I think that morality is objective in the sense that you mentioned in paragraph one. I think that it has the feature of paragraph two that you are talking about but that isn’t the definition objective in my view, it is merely a feature of the fact that we have moral intuitions.
Yes, you can get new information on morality that contradicts your current standpoint. It could never say anything objectionable because I am actually factually correct on baby torture.
I think that an ethical theory that doesn’t believe baby torture is objectively wrong is flawed. If there is no objective morality, then reflection and learning information cannot guide us toward any sort of “correct” evaluation of our past actions. I don’t think preferences should change realist to quasi-realist. Is it any less realist to think murder is okay, but avoid it because we are worried about judgement from others? It seems like anti-realism + a preference. There already is a definition of quasi-realist which seems different from yours unless I’m misunderstanding yours [1].
Reasoning helps us reach truth better. If there are no moral facts, then it is not really reasoning and the knowledge is useless. Imagine I said that I do not believe ghosts exist, but I want to be sure that I look back on my past opinions on ghosts and hope they are correct. I want this because I expect to learn much more about the qualities and nature of ghosts and I will be a much more knowledgable person. The problem is that ghosts have no qualities or nature because they do not exist.
You wanted to use future-proof ethics as a meta-ethical justification for selecting an ethical system, if I recall your original post correctly. My point about circularity was that if I’m using the meta-ethical justification of future proof to pick my ethical system, I can’t justify future proofing with the very same ethical system. The whole concept of progress, whether it be individual, societal or objective relies on a measure of morality to determine progress. I don’t have that ethical system if I haven’t used future proofing to justify it. I don’t have future proofing, unless I’ve got some ethical truths already.
Imagine I want to come up with a good way of determining if I am good at math. I could use my roommate to check my math. How do I know my roommate is good at math? Well, in the past, I checked his math and it was good.
I am a moral realist. I believe there are moral facts. I believe that through examination of evidence and our intuitions, we become a more moral society generally speaking. I therefore think that the future will be more ethical. Future proof choices and ethical choices will correlate somewhat. I believe this because I believe that I can, in the present, determine ethical truths via my intuition. This is better than future proof because it gets at the heart of what I want.
How would you justify your “quasi realist” position. You want future Holden to look back on you. Why? Should others hold this preference? What if I wanted past Parrhesia to respect future Parrhesia. Should I weigh this more than future Parrhesia respecting past Parrhesia? I don’t think this is meta-ethically justified. Can you really say there is nothing objectively wrong with torturing a baby for sadistic pleasure?
[1] see: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quasi-realism