This process typically involves some back-and-forth between our intuitive judgments about how a concept like “knowledge” or “morality” applies to a given case, and the more explicit and systematized analysis that the philosopher has proposed. Typically, intuitions are given substantive but finite amounts of weight, such that they can be revised/discarded if necessary; and considerations other than fit with intuitions (for example, the parsimony and intuitive appeal of the higher-level principles themselves) can play a role as well. The hope is to eventually reach a “reflective equilibrium” that best harmonizes one’s intuitions and one’s higher level analysis/understanding – though philosophers can still differ, here, in which form of harmonization they ultimately end up endorsing.
I’d be very interested in your takes on my critique of reflective equilibrium here.[1] I personally suspect it could be a philosophical mistake if we baked reflective equilibrium into the definition of “human-like philosophy” that AIs are supposed to do. (Not to say you’re claiming we should do that — you do say “typically”, which I appreciate.)
Nice post!
I’d be very interested in your takes on my critique of reflective equilibrium here.[1] I personally suspect it could be a philosophical mistake if we baked reflective equilibrium into the definition of “human-like philosophy” that AIs are supposed to do. (Not to say you’re claiming we should do that — you do say “typically”, which I appreciate.)
Some of my favorite examples of academic critiques:
Nye (2015)
Singer (1974) (largely an exegesis of Sidgwick)
McMahan (2013), sec. “A Sketch of a Foundationalist Conception of Moral Justification”