I took Chris’s meaning to be that moral realism (as defined by the SEP) says that moral claims are fact claims possessing truth values but says nothing about the discoverability or computability of those truth values. Your definition would have every moral realist insisting that every moral claim can be proven either true or false, but it seems to me that Chris’ definition allows moral realists to leave open Gödel-incompleteness status for moral claims, considering their truth or falsity to exist but be possibly incomputable, and still be moral realists. Or, to take no position on whether rational minds would come to the truth values of moral claims, only on whether the truth values existed. Your definition would exclude both of those from moral realism.
Chris, please correct me if this is not what you meant.
I took Chris’s meaning to be that moral realism (as defined by the SEP) says that moral claims are fact claims possessing truth values but says nothing about the discoverability or computability of those truth values. Your definition would have every moral realist insisting that every moral claim can be proven either true or false, but it seems to me that Chris’ definition allows moral realists to leave open Gödel-incompleteness status for moral claims, considering their truth or falsity to exist but be possibly incomputable, and still be moral realists. Or, to take no position on whether rational minds would come to the truth values of moral claims, only on whether the truth values existed. Your definition would exclude both of those from moral realism.
Chris, please correct me if this is not what you meant.