You can say this is just the way things are in philosophy, but then why should we fund philosophy?
Because some of us realize that there are types of inquiry which are valuable and useful despite the confusion they offer to hyper-systemizing brains who can’t accept any view of reality outside a broken conception of radically reductive materialism.
You’d think if this were the case you’d be able to make a more honest assessment of the field.
Alright, I’ll grant you this. You’ve still made the point that the field of philosophy has not acknowledged the unreliability of intuitions, as if this were a novel insight and not something that is taken very seriously in the modern-day (at least) debates, and that this is a fundamental flaw in the discipline itself.
Right here:
The implication being that Cartesian views of mind and reason are in any way relevant to modern philosophy. This isn’t even true for Continental philosophy and hasn’t been for a long time.
I agree, you are, so let’s slow down and look at my actual criticism again.
What you wrote was that philosophers accept intutions at face value, uncritically...which isn’t true, and I responded accordingly.
What you implied, in that it follows necessarily from your explicitly-made argument, is that since some philosophers accept intutions as valid, therefore the discipline-as-a-whole is broken. But that isn’t true; the entire point is to discuss disparate, conflicting, and even dubious ideas; this is no blackmark as you’ve construed it.
A convenient way to hide behind your biases, I suppose, but I’m not sure what it accomplishes otherwise. Even the Stanford Encyclopedia’s entries on moral theory and ethics don’t back up your “unique” assessment of the field.