “utilities” of utilitarianism and the “consequences” of consequentialism. Do you agree that he’s doing this? If so, I assume you think he’s wrong for doing it? Eliezer tends to call himself a utilitarian. Do you agree that he is one, or is he something else? What would you call “using expected utility theory to make moral decisions, taking the terminal value to be human well-being”?
I said nothing about an arbitrary utility function (nor proof for that matter). I was saying that applying utility theory to a specific set of terminal values seems to basically get you an idealized version of utilitarianism, which is what I thought the standard moral theory was around here.
But even in the case of still being in school, one would require the background of having proved non-trivial original theorems? All this sounds exactly like the research agenda I’m interested in. I have a BS in math and am working on an MS in computer science. I have a good math background, but not at that level yet. Should I consider applying or no?
Cool, makes sense. I was planning on making various inquiries along these lines starting in a few weeks, so I may reach out to you then. Would there be a best way to do that?
I definitely agree that there’s a bigger issue, but I think this could be a good small-scale test. Can we apply or own individual rationality to pick up skills relevant to us and distinguish between good and bad practices? Are we able to coordinate as a community to distinguish between good and bad science? Rationality should in theory be able to work on big problems, but we’re never going to be able to craft the perfect art without being able to test it on smaller problems first and hone the skill.
So yeah. I think a guide putting together good resources and also including practical advice in the posts and comments could be useful. Something like this could be the start of answering Eliezer’s questions “how do we test which schools of rationality work” and “how do we fight akrasia”. That second question might be easier once we’ve seen the skills work in practice. Maybe I should make a guide first to get the ball rolling, but I’m not sure I know a topic in-depth enough to craft one just yet.