How should one reply to the argument that there is no prior probability for the outcome to some quantum event that that already happened and splits the world into two worlds, each with a different outcome to some test (say, a “quantum coin toss”)? The idea is that if you merely sever the quantum event and consider different outcomes to the test (say, your quantum coin landed heads), and consider that the outcome could have been different (your quantum coin could have landed tails), there is no way to really determine who would be “you.” Is it necessary to apply the SSA or some form of the SSSA? To me it seems that it should be allowed to rigidly maintain your identity while allowing the outcome of the quantum coin toss to vary across those two worlds. One could then base the prior probability of the coin landing heads in your world on the empirical evidence that quantum coin tosses of that type land heads with frequency 0.5 in any particular instance of a world history.
How should one reply to the argument that there is no prior probability for the outcome to some quantum event that that already happened and splits the world into two worlds, each with a different outcome to some test (say, a “quantum coin toss”)? The idea is that if you merely sever the quantum event and consider different outcomes to the test (say, your quantum coin landed heads), and consider that the outcome could have been different (your quantum coin could have landed tails), there is no way to really determine who would be “you.” Is it necessary to apply the SSA or some form of the SSSA? To me it seems that it should be allowed to rigidly maintain your identity while allowing the outcome of the quantum coin toss to vary across those two worlds. One could then base the prior probability of the coin landing heads in your world on the empirical evidence that quantum coin tosses of that type land heads with frequency 0.5 in any particular instance of a world history.