I think you are overestimating the probabilities there: it is only Pascal’s Mugging if you fail to attribute a low enough probability to the mugger’s claim. The problem, in my opinion, is not how to deal with tiny probabilities of vast utilities, but how not to attribute too high probabilities to events whose probabilities defy our brain’s capacity (like “magic powers from outside the Matrix”).
I also feel that, as with Pascal’s wager, this situation can be mirrored (and therefore have the expected utilities canceled out) if you simply think “What if he intends to kill those people only if I abide by his demand ?”. As with Pascal’s wager, the possibilities aren’t only what the wager stipulates: when dealing with infinites in decision making (I’m not sure one can say “the probability of this event doesn’t overcome the vast utility gained” with such numbers) you probably have another infinite which you also can’t evaluate hiding behind the question.
Tell me your thoughts.
Hello. New to the active part of the site, I’ve been lurking for a while, reading much discussions (and not always agreeing, which might be the reason I’m going active). I’ve come to the site thanks to HPMOR and the quest towards less bias.
I’m a (soon starting a PhD) student in molecular dynamics in France, skeptic (I guess) and highly critical of many papers (especially in my field). Popper is probably the closest to how I define, although with a few contradictions, the philosophy of what I’m doing.
I’m in the country of wine, cheese and homeopathy, don’t forget it :)