I am provoked by the ‘wins outright’ assertion—‘Many-worlds wins outright given our current state of evidence.’ If we were do something along the lines of devising an experiment that shows how Many-worlds is empirically distinguishable from other interpretations, well, I’m impressed. But it hasn’t happened yet. Also, ‘quantum non-realism appears to be a huge bluff’, well, but what of other worlds that we can never observe? Infinite other worlds, this one seems about as ‘huge’, at least, as I can imagine. But also, invisible. A
nd I muse about the phrase ‘just flatly wrong as probability theory’. I muse, that maybe you mean ‘*probably* wrong’? Seems apt, if we are offering this ‘as probability theory’..! ;)W
hile we’re on probability theory:‘
Many-worlds is an obvious fact, if you have all your marbles lined up correctly (understand very basic quantum physics, know the formal probability theory of Occam’s Razor, understand Special Relativity, etc.)‘—
the formal probability theory of Occam’s Razor, eh? How formal is it, really? I’m certainly intrigued by the notion that Occam’s Razor finds a logical justification in probability theory. I get the notion, just as a preliminary notion, that the more assumptions a theory requires, the lower its overall probability, because each additional assumption increases the likelihood of error. But if this is going to be ‘formal’, then what is the likelihood of error, anyways? Approximately? I can do ‘whatever’, it’s just that I would take myself to be doing ‘whatever’, if I’m doing ‘whatever’. I’m saying that I wonder how ‘formal’ this can be—especially, if there are different ways of counting assumptions. I might count all the infinite worlds as assumptions, in which case, they’re ‘uncountable’. I don’t mind the notion that more assumptions reduce the overall probability, but also, multiple independent events do that too, and who has more? Many worlds sounds like ‘more’, eh?
I get it, maybe we tire, of how one of the common objections to the Many Worlds Interpretation is to invoke Occam’s Razor. But you invoke Occam’s Razor, on behalf of Many Worlds? It’s sort of like a Catholic accusing me of selling indulgences. It could happen, though to me it would seem deliberately distracting.
To be clear, I don’t mind Many Worlds as a ‘serious one’, I just am intimidated by the indubitable fact that it is a controversial idea and far from firmly established. Deserves serious discussion, fine. But if we stick with Occam’s Razor, then I gather that it is supposedly a valid criterion for choosing between alternative explanations that fit the data. First, you have to have alternative explanations that fit the data. Do you? Well, then. There is maybe Occam’s razor, if you want to sound like you admit there isn’t any other reason to prefer MWI over say Copenhagen or Bohm.. at which point, it seems sort of like you’re choosing between paintings without eyes. Hey, I have opinions too, but one of them is that the test of Occam’s razor is not, like, deductively valid or anything.
I am provoked by the ‘wins outright’ assertion—‘Many-worlds wins outright given our current state of evidence.’ If we were do something along the lines of devising an experiment that shows how Many-worlds is empirically distinguishable from other interpretations, well, I’m impressed. But it hasn’t happened yet. Also, ‘quantum non-realism appears to be a huge bluff’, well, but what of other worlds that we can never observe? Infinite other worlds, this one seems about as ‘huge’, at least, as I can imagine. But also, invisible. A
nd I muse about the phrase ‘just flatly wrong as probability theory’. I muse, that maybe you mean ‘*probably* wrong’? Seems apt, if we are offering this ‘as probability theory’..! ;)W
hile we’re on probability theory:‘
Many-worlds is an obvious fact, if you have all your marbles lined up correctly (understand very basic quantum physics, know the formal probability theory of Occam’s Razor, understand Special Relativity, etc.)‘—
the formal probability theory of Occam’s Razor, eh? How formal is it, really? I’m certainly intrigued by the notion that Occam’s Razor finds a logical justification in probability theory. I get the notion, just as a preliminary notion, that the more assumptions a theory requires, the lower its overall probability, because each additional assumption increases the likelihood of error. But if this is going to be ‘formal’, then what is the likelihood of error, anyways? Approximately? I can do ‘whatever’, it’s just that I would take myself to be doing ‘whatever’, if I’m doing ‘whatever’. I’m saying that I wonder how ‘formal’ this can be—especially, if there are different ways of counting assumptions. I might count all the infinite worlds as assumptions, in which case, they’re ‘uncountable’. I don’t mind the notion that more assumptions reduce the overall probability, but also, multiple independent events do that too, and who has more? Many worlds sounds like ‘more’, eh?
I get it, maybe we tire, of how one of the common objections to the Many Worlds Interpretation is to invoke Occam’s Razor. But you invoke Occam’s Razor, on behalf of Many Worlds? It’s sort of like a Catholic accusing me of selling indulgences. It could happen, though to me it would seem deliberately distracting.
To be clear, I don’t mind Many Worlds as a ‘serious one’, I just am intimidated by the indubitable fact that it is a controversial idea and far from firmly established. Deserves serious discussion, fine. But if we stick with Occam’s Razor, then I gather that it is supposedly a valid criterion for choosing between alternative explanations that fit the data. First, you have to have alternative explanations that fit the data. Do you? Well, then. There is maybe Occam’s razor, if you want to sound like you admit there isn’t any other reason to prefer MWI over say Copenhagen or Bohm.. at which point, it seems sort of like you’re choosing between paintings without eyes. Hey, I have opinions too, but one of them is that the test of Occam’s razor is not, like, deductively valid or anything.