jacoblyles

Karma: 107

jacoblyles Jul 18, 2012, 7:06 PM
2 points
in reply to: thomblake’s comment on: Torture vs. Dust Specks
First, I don’t buy the process of summing utilons across people as a valid one. Lots of philosophers have objected to it. This is a bullet-biting club, and I get that. I’m just not biting those bullets. I don’t think 400 years of criticism of Utilitarianism can be solved by biting all the bullets. And in Eliezer’s recent writings, it appears he is beginning to understand this. Which is great. It is reducing the odds he becomes a moral monster.

Second, I value things other than maximizing utilons. I got the impression that Eliezer/Less Wrong agreed with me on that from the Complex Values post and posts about the evils of paperclip maximizers. So great evils are qualitatively different to me from small evils, even small evils done to a great number of people!

I get what you’re trying to do here. You’re trying to demonstrate that ordinary people are innumerate, and you all are getting a utility spike from imagining you’re more rational than them by choosing the “right” (naive hyper-rational utilitarian-algebraist) answer. But I don’t think it’s that simple when we’re talking about morality. If it were, the philosophical project that’s lasted 2500 years would finally be over!

jacoblyles Jul 18, 2012, 9:08 AM
7 points
on: Torture vs. Dust Specks
I was very surprised to find that a supporter of the Complexity of Value hypothesis and the author who warns against simple utility functions advocates torture using simple pseudo-scientific utility calculus.

My utility function has constraints that prevent me from doing awful things to people, unless it would prevent equally awful things done to other people. That this is a widely shared moral intuition is demonstrated by the reaction in the comments section. Since you recognize the complexity of human value, my widely-shared preferences are presumably valid.

In fact, the mental discomfort caused by people who heard of the torture would swamp the disutility from the dust specks. Which brings us to an interesting question—is morality carried by events or by information about events? If nobody else knew of my choice, would that make it better?

For a utilitarian, the answer is clearly that the information about morally significant events is what matters. I imagine so-called friendly AI bots built on utilitarian principles doing lots of awful things in secret to achieve its ends.

Also, I’m interested to hear how many torturers would change their mind if we kill the guy instead of just torturing him. How far does your “utility is all that matters” philosophy go?

jacoblyles Jul 18, 2012, 8:04 AM
1 point
on: A Parable On Obsolete Ideologies
Certain self-consistent metaphysics and epistemologies lead you to belief in God. And a lot of human emotions do too. If you eliminated all the religions in the world, you would soon have new religions with 1) smart people accepting some form of philosophy that leads them to theism 2) lots of less smart people forming into mutually supporting congregations. Hopefully you get all the “religion of love” stuff from Christianity (historically a rarity) and the congregations produce public goods and charity.

jacoblyles Jul 18, 2012, 7:38 AM
1 point
on: Reply to Holden on ‘Tool AI’
What makes us think that AI would stick with the utility function they’re given? I change my utility function all the time, sometimes on purpose.

jacoblyles Feb 5, 2012, 9:23 AM
6 points
on: Rational Romantic Relationships, Part 1: Relationship Styles and Attraction Basics
“Long-term monogamy should not be done on the pretense that attraction and arousal for one’s partner won’t fade. It will.”

This is precisely the point of monogamy. Polyamory/sleeping around is a young man’s game. Long-term monogamy is meant to maintain strong social units throughout life, long after the thrill is gone.

jacoblyles Mar 20, 2009, 7:14 PM
1 point
in reply to: conchis’s comment on: Why Our Kind Can’t Cooperate
My point isn’t exactly clear for a few reasons. First, I was using this post opportunistically to explore a topic that has been on my mind for awhile. Secondly, Eliezer makes statements that sometimes seem to support the “truth = moral good = prudent” assumption, and sometimes not.

He’s provided me with links to some of his past writing, I’ve talked enough, it is time to read and reflect (after I finish a paper for finals).

jacoblyles Mar 20, 2009, 7:11 PM
7 points
in reply to: Eliezer Yudkowsky’s comment on: Why Our Kind Can’t Cooperate
Thanks for the links, your corpus of writing can be hard to keep up with. I don’t mean this as a criticism, I just mean to say that you are prolific, which makes it hard on a reader, because you must strike a balance between reiterating old points and exploring new ideas. I appreciate the attention.

Also, did you ever reply to the Robin post I linked to above? Robin is a more capable defender of an idea than I am, so I would be intrigued to follow the dialog.

jacoblyles Mar 20, 2009, 6:54 PM
2 points
in reply to: Nebu’s comment on: Why Our Kind Can’t Cooperate
My writing in these comments has not been perfectly clear, but Nebu you have nailed one point that I was trying to make: “there is no guarantee that morally good actions are beneficial”.

The Christian morality is interesting, here. Christians admit up front that following their religion may lead to persecution and suffering. Their God was tortured and killed, after all. They don’t claim that what is good will be pleasant, as the rationalists do. To that degree, the Christians seem more honest and open-minded. Perhaps this is just a function of Christianity being an old religion and having the time to work out the philosophical kinks.

Of course, they make up for it by offering infinite bliss in the next life, which is cheating. But Christians do have a more honest view of this world in some ways.

Maybe we conflate true, good, and prudent because our “religion” is a hard sell otherwise. If we admitted that true and morally right things may be harmful, our pitch would become “Believe the truth, do what is good, and you may become miserable. There is no guarantee that our philosophy will help you in this life, and there is no next life”. That’s a hard sell. So we rationalists cheat by not examining this possibility.

There is some truth to the Christian criticism that Atheists are closed-minded and biased, too.

jacoblyles Mar 20, 2009, 6:24 PM
−1 points
in reply to: Nick_Novitski’s comment on: Why Our Kind Can’t Cooperate

“Does this sound like what you mean by a “beneficial irrationality”?”

No. That’s not really what I meant at all. Take nationalism or religion, for example. I think both are based on some false beliefs. However, a belief in one or the other may make a person more willing to sacrifice his well-being for the good of his tribe. This may improve the average chances of survival and reproduction of an individual in the tribe. So members of irrational groups out-compete the rational ones.

In the post above Eliezer is basically lamenting that when people behave rationally, they refuse to act against their self-interest, and damn it, it’s hurting the rational tribe. That’s informative, and sort of my point.

There is some evidence that we have brain structures specialized for religious experience. One would think that these structures could only have evolved if they offered some reproductive benefit to animals becoming self-aware in the land of tooth and claw.

In the harsh world that prevailed up until just the last few centuries, religion provided people comfort. Happy people are less susceptible to disease, more ambitious, and generally more successful. Atheism has always been as true as it is today. However, I wouldn’t recommend it to a 13th century peasant.

“I propose that what seems truly beneficial, seems both true and beneficial, and what seems beneficial to the highest degree, seems right.”

This is not true a priori. That is my point. My challenge to you, Eliezer, and the other denizens of this site is simply: “prove it”.

And I offer this challenge especially to Eliezer. Eliezer, I am calling you out. Justify your optimism in the prudence of truth.

Disprove the parable of Eve and the fruit of the tree of knowledge.

jacoblyles Mar 20, 2009, 5:53 PM
2 points
in reply to: conchis’s comment on: Why Our Kind Can’t Cooperate

“Except that we are free to adopt any version of rationality that wins. ”

In that case, believing in truth is often non-rational.

Many people on this site have bemoaned the confusing dual meanings of “rational” (the economic utility maximizing definition and the epistemological believing in truth definition). Allow me to add my name to that list.

I believe I consistently used the “believing in truth” definition of rational in the parent post.

jacoblyles Mar 20, 2009, 9:54 AM
6 points
on: Why Our Kind Can’t Cooperate
There is no guarantee of a benevolent world, Eliezer. There is no guarantee that what is true is also beneficial. There is no guarantee that what is beneficial for an individual is also beneficial for a group.

You conflate many things here. You conflate what is true with what is right and what is beneficial. You assume that these sets are identical, or at least largely overlapping. However, unless a galactic overlord designed the universe to please homo sapien rationalists, I don’t see any compelling rational reason to believe this to be the case.

Irrational belief systems often thrive because they overcome the prisoner dilemmas that individual rational action creates on a group level. Rational people cannot mimic this. The prisoners dilemma and the tragedy of the commons are not new ideas. Telling people to act in the group interest because God said so is effective. It is easy to see how informing people of the costs of action, because truth is noble and people ought not be lied to, can be counter-effective.

Perhaps we should stop striving for the maximum rational society, and start pursuing the maximum rational society which is stable in the long term. That is, maybe we ought to set our goal to minimizing irrationality, recognizing that we will never eliminate it.

If we cannot purposely introduce a small bit of beneficial irrationality into our group, then fine: memetic evolution will weed us out and there is nothing we can do about it. People will march by the millions to the will of saints and emperors while rational causes whither on the vine. Not much will change.

Robin made an excellent post along similar lines, which captures half of what I want to say:

http://lesswrong.com/lw/j/the_costs_of_rationality/

I’ll be writing up the rest of my thoughts soon.

Sorry, I can’t find the motivation to jump on the non-critical bandwagon today. I had the idea about a week ago that there is no guarantee that truth= justice = prudence, and that is going to be the hobby-horse I ride until I get a good statement of my position out, or read one by someone else.

jacoblyles Mar 20, 2009, 8:24 AM
7 points
in reply to: Eliezer Yudkowsky’s comment on: How to Not Lose an Argument
Also, by following their arguments, trying to clarify it and understanding the pieces. Your sincere and genuine attempt to understand them in the best possible light will make them open to your point of view.

The smart Christians are some of the most logical people I’ve ever met. There worldview fits together like a kind of Geometry. They know that you get a completely different form of it if you substitute one axiom for another (existence of God for non-existence of God), much like Euclid’s world dissolves without the parallel postulate.

Once we got to that point in our conversation, I realized that they we agreed on everything about the world except that postulate, which they were also aware of. I realized that they were neither stupid nor evil, as I had assumed before (a remarkably common, and uncivil, view that atheists have of believers). I still disagree with them. However, I was fine with leaving the conversation with both of our positions unchanged, but understanding each other better.

jacoblyles Mar 20, 2009, 8:14 AM
10 points
on: How to Not Lose an Argument
I am curious about the large emphasis that rationalists place on the religious belief. Religion is an old institution, ingrained in culture and valuable for aesthetic and social reasons. To convince a believer to leave his religion, you need not only convince him, but convince him so thoroughly as to drive him to take a substantial drop in personal utility to come to your side (to be more exact, he must weigh the utility gained from believing the truth to outweigh the material, social, and psychic benefits that he gets from religion).

For rationalists’ attention, there are myriad more important and relevant issues where human irrationality has an effect on the world. In addition, these issues are normally easier to change people’s beliefs about.

People have been believing in God for 500,000 years. People have been believing unsupported things about Global Warming for 30. I would rather teach people how to be skeptical and cautious about modern policy debates than have Yet Another God Conversation.

I was scarred by religion growing up. I understand the impulse to despise it and oppose it. But there came a time in my life when I realized that it was going to be around for as long as humanity, though its fortunes may wax and wane. It’s time to move on.