I have a terminological question about Causal Decision Theory.
Most often, this [causal probability function] is interpreted in counterfactual terms (so P (S∖A) represents something like the probability of S coming about were I to choose A) but it needn’t be.
Now it seems to me that causation is understood to be antisymmetric, i.e. we can have at most one of “A causes B” and “B causes A”. In contrast, counterfactuals are not antisymmetric, and “if I chose A then my simulation would also do so” and “If my simulation chose A then I would also do so” are both true. Brian Hedden’s Counterfactual Decision Theory seems like a version of FDT.
Maybe I am reading the quoted sentence without taking context sufficiently into account, and I should understand “causal counterfactual” where “counterfactual” was written. Still, in that case, I think it’s worth noting that antisymmetry is a distinguishing mark of CDT in contrast to FDT.
Update: John Collins says that “Causal Decision Theory” is a misnomer because (some?) classical formulations make subjunctive conditionals, not causality as such, central. Cited by the Wolfgang Schwarz paper mentioned by wdmcaskill in the Introduction.
I have a terminological question about Causal Decision Theory.
Now it seems to me that causation is understood to be antisymmetric, i.e. we can have at most one of “A causes B” and “B causes A”. In contrast, counterfactuals are not antisymmetric, and “if I chose A then my simulation would also do so” and “If my simulation chose A then I would also do so” are both true. Brian Hedden’s Counterfactual Decision Theory seems like a version of FDT.
Maybe I am reading the quoted sentence without taking context sufficiently into account, and I should understand “causal counterfactual” where “counterfactual” was written. Still, in that case, I think it’s worth noting that antisymmetry is a distinguishing mark of CDT in contrast to FDT.
Update: John Collins says that “Causal Decision Theory” is a misnomer because (some?) classical formulations make subjunctive conditionals, not causality as such, central. Cited by the Wolfgang Schwarz paper mentioned by wdmcaskill in the Introduction.