I think that, for almost all values of “you”, you do more good by having children and bringing them up well than by expending resources to preserve and finally resurrect yourself.
If you care about having children, why not do both?
A billion frozen “average Joes” cost a billion times as much to maintain as just one
I suspect that the act of having children causes most people to care less about their own wellbeing, and more about the wellbeing of their children.
As thus, I intuitively find it a good idea for anyone reading this to sign up for cryonics before they have children (conditional on them already being interested in signing up), in case their desire to be cryopreserved dwindles after they have children of their own.
If you care about having children, why not do both?
I think the resources spent on cryonically preserving yourself would be better spent on other things. Yes, one of those things is “having children and raising them properly”, but it seems likely that one would soon see diminishing returns if one ‘overinvested’ in one’s children. Happily, there are plenty of other worthy causes to take up the slack e.g. donating money to charity, building a garden shed, putting extra insulation in your loft, etc.
Actually, I think cryonically preserving yourself has negative value unless there’s some way in which you will be ‘interesting’ or ‘useful’ to future generations. For some people this will be true, but not very many.
I think that if people could somehow ‘stand back’ from their own biased perspective on the world, they would realize that there isn’t anything preferable about “one of the people in the far future having distant memories of being me” as opposed to “no-one in the far future having such memories.”
That’s not nearly true.
Aye. I wasn’t thinking when I wrote that bit, so as you can see, I’ve edited my original comment.
Actually, I think cryonically preserving yourself has negative value unless there’s some way in which you will be ‘interesting’ or ‘useful’ to future generations.
Not negative value to me. I refuse to pretend I am not self interested.
Abandoning one’s perspective isn’t the same thing as abandoning one’s values (as I interpret the words). For example, in the default human perspective, it’s natural to be indifferent to other people’s experiences: we don’t care if others are suffering, as long as we’re doing okay. But from a more global perspective, this is kind of bizarre: the experience is still there even if it’s not you who’s experiencing it, for the same reason the world doesn’t actually go dark when you close your eyes.
they would realize that there isn’t anything preferable about “one of the people in the far future having distant memories of being me” as opposed to “no-one in the far future having such memories.”
This sounds like a value, though. I interpreted your comment as saying “if people stood back from their perspectives, they would see their values aren’t preferable”.
You might want to improve your perspective-providing heuristics (you’ll do so from your own perspective, inevitably, although that’s not a reason to approve of this necessity, and could be a reason to do something else instead of attempting to improve the heuristics with the imprecise instrument of those heuristics).
I think that if people could somehow ‘stand back’ from their own biased perspective on the world, they would realize that there isn’t anything preferable about “one of the people in the far future having distant memories of being me” as opposed to “no-one in the far future having such memories.”
I appreciate this is an old comment, but you seem to be neglecting the fact that death is bad.
I think that if people could somehow ‘stand back’ from their own biased perspective on the world, they would realize that there isn’t anything preferable about “one of the people in the far future having distant memories of being me” as opposed to “no-one in the far future having such memories.”
Wouldn’t that exact same argument apply to having kids and replacing “is descended from” instead of “having distant memories of”?
Or even replacing “the far distant future” with “now” and “distant memories” being “currently remembered”?
That might be true for some people, but most people have a ‘part to play’: If you ‘delete’ such and such a person then you typically cause ‘damage’ to their social circle and perhaps even the wider world—grief, loss of valuable skills, unique stories, insights etc. which may have considerable local value, and thereby help to keep the human race going, even if they’re subsequently forgotten.
However, if you look far enough into the future, any given person alive today (with a few exceptions, like a great artist or scientist) becomes ‘obsolete’ - all of the things in the here and now that make them ‘valuable’ gradually disappear. At best they become an interesting relic of a bygone age.
Therefore, if I let go of the idea that there’s something intrinsically valuable about the psychological continuity between my dying self and my post-cryonic, reanimated self, then cryonically preserving myself doesn’t seem to have any purpose.
(ETA: It’s not that “death is good”, but that what makes death bad has already happened by the time your frozen corpse is reanimated.)
Isn’t arguing about having a ‘part to play’ inconsistent with talk of intrinsic value? Or are you arguing some form of expiration-date-labeled intrinsic value?
It seems that any loss of intrinsic value are a decay, and not an immediate severance. One might make the argument that your continued self was exactly as valuable until the day your last friend/family member dies. For surely, your loss caused damage to them and the wider world. So would you be willing to cryo-preserve yourself under stipulation that you are thawed and buried with your last living relative who personally knew you, but to bring you back if possible before then? Of course, arguing about likelihood is a different matter.
If you care about having children, why not do both?
That’s not nearly true.
I suspect that the act of having children causes most people to care less about their own wellbeing, and more about the wellbeing of their children.
As thus, I intuitively find it a good idea for anyone reading this to sign up for cryonics before they have children (conditional on them already being interested in signing up), in case their desire to be cryopreserved dwindles after they have children of their own.
I think the resources spent on cryonically preserving yourself would be better spent on other things. Yes, one of those things is “having children and raising them properly”, but it seems likely that one would soon see diminishing returns if one ‘overinvested’ in one’s children. Happily, there are plenty of other worthy causes to take up the slack e.g. donating money to charity, building a garden shed, putting extra insulation in your loft, etc.
Actually, I think cryonically preserving yourself has negative value unless there’s some way in which you will be ‘interesting’ or ‘useful’ to future generations. For some people this will be true, but not very many.
I think that if people could somehow ‘stand back’ from their own biased perspective on the world, they would realize that there isn’t anything preferable about “one of the people in the far future having distant memories of being me” as opposed to “no-one in the far future having such memories.”
Aye. I wasn’t thinking when I wrote that bit, so as you can see, I’ve edited my original comment.
Not negative value to me. I refuse to pretend I am not self interested.
I don’t see why this is a good idea. Why would anyone want to abandon their own perspective?
Abandoning one’s perspective isn’t the same thing as abandoning one’s values (as I interpret the words). For example, in the default human perspective, it’s natural to be indifferent to other people’s experiences: we don’t care if others are suffering, as long as we’re doing okay. But from a more global perspective, this is kind of bizarre: the experience is still there even if it’s not you who’s experiencing it, for the same reason the world doesn’t actually go dark when you close your eyes.
This sounds like a value, though. I interpreted your comment as saying “if people stood back from their perspectives, they would see their values aren’t preferable”.
I agree.
Note that I am not AlephNeil; I assumed your question wasn’t necessarily directed at him specifically.
Foiled by the anti-kibitzer!
You might want to improve your perspective-providing heuristics (you’ll do so from your own perspective, inevitably, although that’s not a reason to approve of this necessity, and could be a reason to do something else instead of attempting to improve the heuristics with the imprecise instrument of those heuristics).
I appreciate this is an old comment, but you seem to be neglecting the fact that death is bad.
Wouldn’t that exact same argument apply to having kids and replacing “is descended from” instead of “having distant memories of”?
Or even replacing “the far distant future” with “now” and “distant memories” being “currently remembered”?
That might be true for some people, but most people have a ‘part to play’: If you ‘delete’ such and such a person then you typically cause ‘damage’ to their social circle and perhaps even the wider world—grief, loss of valuable skills, unique stories, insights etc. which may have considerable local value, and thereby help to keep the human race going, even if they’re subsequently forgotten.
However, if you look far enough into the future, any given person alive today (with a few exceptions, like a great artist or scientist) becomes ‘obsolete’ - all of the things in the here and now that make them ‘valuable’ gradually disappear. At best they become an interesting relic of a bygone age.
Therefore, if I let go of the idea that there’s something intrinsically valuable about the psychological continuity between my dying self and my post-cryonic, reanimated self, then cryonically preserving myself doesn’t seem to have any purpose.
(ETA: It’s not that “death is good”, but that what makes death bad has already happened by the time your frozen corpse is reanimated.)
Isn’t arguing about having a ‘part to play’ inconsistent with talk of intrinsic value? Or are you arguing some form of expiration-date-labeled intrinsic value?
It seems that any loss of intrinsic value are a decay, and not an immediate severance. One might make the argument that your continued self was exactly as valuable until the day your last friend/family member dies. For surely, your loss caused damage to them and the wider world. So would you be willing to cryo-preserve yourself under stipulation that you are thawed and buried with your last living relative who personally knew you, but to bring you back if possible before then? Of course, arguing about likelihood is a different matter.