Daniel Griffin on This Week in Virology isn’t yet convinced that Omicron is less virulent than Delta.
Nanda Ale
Vaccines do good work even shortly after being infected (paper).
Could this same effect also apply to boosters? If you test positive but are yet to be symptomatic, but you are in a high risk group and expect to be, then could getting an immediate booster be beneficial? What’s the intuition here for how this works? Maybe something like, it would normally take a few days for your immune system to kick into high gear, but the vaccine gets it going within 24 hours?
I really can’t understand Putin’s action here. The sanctions will actually cause of a lot of pain to the oligarchs, and so to Putin’s patronage networks, the cash control systems. These could have targetted by sanctions before but Putin always stayed just under the line.
But now, isn’t Putin trading away all of it? Or at least gambling everything? I actually feel like this invasino puts a timer on Putin’s Russia. It doesn’t make any sense.
The only expalanation I can come up with a terminal cancer diagnosis or something, so Putin just doesn’t care about Russia more than a few years in the future.
Russian troops on CNN 15 miles outside of Kyiv.
https://twitter.com/iamsuffian/status/1496852857525465096
One major point I think is under-discussed is what this means for nuclear proliferation.
Interesting analysis from a Twitter thread. You may want to view the original, as I am only quoting the text and many of the Tweets use an external link for more context:
https://twitter.com/ProfTalmadge/status/1496837475901362180
Haven’t tweet much on Ukraine crisis for multiple reasons. But developments in the last 24 hours are heartbreaking and a preview of great brutality I fear is coming. A few observations here on the nuclear & conventional dimensions.
Putin’s pointed, not-veiled nuclear threats are really remarkable, signaling a willingness to turn to the country’s arsenal if the West interferes with the Russian invasion of Ukraine.
This is about the clearest evidence I have ever seen for the Stability-Instability Paradox: the notion that mutual vulnerability (“MAD”) at the strategic nuclear level can actually make conflict more likely at lower rungs of the escalation ladder.
Deterrence theorists associated with the Nuclear Revolution often dismiss this idea, arguing that nuclear stalemate means both sides will avoid crises and conflicts out of the fear they could escalate. The result should be peace, stability, and less military competition.
Yet Putin’s behavior suggests that revisionist actors are not so inhibited and may instead use their strategic nuclear forces as a shield behind which they can pursue conventional aggression, knowing their nuclear threats may deter outside intervention.
Now of course, Ukraine is not a member of NATO, nor a U.S. treaty ally. But then neither is Taiwan. So if you think nuclear stalemate is going to keep the peace in the Strait, you would need to do some hard thinking about why it hasn’t kept the peace in Eastern Europe.
China, in fact, is developing the same types of forces that Putin references in his remarks: not only a survivable second-strike capability, but also theater nuclear forces suited for limited strikes for coercive escalation. Not a coincidence.
More broadly, as a student of military operations and foreign policy, it’s hard for me to see the Russian end game here either operationally or strategically, for reasons @jeffaedmonds and @KofmanMichael and others have identified.
Yes, at a tactical level Russia can steamroll Ukrainian regular forces, though I expect Ukraine can make this more costly than Russia has anticipated. Urban warfare is unkind to invaders, even strong ones. 8/ https://publications.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/1595.pdf
But beyond that, what is military endgame? Regime change and then puppet government? Difficulties of indefinitely occupying a nation of 41 million should be apparent after Soviet experiences with Warsaw Pact & Afghanistan, among others @dmedelstein
Russian invasion likely to provoke higher European defense spending, tighter NATO, deployment of NATO forces east, hostility with West. Ukraine was not headed for NATO membership any time soon, so a destabilizing invasion wasn’t necessary to forestall that perceived danger. 10/
At the strategic level, Russian invasion gives off big Schlieffen Plan energy. It is like committing suicide for fear of death, bringing about the very problems it is supposed to solve, and generating new ones like risks of inadvertent escalation. 11⁄11
Definitately scrub your phone before you leave. Not sure what’s best though—a full reset might look suspicious? My friend who managed to get out said the guard took their phone for almost an hour. They cleared web history and messages and weren’t stopped. $3000 ticket price though!
Ukraine’s offer was for surrender and amnesty, not defection, and I think the word choice makes a difference. I would not be surprised if Russia punishes friends and family for defections. I think there’s also an escalation risk of EU offers it. But overall worth considering.
Unnecessarily risky. Drones and portable AA can accomplish the same goals. In fact, portable AA may be preferable. Much easier for Russia to knock out Ukraine’s ability to keep jets in the air than it is for them to knock MPAA and drones.
It means the people flying the planes are ‘private citizens’—probably retired ex-military and acting as private citizen volunteers, technically, but organized through unofficial channels and with support. If there were truly no other options I might consider it but I think there are less escalatory and still effective ways to help.
My understanding is that the purpose of sanctions are:
Diminish the capability of the Russian economy to sustain a military invasion.
As a bargaining chip. The releasing of sanctions can be traded for a withdrawal, creating an incentive to end the invasion.
There are people (especially online commenters) who think it will change the entire government of Russia, but that’s not a concrete outcome like the main effects.
What other options are there in terms of nonmilitary responses to a military actions?
I already donated. I have a lot of family in Poland and everyone is scared right now.
I’m fairly new to this site. Your post really jumped at me for the quality of the prose, really on another level. I’d love to see this in a short story collection. Very Ted Chiang, in all the right ways.
The Wagner group specifically isn’t really a mercenary, like a neutral force anyone can hire. It’s built and maintained by the Russian government. (It’s not like Ukraine could have outbid Russia and the Wagner group would have come in to defend against Russia instead.)
Ukraine has offered a million dollars for every Russian pilot who defects with a jet, or $500k for a helicopter. Pretty interesting strategy though I have no idea how the pilots are supposed to make that happen without getting shot down.
The Sinovac vaccine isn’t as effective as the mRNA vaccines, but it’s not bad. It’s quite effective against severe illness and death, isn’t it? At least compared to the pre-vaccinated pandemic.
What do you think of these theories?
3 theses on the Russian-Ukrainian war:
1. Putin’s decision to start the war on Ukraine isn’t foreign policy. It’s domestic one. Putin first consolidated his power through the war in 1999-2000 and it worked. So he repeated this trick every time his popularity started waning🧵
Putin was confirmed as the Prime Minister on 16 August 1999. By that point Yeltsin chose him as a successor and Putin controlled intelligence. But he still had to stand on elections—and he was unknown. His rate of approval was between 3-4% because ppl didn’t recognise his face
Just two weeks later apartment bombings started. Since September 4, a number of residential houses in Moscow, Volgodonsk, Buinaksk were blown up. More than 300 people died, 1700 were wounded. Putin accused Chechen terrorists in these attacks and invaded the separatist region
He won. In the course of the war he built his
as a tough victorious military leader. And Russian public opinion likes victorious military leaders. By the end of the year with the Chechen resistance largely crushed, he became very electable. That’s how he became a President
Of course, the entire story with so timely blown up houses looked kinda shady. There were certain suspicions regarding who really organised these attacks, especially in the context of the Ryazan case
With all these explosions, the country became vigilant. On September 22 Alexey Kartofelnikov living on Novoselov 14⁄16 in Ryazan noticed a strange white car parked near their residential building. Its passengers took several bags and brought them into the basement of the house
After the strangers left, locals called the police. Police came and found several large bags from sugar—with a detonator. People were evacuated and the police expertise showed that the bags contain hexagon. Next day it became the national news—the media were still free
Prime Minister Putin congratulated them with preventing a terrorist attack. The same night police (police is MVD—different from FSB) arrested two suspects. To their surprise they showed the FSB IDs. Ofc Moscow HQ of FSB called the police and ordered to release their agents
Next day Putin gave a different version. Now he said that those were simply the trainings, the manoeuvres. The FSB was learning how to prevent terror attacks and these bags contained regular sugar. The detonators were fake
It all sounded shady. But the military planes were already raising Grozny to the ground. Successful invasion that followed changed the electoral balance completely. In August 1999 2% voters would vote for Putin, in 2000 − 53% did. Russian people love victorious wars
So, it worked. And that’s how the institutional inertia dynamics commence. Whatever worked out in the past, will likely work out again. So why bother with making up new ideas if older ones are completely reliable? And indeed, reliable they were
In 2010s Putin was clearly losing popularity. Fraud on the parliamentary elections of 2011 triggered the largest street protests since Putin came to power. That was a bad marker. Economy was rising, quality of life improving. And many were still angry
But streets protests could be ascribed to a politicised minority, whereas silent majority supported him. That’s why he confidently came to a boxing championate to give a speech, with the federal TV broadcasting it in real time. And he was booed with millions people watching
That was a heavy blow. He came to power as a victorious military leader. But now, 11 years later, ppl didn’t recognise him as such. They saw him as a pathetic gerontocrat with too much botox fillings. He became a joke. So he had to take urgent action to be treated seriously again
His popularity falling, he had to restore his
as a serious leader. How? Well, by winning wars. Again, he initially built his legitimacy through a military victory, so why not do it again? Thus Russia engages into wars: Syria, Ukraine, Africa. Domestic policy by other means
So the real audience of this play are neither Ukrainians, nor Westerners. It’s Russians. Of course many won’t wholeheartedly support the war. But it will make them take Putin seriously. And for Putin it’s much better to be regarded as bloody and merciless, rather than ridiculous
2. Many in the West exaggerate how robust the Putin’s regime is. It’s not only dependent on Western technologies and imports, it also can’t decrease its dependence without a renegotiation of power balance. Which means it exists only as long as the West doesn’t take action
Infrastructure-wise there is one thing it’s doing well—building and maintaining communications for exporting raw materials. Railways, pipelines, seaports
And yet, sanctions obstruct development of new oil or gas deposits. There are new deposits introduced, but they don’t compensate the depletion. Theoretically Russia has huge deposits, but they’re primarily on Arctic shelf and Russia lacks the technology to extract them alone
Russia is not the USSR. The USSR was a theocracy legitimised through technological progress, which valued scientists and engineers highly. Modern Russia doesn’t. Consider salaries which state corporation offers to aerospace engineers—kinda 150 usd/month
That’s important to keep in mind. Unlike USSR, Russia doesn’t value people who produce stuff. It’s not prestigious, it doesn’t pay. So whoever can leave to the IT and work for international market directly, will do it. There’s huge negative selection in production of hardware
Which means that Russian industry, including military, is highly dependent upon Western technologies and equipment. Precision manufacturing is done on German, Swiss, Italian machines. Production of literally anything complicated continues only as long as it is allowed to continue
3. What will be the result of this war? That largely depends on Western, primarily American reaction. If Putin manages to win a small victorious war again and get away with that, it will not only increase his authority but trigger tons of terrirotiral conflicts all over the world
Let’s be honest, in most countries there’re groups who believe that their neighbours occupy a piece of our sacred land illegitimately. That’s very typical feeling and usually it’s mutual. The only reason why wars over the land don’t happen more frequently is the fear of reprisals
If this invasion succeeds and Putin gets away with it, this will trigger a chain of imitators waging their small victorious wars all over the world. More powerful powers than Russia will certainly do, less powerful ones will try their chance, too. That will be a very bloody era
Paradoxically enough, even the military defeat of Russia is not necessary to prevent that scenario. Simply Putin losing his power would be enough as a warning. And counterintuitively, that would likely result naturally if he doesn’t achieve a quick victory
There’s a big difference between an easy war and a hard war. An easy war makes regime stronger because it achieves victory without having to transform. But a hard war will transform it. The longer WWI lasted, the more the real power over Germany flowed from Kaiser to Ludendorff
Russia plays hard. But hard war is incompatible with the state security rule. They aren’t guys who do stuff, they are the guys who find wrongdoings in the work of others. Critics, not doers. So once the war becomes existential, power will start flipping from their hands. End of🧵https://twitter.com/kamilkazani/status/1496711906412933121
https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1496711906412933121.html
Kamil Galeev makes a case for going hard on scheme 1. You may want to view the original thread as almost every Tweet has a related image.
https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1503768312236421120.html
Today I’ll suggest some specific measures to end this war. To start with, the very idea of deescalation as the ultimate goal is absolutely insane. It would mean repeating Napoleon’s mistake. Napoleon worked hard on deescalation – that’s why he lost a war he could’ve totally won🧵
You may object. Invasion to Russia with an enormous pan-European army doesn’t look like deescalation, does it? Yes, Napoleon’s means were destructive. And yet his goals were highly constructive. He didn’t want to overthrow the Russian empire, he wanted to reach a favorable peace
Wars are not launched for military goals. They are launched for political goals. And the political goal of Napoleon was to force Russian Emperor Alexander I into the alliance against Britain and into the Continental Blockade system without breaking Russian empire
Napoleon didn’t view Alexander as an enemy. He didn’t want to destroy him. Thus he avoided playing on inner social divisions of Russia . Napoleon launched a purely military campaign and didn’t even try provoking a social chaos in Russia—as Russian authorities feared so much
To start with, most Russian people were slaves. Calling them “serfs” is simply a lie. In 1600 Russian крепостничество was indeed comparable to European serfdom. But with every generation it would become worse. By the late 18th c it was very similar to American plantation slavery
I’ll give you an example. First *real* Russian code of laws Соборное Уложение 1649 allowed serfs to complain on their masters who mistreated them. Authorities would investigate these claims. In the age of Alexis they often recognised peasants were right and punished their masters
By the age of Peter it was impossible. Nope, nobody abolished this 1649 Code of Laws, it still functioned. But by 1700s we can find almost no cases when authorities would recognise serfs’ complaints as valid. Yeah, you can complain. It’s just 99% it will be dismissed as a lie
That’s why it’s absurd to analyze the statute law without considering how it is enforced. Statute law regarding the peasants’ rights didn’t change much. But the law enforcement changed completely, peasants were stripped of every real instrument to enforce their theoretical rights
The apotheosis of Russian slavery was reached in the reign of Catherine who stripped peasants of even a formal right to complain on their masters. Now they were whipped and exiled to Siberia for even attempting to complain against their owner
This is the elephant in the room so often ignored when discussing Russian Empire. Yes, it had European high culture, beautiful palaces strong army. But it was paid by 70% of population reduced to plantation slaves, sold on auctions and slave markets, like in Jamaica or Barbados
That wasn’t a purely Russian phenomenon. After 1500 peasants all over Europe to the East of Elbe were losing their freedom. It was widely criticised by urban elites, e.g. Stralsund alderman Balthasar Prutze in 1614 described Pomeranian serfdom as ‘barbaric and Egyptian servitude’
In a sense Russia followed this Eastern European trend with peasants becoming less free with every year. However, in Russia it went lower than anywhere else, to the literal plantation slavery. Why? It was the combined policy of state and aristocracy not checked by any other force
Enslavement in East Germany didn’t go that far, partially because it was sabotaged by the urban elites who feared landlords and resented them. So relative freedom of peasants was a result of elite war. But Russian urban classes were weak and the power of aristocracy unchecked
What used to be limited serfdom in 1600 by 1800 evolved into a literal chattel slavery. Consider this advert:“For sale three beautiful girls of 14 and 15 y. They do needlework, knit purses with monograms, one knows plays gusli. See them and ask the price at Arbat 1 apt N1117”
What did serfs think? Official propaganda claimed they are happy. One aristocrat wrote to Catherine how deeply serfs love their masters“Yeah, that’s why they’re killing masters so often” wrote Catherine on the fields
She knew everything. She just wouldn’t do anything about it
Problem of serfdom was linked to the military problem. Old Muscovy was built on their idea of “justice”. Muscovites were either white or black. Black people черные люди had to pay taxes and work. Black people (like these) owed “pulling” тягло to the Tsar. That was their duty
White people, or more correctly, the “white bone”, had to fight. That was their duty to the Tsar. That wasn’t always true factually, but at least theoretically military service was considered the duty of the white, noble class. Peasants work, noblemen fight
Btw when you are reading old Russian texts, you should keep in mind that “white” and “black” are not racial, but purely social terms. When Poland-Lithuania and Muscovy were negotiating on finishing the Livonian War, Poles suggested that Moscow is weak because of its inner threats
Poles told: “You just conquered Kazan, it can rebel at any time”Muscovites told: “All the princes, murzas,and uhlans (=nob;es) in Kazan are exterminated извелись. Only the black people remained, they can’t do anything”
= We cleansed the elites, the rest can’t launch resistance
Theoretically Muscovy had some justice—whites fight, blacks work. Since Peter I it changed. First of all, to launch his total war against Sweden he introduced the draft рекрутчина. The state was forcibly drafting a number of commoners every year for a life long military service
Military service was brutal. You were drafted since as young as 15 or 16. After they chose you for service, they’d put your to chains so you can’t escape and transport you to the army, where you’ll be subject to excruciating discipline and drilling with little chance of promotion
Discipline was maintained by punishments like “dragging through the lines”. Two lines get sticks and beat a punished soldier dragged through. Typically 3 000 was enough to kill, but they could give 5 000+. In 1800s they would typically kill one soldier from a regiment per week
Discipline in most European armies was brutal from the modern perspective. However, Russian army had a lifelong service. In late 18th c it was reduced to 25 y. but practically speaking it didn’t matter. Once you’re drafted, you never get out. A soldier = unburied corpse
Very importantly, while Muscovy had some idea of justice: commoners work, noblemen fight, Russian Empire didn’t even try to keep it. While subjecting commoners to serfdom, taxation, corvee and the most hated duty—military draft—it relieved nobility from any duty at all
In 1760s nobility was relieved of compulsory service, be it civil or military. This created a hugeasymmetry. Commoners, work, pay, fight—in terrible conditions—while nobility is free to do whatever. Russian Empire was much more obviously unjust than the previous regime
This created a huge social tension. Both greatest Cossack rebellions in Russia—of Razin and Pugachev—never presented much danger military-wise. But wherever Cossacks went, serfs would massacre their masters en masse. Besides, many soldiers would desert and join the Cossacks
If American dream was to be a millionaire, a Russian dream was to be a Cossack. That’s what pretty much every Russian peasant wished. They didn’t aim to be nobles, social envy doesn’t go that far, only Cossacks. Cossacks knew it and offered Cossack status to whoever who joins
This tension seldom led to soldier mutinies. It mostly led to voting by legs via desertion. Russian soldiers deserted en masse to Ottomans, Chechens, Old Believers, Cossack rebels, to whoever would give them the way out. They were instrumental in remodelling Persian army in 1800s
To put it simply, Russian Empire had enormous, incredible social tensions even among its ethnic Russian population (minorities made it even more complicated). Imperial government was very anxious Napoleon would play it. And you guess what? He didn’t(I’ll pause for like 15 min)
Trying to negotiate wasn’t wrong idea. But the question is—what leverage will you use to negotiate? Threats work only that far. Moral preaching, too. Usually you need to give some carrot. NB you should give not what *you* consider to be carrot, but what *they* view as such
How were the large animals initially domesticated? I really like the theory that ancient people used the same trick modern hunters use—salt traps. They would give animals salt (which they need badly), so they have to come. Even husbandry has an element of bribe and negotiation
You *have to* bribe. If Napoleon wants sth from Alexander—join the Continental Blockade—he has to offer him something he needs. But Napoleon couldn’t. He used preaching, seductiion, force, but in vain. Because he didn’t have a real material carrot and the British did
Any form of Russian-French alliance was doomed, because Napoleon couldn’t offer Alexander salt. He tried to use military leverage, and it didn’t work out. Why? Because to maximise the damage on Alexander he should’ve offered salt to those who needed the salt Napoleon had
You need to give people want they want they want. Now what do they want? That’s usually very simple to understand, they won’t shut up about it. They may express indirectly through projections though. For example based orthodox Russia is largely a projection of Western right wings
Western right wings desire a great Christian conservative power which will save them from the wokes. They dream about it day and night. That’s a very need and of course they project their need to the nearest available candidate—Vladimir Putin, viewing him as a parental figure
The same way Western intellectuals idolise Dugin. Why? Because it’s their projection. Since the days of Plato intellectuals have been dreaming of taking a position of a Philosopher, advising a tyrant. The smartest of them like Plato and Carl Schmitt tried, it usually ended badly
Western intellectuals know they’ll never become Tyrant’s advisors. But they want to believe that in some frozen Hyperborea there is a tyrant consulted by a mysterious philosopher. They chose Dugin to project their own needs on him. Why Dugin? Well, he has a beard, easy to idolise
Why Dugin is so well known in the West, his importance being hugely exaggerated, and Galkovsky—the most important figure of modern Russian nationalism, who created its language of hatred, is unknown? Perhaps he doesn’t look menacing, difficult to project your own dreams on him
If you want to negotiate with someone you usually need to offer them salt they *really* need and not what you think they need. How do you know what they really need? Usually they won’t shut up about it and will project 24⁄7. That’s how you figure out what you must offer them
Now what Russian people were projecting on the eve of Napoleon’s advance? Oh, that’s pretty easy. Primarily—the abolishment of serfdom. Dreaming, projecting and praying for Napoleon’s conquest of Russia started long before he crossed the border 24th of June 1812
Russian police archives contain lots of cases of serfs arrested for treasonous talk. Most importantly, that the imminent Napoleonic invasion brings them freedom. Earliest arrests that I know of were done in 1807, but in months preceding the invasion, the number expanded greatly
A typical treasonous rumour—the real cause of war is that Napoleon wants to liberate Russian serfs. And that he wrote to Tsar Alexander he’ll fight against him until he liberates peasants. As you see, it’s pure projection. Serfs were projecting on Napoleon their real needs
Governor of Moscow Rostopchin wrote to the emperor Alexander. Yes, we amassed huge levies. But they’ll become nothing as soon as the “rumours of a supposed freedom will rise the people to earn it and massacre nobility which is the only aim of low classes in all their mutinies”
Few weeks before the Napoleonic invasion, general Raevsky wrote to emperor Alexander:“I’m afraid of Napoleon’s proclamations that could give freedom to the people, I’m afraid of internal unrests in our country”
What is missed in the history of Napoleonic invasion is how eagerly peasantry tried to switch to Napoleon. Governor of Tver Kologrivov learnt that villages in Porechsky district “fantasise about belonging to the French forever”. Indeed, they decided they’re now French subjects
Polish-Lithuanian support of Napoleon is well known. It was quite common, even though Napoleon didn’t play fully. He didn’t even declare the restoration of independent Rzeczpospolita—if he did, he’d get *way* more support. But people collaborated even in purely Russian lands
Attacks on landlords, burnings of their houses were starting weeks before the French would actually come to a town. After Napoleon occupied Moscow, many villages in the Moscow region refused to obey their masters claiming that since Napoleon rules in Moscow, he’s their Tsar now
Interestingly enough, governor of Moscow Rostopchin ascribed these unrests to the “bad influence of the levy”. Peasants were drafted to the levy en masse without proper training or control and they turned into the unruly force dreaming of Russia’s defeat. Many had to be disbanded
As you see Russia had huge social tensions and divisions which could be easily played on. But Napoleon didn’t. He thought he needs strong Russia as a tool in his continental blockade, and didn’t want to disrupt it, turning it into chaos. He wanted to keep the machine intact
Another concern was ideological. Napoleon established a monarchy and now viewed any anarchic movements as highly problematic. He avoided weaponising mass discontent, even if he totally could. Peasants were making up that he wants to liberate them, because they were projecting
Napoleon aimed for an unreachable goal—alliance with Alexander. It was unreachable because Napoleon didn’t have a salt to offer him. He had a salt to offer to the many discontent in Russia, but didn’t, because he believed he can work out a compromise with Alexander (nope)
What would be the best salt strategy for Napoleon?1. Freedom to the peasants
2. Freedom to the soldiers. You don’t have to fight me, just go home and skip next 20 years of military service
3. Independence to minorities and the conquered
4. Equality to the Old Believers
Jewish role in Russian revolution is discussed a lot, but it’s largely a projection. Westerners project their own culture wars on Russia. Meanwhile the elephant in the room—dissidence *within* the Orthodox Church is ignored. It’s difficult to weaponise in Western culture wars
So now let’s get to the policy recommendations for the current conflict. The best strategy would be playing on internal divisions which are enormous. Giving salt to the ones who need the salt you have and not fantasising about deescalation with the ones who don’t
First. Make surrender of Russian troops in Ukraine as easy and lucrative as possible. Ukrainians understand it and try to work on that. They try to lure Russian soldiers to surrender “to save their lives”, they’re offering pilots a million usd to turn over their jet to UkrainiansI don’t think it gonna work well. First, Slavs don’t really believe in Slavic financial guarantees. If it was let’s say a Swiss company offering money, it would have stronger appeal. Great strategy would be—offer cash for 1) turning over 2) destroying Russian military equipment
The very fact that you might get a lot of cash in hard currency for destroying a Russian missile system, adding sugar to the oil or doing other sabotage would very much destroy the trust among the troops. Especially regarding that many already look for the way out
Another obvious question is—ok, I surrender. Now what? Honestly speaking, right now I don’t see any attractive perspective. What you gonna do after, return to Russia where they investigate how and why you surrendered? Doesn’t look that promising to be honest
Some speculate about giving surrendering Russian soldiers refuge on the West. It could be a good idea, but I don’t think it may really be organised soon. And in order to have an impact on the course of war the green corridor for surrendering Russians should be organised asap
A more realistic option would be negotiating with some warm countries with easy immigration policy (Colombia, Argentina, etc) and simply paying them to accept surrendered Russians. So they would get them some sort of visas + small cash for surrendering + a lot for active sabotage
I know that doesn’t sound efficient moral crusade wise. But it absolutely can be efficient goal wise. With the conflict ongoing, much of the world would be in a deep economic crisis, and there will be warm countries with easy immigration policies desperately looking for cash
Many Russian troops in Ukraine have very low motivation. Conscripts were sent by force. Many national guard paramilitary feel tricked into the war. When they transferred from the police to the newly created guard, they thought they’re getting military benefits with no risk
Cops thought they get military mortgage etc with no downsides. Instead they were sent to a bloodbath. Many started complaining that the entire reform was about “tricking cops into the war”. If you watch this video with destroyed Russian convoy, you’ll see why they want to escape
Finally, many of the “Donbass and Luhansk army” are also low motivated. In the jargon of Russian irredentists there there is such a word as twenty-five-thousanders, двадцатипятысячники. What does it mean?
On the early stages of Donbass war, it was launched my highly motivated fighters. Russian security apparatus, intelligence and many local volunteers. As it usually happens on wars, they ran of volunteers quickly. Their casualties are huge, while the supply is limited
Fortunately for Russia, Donbass fall into humanitarian catastrophe. Most businesses closed, remaining like cpal mines, paid minuscule salaries among the rampant inflation. It was very difficult to earn your living. So Russians would pay 25 000 rubles for joining “Donbass army”
These people were called twenty-five-thousanders because they obviously joined for pay check, around 400 usd per month. They were looked down upon because they had lower motivation and honestly they’d prefer to collect the pay check and skip the fighting
This case shows first of all, that the Donbass crisis was manufactured and maintained by Russia. They portray it as a natural mass rebellion, but almost all of actual fighters were unmotivated ones who literally fought for food, because of humanitarian catastrophe Russia created
Secondly, American military always exaggerate how easy it is to crush this or that group by force (with no salt offered) and underestimate how cheap it is to bribe them. As a rule, people who end up on war are poor (by standards of a region). There are few rich kids in trenches
Thirdly, huge number of Russian military in Ukraine are low motivated. They don’t want to fight. They would rather turned back and go to Russia, but that’s not an option now. They would escape, but don’t know where. Give them the way out. Give a green corridor to a *warm* country
Add a small cash payment for the fact of surrendering and large ones for documented sabotage/turning over the military equipment and you’ll be surprised how quickly Russian fighting ability deteriorated, partially because of sabotage, partially by decline in mutual trust
I’ll finish with a little known fact. Borodino Battle near Moscow was the single bloodiest day of the Napoleonic wars. Russian soldiers stood all day beating off one French attack after another. They lost 39 00 men, but didn’t run away being gunned, shelled and charged by cavalry
You know where Russian army lost more men than at Borodin? In France. After Russian army occupied France, soldiers realised that this is a far richer nation. And after Napoleonic wars it has few men in countryside. So you can easily find a girl wit HER. OWN. PLOT. OF. LAND.In a rich country with few adult males who now how to farm their positions on sexual and economic market were great, far better than they could ever be in Russia. Bonus point, the country had no passport system, so you could just disappear and it would be hard to find you
And the army started disintegrating. It probably lost around 45 000 men due to desertion, much more than at Borodino. Tsar Alexander was very upset and asked king Louis if he could find them. Louis said sorry no—and Alexander marched out with remaining forces out of France asap
The same soldiers who stood to death against Napoleon when they had no way out, deserted in huge numbers the moment they saw they way out and advantageous perspectives after. So they voted by legs, ending Russian occupation of France quicker than planned
This should be taken into account when planning modern policies. If you want to influence people, you should give them salt. And you give it to those who *really* need the salt you have. Napoleon deluded himself he has salt Alexander needs, but he couldn’t offer him anything
So the reasoning shouldn’t go like “Cooperation with whom would be the most useful for me?” but “who desperately needs the salt I have and will need it for sufficiently long time?”. These will be the only on whose cooperation you can truly rely
The West can very easily and very cheaply give salt to Russia military in Ukraine. It’s way cheaper than sending military equipment there. It also can reasonably give salt to Russian officials many of whom now see their situation as desperate and hopeless
West can even give salt to Russian military and intelligence chiefs. It seems Putin didn’t consult them about his invasion of Ukraine and dragged them all into existential war without their knowledge or approval. Many of them will be looking for way out and will cooperate
I just don’t see which salt the West could give to Putin. Lift sanctions and resume trade? Well, he’ll accept it, but now it’ll just buy him time to re-orient to China. It won’t influence his long term goals, it will just make meeting them way more realistic. End of 🧵
https://twitter.com/kamilkazani/status/1503768312236421120
What’s up with China’s vaccination rates?
https://twitter.com/jburnmurdoch/status/1503420660869214213
Almost a 5% case fatality rate for Omicron in Hong Kong? How is that the country with the most hardcore lockdown measures in the world isn’t at a 99% vaccination rate? Why go to all that effort and skip the final and potentially most important step?
Should we update on Omicron’s lethality? Perhaps the ‘mildness’ was more explained by vaccine effectiveness and previous infections than we thought.
Edit: I read some comments from people in China, they said there were some political issues about vaccine liability which lead to hesitancy, and vaccine mandates generally were generally about work requirements, so older/retired populations weren’t pushed as hard, leading to surprisingly large unvaccinated vulnerable populations in China.
It’s not a good enough explanation for me though. China has shown a willingness to take extreme measures in containment, but not willing to just require everyone get vaccinated?
Are there any arguments against opting into a fourth booster, for folks like myself who only had mild shoulder soreness as a side effect? I have some risk factors but would consider not myself high risk. (My parents on the other hand, very much high risk.) I see ‘immune fatigue’ brought up. As far as I can tell this is more of a theoretical thing that could happen with too many repeated boosters, but there’s no reason to think it’s a plausible risk at 4.
I don’t mind if the benefits are quite small, as long as they aren’t negative.
I think a better way to express ‘political suicide’ is “The way Russia will have to prosecute the Ukraine campaign to win the military conflict, will assure the political objectives that were the reason for the war in the first place can not be achieved.”
A video from 4 days after the invasion that I think holds up. Start at 44 minutes. There’s a good tactical summary at 25 minutes too.
Has anyone seen a convincing explanation on how China, specifically Hong Kong, dropped the ball on vaccination rates so badly?
Paxlovid:
“SCOOP: The FDA is set to authorize the Covid-19 treatment pills from *both* Pfizer and Merck. An announcement is expected this week. It would open up two significant treatment options for severe cases. A big milestone.”
https://twitter.com/josh_wingrove/status/1473318224204910593?s=20
Some testing movement:
“The White House is also purchasing 500 million at-home Covid tests that Americans can order for free through a website starting in January.”
https://www.cnbc.com/2021/12/21/omicron-us-to-deploy-troops-to-hospitals-purchase-500-million-covid-tests.html