In Kantian deontology the actions of someone else can generate a positive obligation. In particular, your are obligated to punish those who violate the Categorical Imperative. You’re definitely obligated to punish Hitler after the fact. Beforehand is trickier (but this is more a metaphysics of time issue than a ethical issue, you could probably make a case for timeless punishment under Kantian deotology).
My point wasn’t punishment. If I were to kill an innocent man to keep Hitler from getting into power, that would still save him from murdering millions, and there’d be a net decrease in the murder of innocent people.
If anything, this version is even more clear cut, since it’s not clear if you’re really saving someone if they end up dead.
The only reason you can justify not doing it is if you think it’s more important for you to not be a murderer than Hitler.
Your excellent comment would have been improved by instead saying “murdering 11 million in concentration camps” or better yet “beginning a war that led to over fifty million dead”.
Many consequentialist theories might have a special term in which it is bad (for people, to be sure) if a culture or a people is targeted and destroyed. If Poland had ~35 million people, including ~3 million Jews, and Hitler killed ~6 million Polish civilians, including nearly all the Jews, he did worse than if he would have killed 6 million at random, as he killed ~6 million innocent people and one innocent people (sic). In another sense, there may have been similar suffering among Polish Jews and non-Jews (perhaps more aggregate suffering among non-Jews if the non-fatal suffering of the other Poles is included, but as a point of historical fact the average suffering by a Jew before death was probably greater than the average Pole’s before death 1939-45). Perhaps killing a people isn’t very bad, and our condemnation to it has to do with how hard it is to kill a people without killing people, the second of which is the important bad thing.
Similarly, the mode of death and capacity of the dead varies greatly among consequentialism and deontology, but a singular mention of the murdered somewhat indicates deontological thinking. How much worse is a murder than a killing (of a volunteer soldier? Of a draftee? Of a weapons manufacturing worker? Of a power plant worker? Of an apprentice florist who has nearly reached draft age)?
Broadly speaking, when generalizing over consequentialism I wouldn’t focus on those murdered, but of those who died. Doing so would have more clearly indicated that your point wasn’t punishment.
Your excellent comment would have been improved by instead saying “murdering 11 million in concentration camps” or better yet “beginning a war that led to over fifty million dead”.
My reference to historical events would have been slightly more complete? Referencing historical events isn’t important. I wasn’t even so much referencing the event as referencing that it always gets referenced. Hitler just happened to end up in the middle of a popular thought experiment.
Many consequentialist theories might have a special term in which it is bad (for people, to be sure) if a culture or a people is targeted and destroyed....
So? My point is that, even if you accept a given action is inherently bad, if it’s bad for anyone to do it, it may be worth while for you to do it. It only works out as Deontology if you assume that actions can only be bad if you’re the one doing them. More specific thought experiments can show that it only works if they’re only bad if you’re doing them right at this very moment.
Broadly speaking, when generalizing over consequentialism I wouldn’t focus on those murdered, but of those who died.
If it was just bad to die, no deontologist would argue that there’s anything wrong with killing one guy to keep him from killing another. I was assuming for the sake of argument. it was just murder that was bad.
In Kantian deontology the actions of someone else can generate a positive obligation. In particular, your are obligated to punish those who violate the Categorical Imperative. You’re definitely obligated to punish Hitler after the fact. Beforehand is trickier (but this is more a metaphysics of time issue than a ethical issue, you could probably make a case for timeless punishment under Kantian deotology).
My point wasn’t punishment. If I were to kill an innocent man to keep Hitler from getting into power, that would still save him from murdering millions, and there’d be a net decrease in the murder of innocent people.
If anything, this version is even more clear cut, since it’s not clear if you’re really saving someone if they end up dead.
The only reason you can justify not doing it is if you think it’s more important for you to not be a murderer than Hitler.
Your excellent comment would have been improved by instead saying “murdering 11 million in concentration camps” or better yet “beginning a war that led to over fifty million dead”.
Many consequentialist theories might have a special term in which it is bad (for people, to be sure) if a culture or a people is targeted and destroyed. If Poland had ~35 million people, including ~3 million Jews, and Hitler killed ~6 million Polish civilians, including nearly all the Jews, he did worse than if he would have killed 6 million at random, as he killed ~6 million innocent people and one innocent people (sic). In another sense, there may have been similar suffering among Polish Jews and non-Jews (perhaps more aggregate suffering among non-Jews if the non-fatal suffering of the other Poles is included, but as a point of historical fact the average suffering by a Jew before death was probably greater than the average Pole’s before death 1939-45). Perhaps killing a people isn’t very bad, and our condemnation to it has to do with how hard it is to kill a people without killing people, the second of which is the important bad thing.
Similarly, the mode of death and capacity of the dead varies greatly among consequentialism and deontology, but a singular mention of the murdered somewhat indicates deontological thinking. How much worse is a murder than a killing (of a volunteer soldier? Of a draftee? Of a weapons manufacturing worker? Of a power plant worker? Of an apprentice florist who has nearly reached draft age)?
Broadly speaking, when generalizing over consequentialism I wouldn’t focus on those murdered, but of those who died. Doing so would have more clearly indicated that your point wasn’t punishment.
My reference to historical events would have been slightly more complete? Referencing historical events isn’t important. I wasn’t even so much referencing the event as referencing that it always gets referenced. Hitler just happened to end up in the middle of a popular thought experiment.
So? My point is that, even if you accept a given action is inherently bad, if it’s bad for anyone to do it, it may be worth while for you to do it. It only works out as Deontology if you assume that actions can only be bad if you’re the one doing them. More specific thought experiments can show that it only works if they’re only bad if you’re doing them right at this very moment.
If it was just bad to die, no deontologist would argue that there’s anything wrong with killing one guy to keep him from killing another. I was assuming for the sake of argument. it was just murder that was bad.