fortyeridania

• fortyeridania 21 Jul 2010 15:44 UTC

  0 points

  in reply to: Emile’s comment on: Cached Selves

  I’m just getting into learning about CBT and its relatives. I’m in the middle of Cognitive Therapy: Basics and Beyond. Benefits: It seems pretty comprehensive and detailed, with plenty of “dialogs” between patient and therapist to illustrate the communication of various CBT concepts and techniques. Drawbacks: Because it’s geared toward therapists, not patients, some of the information seems irrelevant for self-therapy, e.g. how to structure a session.

  Part of the point of CBT is to prepare people to be their own therapists. It would be nice if anyone out there knew about literature specifically about self-therapy.

• fortyeridania 12 Oct 2010 15:03 UTC

  6 points

  in reply to: Perplexed’s comment on: Mo­ral­ity and rel­a­tivis­tic vertigo

  I don’t think that anyone has ever doubted that science might be relevant in computing the expected consequences of actions.

  Indeed. Put differently, science bears upon instrumental issues but not terminal ones. What would falsify this idea would be an example of new factual knowledge changing someone’s perception of the moral value of some action, with this change persisting even after adjusting for the effect the knowledge has on the instrumental value of the action.

  Neither Harris nor Academian seems to have provided such an example, and I’m not sure one exists. Following are two examples of a slightly different type that also seem to fail.

  1. Alice thinks homosexuality is immoral because it’s unnatural. Bob tells her that there are cases of animal homosexuality. Alice decides that it’s not unnatural and that it isn’t wrong. (But isn’t being natural the end, with sexuality being merely a means, such that what we see here is still just a revaluation of instruments?)

  2. Alice thinks it’s wrong to X until Bob tells her about an evopsych theory under which condemning X was adaptive before people invented farming. Condemning X is not obviously adaptive or maladaptive today. Alice stops condemning X because she thinks her disapproval of it was just a mind trick and she’d rather not expend effort condeming things that aren’t “really wrong.” (Again, the end here is some sort of mental energy economy, while the instrument is her moral belief set?)

  That said, I’m not too comfortable with the idea that new knowledge has no effect on terminal values. This is because the other contenders for influence on terminal values (e.g. ancient instinct) seem decidedly less open to my control.

  P.S. I’m rather new here, and have not finished the sequences. If I’ve missed something that’s already been covered, I’d love a point in the correct direction.

• fortyeridania 18 Oct 2010 4:11 UTC

  0 points

  in reply to: torekp’s comment on: Mo­ral­ity and rel­a­tivis­tic vertigo

  This needn’t mean that “the true terminal value” is pleasure or other positive emotion

  True, it wouldn’t mean that pleasure was the actual terminal value, and the fact that many people reject wire-heading is evidence that pleasure is indeed not a terminal value for those people.

  However, what role could “happiness” or feelings of well-being play, if not as true terminal values, if it’s in response to those feelings that people change (what they thought were) their terminal values?

• fortyeridania 8 Nov 2010 15:49 UTC

  0 points

  in reply to: JoshuaZ’s comment on: Ra­tion­al­ity Quotes: Novem­ber 2010

  Voted up. My quibble is that gods are often anthropomorphic in mind, if not in body.

• fortyeridania 21 Nov 2010 15:05 UTC

  1 point

  in reply to: ABranco’s comment on: Book Recommendations

  I go through Meditations on a regular basis. I have found it to be singularly uplifting. It has never “flattened” my emotional state at all, but I’m not surprised that flattening is an outcome for some readers.

  It’s possible that the translation you’re using gives the text a morose tone. On the other hand, I’ve enjoyed both of the translations I’ve read (My current one is Maxwell Staniforth’s and George Long’s.)

• fortyeridania 21 Nov 2010 15:41 UTC

  0 points

  on: Book Recommendations

  Epictetus’ extant works have much to recommend them. The basic themes are that you are in control of your thoughts and behavior to a greater degree than you might think, you are less in control of others’ behavior and other “externals” than you might think, and that fretting about what’s not under your control will lead to unhappiness. It’s not hard to quibble with the details and arguments he offers, but the basic picture he offers is very inspiring to me.

  It’s rather repetive, and it’s not systematic. With books of this type, I like to read a bit each evening and then re-read the same bit the following morning. Upon the second read, I pick a passage and memorize it, repeating it to myself on occasion throughout the day. I’d be interested to learn whether others have similar habits.

Does cog­ni­tive ther­apy en­courage bias?

• fortyeridania 29 Nov 2010 8:02 UTC

  0 points

  in reply to: [deleted]’s comment on: The Sin of Persuasion

  Maybe you’re right that (1) religious and political beliefs are about identity more than truth and that (2) this explains why evangelism is a frowned upon. But could strategy be another explanation for the taboo on proselytism?

  It would seem that if people are annoyed by badgering (no matter the content or intent), then badgering people to give up animal products or accept Christ would be counterproductive. Thus non-evangelism would end up more effective in such a society.

• fortyeridania 2 Dec 2010 17:12 UTC

  2 points

  in reply to: JenniferRM’s comment on: Cheat codes

  (1) I think using the word “technique” rather than “cheat code” or “trick” is an excellent idea.

  (2) You say that Allen suggests using the common human reaction to sunk costs (which is to count them as if they were relevant to the decision). Now, as far as I know, it may well be advisable to use error to combat error. However, let’s not forget that considering sunk costs in the case of exercise might make it harder to ignore them when it counts.

Akra­sia as a col­lec­tive ac­tion problem

• fortyeridania 7 Dec 2010 23:08 UTC

  1 point

  in reply to: Manfred’s comment on: Akra­sia as a col­lec­tive ac­tion problem

  Thanks for the link.

  Yes, you could reward and punish recalcitrant subagents separately from other subagents. Is this an example of what you’re talking about?

  or she allows herself to sleep in once a week

  In practice, it might be hard to target the relevant subagent and keep the reward/​punishment confined in that subagent’s domain. Other than occasionally allowing more indulgence, I’m not sure how to do it. Any ideas?

• fortyeridania 10 Dec 2010 10:17 UTC

  7 points

  in reply to: wedrifid’s comment on: Best ca­reer mod­els for do­ing re­search?

  Yes, the acts in question can easily be denoted by the terms “blackmail” and “censorship.” And your final sentence is certainly true as well.

  To avoid being called a cult, to avoid being a cult, and to avoid doing bad things generally, we should stop the definition debate and focus on whether people’s behavior has been appropriate. If connotation conundrums keep you quarreling about terms, pick variables (e.g. “what EY did”=E and “what WFG precommitted to doing, and in fact did”=G) and keep talking.

• fortyeridania 10 Dec 2010 15:37 UTC

  4 points

  in reply to: [deleted]’s comment on: Open Thread: July 2010, Part 2

  Thank you for pointing out the difficulty of quantifying existential risks posed blog posts.

  The danger from deleting blog posts is much more tangible, and the results of censorship are conspicuous. You have pointed out two such dangers in your comment--(1) LWers will look nuttier and (2) it sets a bad precedent.

  (Of course, if there is a way to quantify the marginal benefit of an LW post, then there is also a way to quantify the marginal cost from a bad one—just reverse the sign, and you’ll be right on average.)

• fortyeridania 11 Dec 2010 3:03 UTC

  6 points

  on: A sense of logic

  I feel disoriented for a brief period until I realize that what I’d just heard does not have to make sense.

  By the way, I think you would have evoked more authentic reactions if you hadn’t begun your post by revealing the badness of the arguments. At least in my own case, knowing an argument is bad before hearing it lets me brace myself and put on my flaw-hunting vest. (The vest is made of flawnel, of course.)

  Maybe others differ from me in always being alert to flaws.

• fortyeridania 11 Dec 2010 3:47 UTC

  0 points

  in reply to: TheOtherDave’s comment on: Open Thread: July 2010, Part 2

  Are you saying: (1) A bad post is less likely to be read because it will not be promoted and it will be downvoted; (2) Because bad posts are less read, they have a smaller cost than good posts’ benefits?

  I think I agree with that. I had not considered karma and promotion, which behave like advertisements in their informational value, when making that comment.

  But I think that what you’re saying only strengthens the case against moderators’ deleting posts against the poster’s will because it renders the objectionable material less objectionable.

• fortyeridania 11 Dec 2010 3:48 UTC

  2 points

  in reply to: jimrandomh’s comment on: Open Thread: July 2010, Part 2

  You are right to say that it’s possible to have extemely harmful blog posts, and it is also possible to have mostly harmless blog posts. I also agree that the examples you’ve cited are apt.

  However, it is also possible to have extremely good blog posts (such as one containing designs for a tool to prevent the rise of UFAI or that changed many powerful people’s minds for the better) and to have barely beneficial ones.

  Do we have a reason to think that the big bads are more likely than big goods? Or that a few really big bads are more likely than many moderate goods? I think that’s the kind of reason that would topple what I’ve said.

  One of my assumptions here is that whether a post is good or bad does not change the magnitude of its impact. The magnitide of its positivity or negativity might change its the magnitude of its impact, but why should the sign?

  I’m sorry if I’ve misunderstood your criticism. If I have, please give me another chance.

• fortyeridania 11 Dec 2010 4:01 UTC

  3 points

  in reply to: AlexGreen’s comment on: Wel­come to Less Wrong!

  Don’t be so hard on yourself. Or, more precisely: don’t be hard on yourself in that way. Bitter self-criticism could lead to helpful reforms and improved habits, but it could also lead to despair and cynicism. If you feel that you need to be criticized, post some thoughts and let other LWers do it.

• fortyeridania 14 Dec 2010 1:00 UTC

  8 points

  on: What top­ics would you like to see more of on LessWrong?

  I’d like to see more posts about emotion. Feelings influence decisions and beliefs quite strongly, yet there’s very little on this site (that I’ve seen) that deals with this topic. Exceptions include posts on misguided [compassion] (http://​​lesswrong.com/​​lw/​​6z/​​purchase_fuzzies_and_utilons_separately/​​).

  Depression, anger, lust, and, of course, happiness, can all lead people astray; under their influence, people often make poor decisions (i.e. ones that harm their own futures or harm others).

  Naturally, emotions can also be a force for good. Nevertheless, the relationship between rationality and emotion is complex, and I’d like to know more.

• fortyeridania 23 Dec 2010 15:17 UTC

  11 points

  on: Some prob­lems with ev­i­dence-based aid

  Is there a standard LW term for searching where it’s easy to search rather than where the answer is likely to be?

  I don’t know of a standard LW term, but why not “lamp posting”?

• fortyeridania 23 Dec 2010 15:39 UTC

  8 points

  in reply to: khafra’s comment on: I’m scared.

  I second khafra’s suggestion that you look into Stoicism, although I have not read the book in question.

  At least in my case, regular reading of Marcus Aurelius’s Meditations helped bring about a fundamental change in my paradigm. I now find myself much more in aware of my feelings and in control of my overall outlook (if not my every affective state).

  However, I also second khafra’s reservation. Marcus Aurelius seems to have been a smart dude, but people have learned a lot in the last 1900 years. For the modern analogs of Stoicism, see cognitive behavioral therapy and its close cousin, REBT (rational emotive behavior therapy). They emphasize the importance of grokking the relationship between beliefs and emotions—emotions are a reaction to beliefs. (For good information on the Stoic views on this, see the aptly-titled Stoicism and Emotion.)

  Destructive emotions are caused by distorted beliefs. In REBT terms, these beliefs tend to contain implicit demands on ourselves, other people, or the world generally. For example, someone’s depression might be based on the belief that they’re inadequate. But according to REBT, that’s not the end of the analysis: they also demand of themselves that they be “adequate,” by some standard. (Without the demand, the belief would no more cause depression than any other belief would, e.g. “I’m too short to play in the NBA.”)