Wow, this gives me a much more favorable view of Dennett. I had been of the opinion that he was both opposed to phenomenology and the existence of qualia, but in fact he is himself a phenomenologists and clearly seems to support, though would perhaps not say he does, the existence of qualia as a class of phenomena. The disagreements seem to come from two places.
First, he rejects the primacy of any phenomenological account as universal, to which I say “duh”, but I realize not all phenomenologists are as epistemologically careful as me and, it seems, Dennett, so I understand how the myth of his anti-phenomenological stance has been perpetrated.
Second, he rejects qualia because it is often treated as if it were opaque. I agree, and although I try to rehabilitate qualia as a technical term for the class of phenomena that differentiate the phenomenally conscious from the not, I empathize with his choice because at other times I’ve done the same thing and rejected the idea that qualia might exist because it seemed to posit an explanation by introducing an epicycle.
I guess in hindsight I should be less surprised, and makes me wonder if others who seem to be mistaken based on my understanding of their work in this area like Chalmers and Searle do in fact accurately describe reality and it is only the representation of their work that has stripped the nuance that would allow me to see this.
Wow, this gives me a much more favorable view of Dennett. I had been of the opinion that he was both opposed to phenomenology and the existence of qualia, but in fact he is himself a phenomenologists and clearly seems to support, though would perhaps not say he does, the existence of qualia as a class of phenomena. The disagreements seem to come from two places.
First, he rejects the primacy of any phenomenological account as universal, to which I say “duh”, but I realize not all phenomenologists are as epistemologically careful as me and, it seems, Dennett, so I understand how the myth of his anti-phenomenological stance has been perpetrated.
Second, he rejects qualia because it is often treated as if it were opaque. I agree, and although I try to rehabilitate qualia as a technical term for the class of phenomena that differentiate the phenomenally conscious from the not, I empathize with his choice because at other times I’ve done the same thing and rejected the idea that qualia might exist because it seemed to posit an explanation by introducing an epicycle.
I guess in hindsight I should be less surprised, and makes me wonder if others who seem to be mistaken based on my understanding of their work in this area like Chalmers and Searle do in fact accurately describe reality and it is only the representation of their work that has stripped the nuance that would allow me to see this.