Of course the conclusion that the Counter-Force was the anthropic principle was wrong in this case- the counter force was actually narrative necessity (unless Eliezer wants to claim he actually analyzed this kind of thing on billions of fictional worlds and only wrote about the one that survived).
And this isn’t just a joke. From a Bayesian perspective, what is the anthropic principle? Well, there are a bunch of facts that must have been the case in order for us to be in our current situation (in general, alive). One could ask why these facts happen to be true. In some sense, there are two very general explanations that could be given: 1) These facts are the way they are because of coincidence. 2) These facts are the way they are for some good underlying reason. Bayes’ Theorem tells us that we should only consider (1) to be more likely than (2) if the priors against (2) are stronger than the evidence against (1) [evidence because if there’s an underlying reason, the conditional probability of the facts occurring as they should is higher than if there isn’t an underlying reason].
The hero I think made an actual error in reasoning here. The odds against (1) seem pretty substantial. And while the priors against (2) are relatively high, there are explanations that aren’t that unlikely. Like that this is a gameshow, or a simulation, or a work of fiction.
Of course the conclusion that the Counter-Force was the anthropic principle was wrong in this case- the counter force was actually narrative necessity (unless Eliezer wants to claim he actually analyzed this kind of thing on billions of fictional worlds and only wrote about the one that survived).
And this isn’t just a joke. From a Bayesian perspective, what is the anthropic principle? Well, there are a bunch of facts that must have been the case in order for us to be in our current situation (in general, alive). One could ask why these facts happen to be true. In some sense, there are two very general explanations that could be given:
1) These facts are the way they are because of coincidence.
2) These facts are the way they are for some good underlying reason.
Bayes’ Theorem tells us that we should only consider (1) to be more likely than (2) if the priors against (2) are stronger than the evidence against (1) [evidence because if there’s an underlying reason, the conditional probability of the facts occurring as they should is higher than if there isn’t an underlying reason].
The hero I think made an actual error in reasoning here. The odds against (1) seem pretty substantial. And while the priors against (2) are relatively high, there are explanations that aren’t that unlikely. Like that this is a gameshow, or a simulation, or a work of fiction.