Hi, thanks for the thoughtful reply. It seems that you are denying the following assumption:
Setting aside the costs of making changes, if a person should not switch from SOA1 to SOA2, then a person should switch from SOA2 to SOA1.
It may be true that a person should not switch from either to the other, because of uncertainty about the other. That is an important observation. But is there that much uncertainty in this case? I can imagine what it would be like to be asexual. Conversely, if I were asexual, by listening to the experiences of others, I could imagine what it would be like to be sexual (not asexual). Is not knowing exactly how it would feel so important?
If I were blind, and there were a new technology that made me permanently sighted, I would gladly use this technology, despite not knowing what it would be like to see. In particular, I should not make myself go blind. (If it is uncertainty about the technology/drug that is the problem, then I may be inclined to agree, though I consider this part of the cost of switching, and not the SOA itself: my attempt to switch might not lead to the SOA which I intended).
In any case, we can amend the thought experiment by supposing that I wake up tomorrow asexual, and must ask my doctor to restore my sexuality. Would I do it? Here, I have direct experience of both being sexual and asexual, so there is not much uncertainty. I think I would shrug my shoulders and move on, happy to have one fewer desire to satisfy.
My point is that I never opted in to sexuality. It is well-known that you can make people do something, like save for retirement, simply by making it the default to “opt in”; they often won’t bother to opt out. But these people are irrational: it is rational not to opt out only if you would have opted in. I would not have opted in to sexuality, and therefore, I should opt out.
Hi, thanks for the thoughtful reply. It seems that you are denying the following assumption:
Setting aside the costs of making changes, if a person should not switch from SOA1 to SOA2, then a person should switch from SOA2 to SOA1.
It may be true that a person should not switch from either to the other, because of uncertainty about the other. That is an important observation. But is there that much uncertainty in this case? I can imagine what it would be like to be asexual. Conversely, if I were asexual, by listening to the experiences of others, I could imagine what it would be like to be sexual (not asexual). Is not knowing exactly how it would feel so important?
If I were blind, and there were a new technology that made me permanently sighted, I would gladly use this technology, despite not knowing what it would be like to see. In particular, I should not make myself go blind. (If it is uncertainty about the technology/drug that is the problem, then I may be inclined to agree, though I consider this part of the cost of switching, and not the SOA itself: my attempt to switch might not lead to the SOA which I intended).
In any case, we can amend the thought experiment by supposing that I wake up tomorrow asexual, and must ask my doctor to restore my sexuality. Would I do it? Here, I have direct experience of both being sexual and asexual, so there is not much uncertainty. I think I would shrug my shoulders and move on, happy to have one fewer desire to satisfy.
My point is that I never opted in to sexuality. It is well-known that you can make people do something, like save for retirement, simply by making it the default to “opt in”; they often won’t bother to opt out. But these people are irrational: it is rational not to opt out only if you would have opted in. I would not have opted in to sexuality, and therefore, I should opt out.