Interesting. A parliamentary model applied to moral uncertainty definitely fails axiom 1 if any of the moral theories you’re aggregating isn’t VNM-rational. It probably still fails axiom 1 even if all of the individual moral theories are VNM-rational because the entire parliament is probably not VNM-rational. That’s okay from Bostom’s point of view because VNM-rationality could be one of the things you’re uncertain about.
Then I am not sure, because that blog post hasn’t specified the model precisely enough for me to do any math, but my guess would be that the parliament fails to be VNM-rational. Depending on how the bargaining mechanism is set up, it might even fail to have coherent preferences in the sense that it might not always make the same choice when presented with the same pair of outcomes…
This and models similar to it.
Interesting. A parliamentary model applied to moral uncertainty definitely fails axiom 1 if any of the moral theories you’re aggregating isn’t VNM-rational. It probably still fails axiom 1 even if all of the individual moral theories are VNM-rational because the entire parliament is probably not VNM-rational. That’s okay from Bostom’s point of view because VNM-rationality could be one of the things you’re uncertain about.
What if it is not, in fact, one of the things you’re uncertain about?
Then I am not sure, because that blog post hasn’t specified the model precisely enough for me to do any math, but my guess would be that the parliament fails to be VNM-rational. Depending on how the bargaining mechanism is set up, it might even fail to have coherent preferences in the sense that it might not always make the same choice when presented with the same pair of outcomes…