The alternative is a presumption that everything we observe in the universe is explainable by the laws of physics as we know them, until someone presents a logical argument, starting from the laws of physics as we know them, not relying on intuition, and leading to the conclusion that the observed thing cannot exist. I would have thought this presumption was part of basic scientific literacy. You seem to have been against it all along, how do you not see it? If we didn’t have this presumption, we would have to question whether the existence of chairs was explainable within the known laws of physics, since there is no chair term in any of the equations, and it is not intuitively apparent how you can get something as complicated and useful as a chair from such simple equations. The silliness and wasted intellectual effort of Chalmers and his ilk has no more substance to it.
The alternative is a presumption that everything we observe in the universe is explainable by the laws of physics as we know them, until someone presents a logical argument, starting from the laws of physics as we know them, not relying on intuition, and leading to the conclusion that the observed thing cannot exist.
You are treating the presumption as infallible, as a fixed dogma. Not as a capable of being defeated, in at least some cases. But fallibilism is central to science. Consider the possibilitiy that those you are arguing against are being scientific.
If the claim that they every thing has a scientific explanation is capable of being refuted, by some observation..what would that look like?
It wouldn’t look like rejecting the observation out of hand
I would have thought this presumption was part of basic scientific literacy.
As a falsifiable presumption it is, as a fixed dogma, it isn’t.
You seem to have been against it all along, how do you not see it? If we didn’t have this presumption, we would have to question whether the existence of chairs was explainable within the known laws of physics, since there is no chair term in any of the equations, and it is not intuitively apparent how you can get something as complicated and useful as a chair from such simple equations.
It is in fact highly intuitive that you can explain a chair in terms of the laws of physics and it’s component parts. Chalmers thinks so, too. If he were saying something like chairs are reductively explicable ,but tables aren’t, then that would be a problem.
But he isn’t. And his arguments, are based on intuition. And yours aren’t? If they are not, they are based on dogma.
There is no meaningful difference between a table and a qualia here, so yes, what Chalmers is doing is exactly like that.
Is the presumption falsifiable? In principle, yes. But consider what that falsification would look like. It would look like trained physicists (at the very least, possibly many more people) being able to look at a new phenomenon and immediately intuitively see how it falls out of the laws of physics. And we know that they can’t do that. One of Einstein’s greatest achievements was explaining Brownian motion, which he did purely in terms of the laws of physics that were already well known and accepted at the time. It was a great achievement because none of the other great physicists of the time could see how the observed phenomenon could be explained. This sort of thing happens repeatedly in the history of physics. So yes, in principle, the presumption is falsifiable, just as the presumptions that pigs don’t fly and that the moon isn’t made of cheese are in principle falsifiable. For all practical purposes though, it is still correct to laugh at people who reject the presumption.
There is no meaningful difference between a table and a qualia here, so yes, what Chalmers is doing is exactly like that.
There is a difference . One is objective and of describable, the other is subjective and ineffable.
But consider what that falsification would look like. It would look like trained physicists (at the very least, possibly many more people) being able to look at a new phenomenon and immediately intuitively see how it falls out of the laws of physics
I don’t see how that’s a falsification of reductionism.
You keep talking about understanding phenomena in ternpns of laws alone. As I tried to emphasize last time, that doesn’t work, because you also need facts about how things are configured, about starting states. And then you can intuitively see how reductive expanations work...where they work. The basis of reductionism, as a general claim, is the success of specific instances, not an act of faith.
One of Einstein’s greatest achievements was explaining Brownian motion, which he did purely in terms of the laws of physics that were already well known and accepted at the time.
And another was overturning the laws of physics of the time. Of you retroactively apply the rule that “any phenomenon iwhich appears inexplicable I terms of the currently known physics must be rejected out of hand”, you don’t get progress in physics.
There is a difference. One is objective and of describable, the other is subjective and ineffable.
Calling experience “subjective” and “ineffable” isn’t doing any work for you—experiences are subjective only in the sense that hair color is subjective—mine might be different from yours—but there is an objective truth about my hair color and about your hair color. And yes, experiences are effable, a lot of language is for describing experiences. You seem to be using the words to do nothing more than invoke an unjustified feeling of mysteriousness, and that isn’t an argument.
I don’t see how that’s a falsification of reductionism.
I’m not sure if reductionism is exactly the right word, I don’t find it useful to think in the vocabulary of philosophers. But your basic argument is that because you can’t intuitively see how human experience can be explained in terms of the laws of physics, therefor we should take seriously the idea that it can’t be. That would only make sense in a world where intuition was a good guide to what is explainable in terms of the laws of physics, which is the hypothetical falsification I presented. My point is that intuition is a terrible guide to what is explainable in terms of the laws of physics, as anyone who has spent any time studying those laws knows.
You keep talking about understanding phenomena in ternpns of laws alone. As I tried to emphasize last time, that doesn’t work, because you also need facts about how things are configured, about starting states. And then you can intuitively see how reductive expanations work...where they work. The basis of reductionism, as a general claim, is the success of specific instances, not an act of faith.
You are the one who seems to be going on unjustified faith in your intuitions.
I never rejected considering starting states of a system. Where I disagree, as I keep trying to point out, is with “then you can intuitively see how reductive explanations work”—NO YOU CAN’T! Even when you understand the laws and the starting states, it is still usually very very unintuitive how the reductive explanations work. It often takes years of study, if you can get there at all. This is what scientists spend their lives on. Do you not see how incredibly arrogant it is for you to think that you can just intuit it?
And another was overturning the laws of physics of the time. Of you retroactively apply the rule that “any phenomenon iwhich appears inexplicable I terms of the currently known physics must be rejected out of hand”, you don’t get progress in physics.
I am not suggesting such a rule. The point I was making was that the trained physicists of the time couldn’t intuitively see how the laws of physics that they knew could explain Brownian motion. If they had done what you want to do with qualia, to conclude that it couldn’t be explained in terms of the known laws of physics, they would have been wrong. Not seeing how a phenomenon can be explained is not a reason for thinking it can’t be, most explanations are not apparent. We don’t have a reason for thinking a phenomenon can’t be explained in terms of the laws of physics until someone points out “the laws of physics say that this thing can’t exist, and here is my reasoning...”.
I am simply pointing out that the phenomenon in question, human experience, does NOT appear inexplicable in terms of the currently known laws of physics. You seem to take as a given that it is, without presenting any argument that it is, and that is what I have been objecting to this whole time.
Calling experience “subjective” and “ineffable” isn’t doing any work for you—experiences are subjective only in the sense that hair color is subjective—mine might be different from yours—but there is an objective truth about my hair color and about your hair color. And yes, experiences are effable, a lot of language is for describing experiences.
Hair colour merely belongs to a subject..and that’s not the usual meaning of “subjective”. Experiences are only epistemically accessible by a subject .. and that is the usual meaning of “subjective”.
And yes, experiences are effable, a lot of language is for describing experiences
A lot attempts to, but often fails. Where it succeeds, it is because both speaker and hearer have had the same experience. Describing novel experiences is generally impossible...”you don’t know”, “you had to be there”. and so on.
I’m not sure if reductionism is exactly the right word, I don’t find it useful to think in the vocabulary of philosophers
Yudkowsky uses the word. Is he a philosopher?
That would only make sense in a world where intuition was a good guide to what is explainable in terms of the laws of physics, which is the hypothetical falsification I presented. My point is that intuition is a terrible guide to what is explainable in terms of the laws of physics, as anyone who has spent any time studying those laws knows.
And my argument is, still, that intuition is always involved in accepting that some high level phenomenon is reductively explicable,because we never have fully detailed quark-level reductions.
Even when you understand the laws and the starting states, it is still usually very very unintuitive how the reductive explanations work. It often takes years of study, if you can get there at all. This is what scientists spend their lives on
All you are doing there is contrasting naive, uninformed intuition with informed intuition. And if it were then case that 100% of scientists were qualiaphobes, you would be into something … but it isn’t. Many scientists agree that we don’t have a satisfactory reductive explanation of consciousness.
Do you not see how incredibly arrogant it is for you to think that you can just intuit it?
You’re assuming I’m not a scientist. Why? Because I disagree with you? Actually. I have a physics degree. So I am not arrogantly disagreeing with the scientists...twice over.
Not seeing how a phenomenon can be explained is not a reason for thinking it can’t be,
And yet some things still can’t be explained in terms of our currentunderstanding. You are not advancing the argument at all.
I am simply pointing out that the phenomenon in question, human experience, does NOT appear inexplicable in terms of the currently known laws of physics.
“Appear” is just an appeal to your own intuition.
You seem to take as a given that it is, without presenting any argument t
I am appealing to the arguments made by Chalmers and other qualiphilic philosophers, as well as those by by qualiaphilic scientists. You have not refuted any of them. You have so far only made a false claim that theydont exist.
Hair colour merely belongs to a subject..and that’s not the usual meaning of “subjective”. Experiences are only epistemically accessible by a subject .. and that is the usual meaning of “subjective”.
It may be more difficult to get evidence about another person’s experiences than about their hair color, but there is no fundamental epistemic difference. You can in principle, and often in practice, learn about the experiences of other people.
A lot attempts to, but often fails. Where it succeeds, it is because both speaker and hearer have had the same experience. Describing novel experiences is generally impossible...”you don’t know”, “you had to be there”. and so on.
Taken literally, those kinds of statements are just false. Sometimes they come from people who just want to be overly dramatic. Sometimes they really mean “explaining it would take more time than I want to invest in this conversation.” But they are never literally true statements about what a person can know or how they can know it.
And my argument is, still, that intuition is always involved in accepting that some high level phenomenon is reductively explicable,because we never have fully detailed quark-level reductions.
Why on earth do you presume that we need to know how in order to know that? Of course we almost never have quark-level or even atom-level reductions. So what? Why on earth would that mean that we need intuition to accept that something can be explained in terms of known physics? We use induction just like we do on many other things in science—most stuff that people have tried to explain in terms of known physics has turned out to be explainable, therefor we infer that whatever phenomenon we are looking at is also explainable. There is no intuition involved in that reasoning, just classic textbook inductive reasoning.
All you are doing there is contrasting naive, uninformed intuition with informed intuition.
How can intuition be more or less informed on something like experience? That doesn’t even make sense to me.
And if it were then case that 100% of scientists were qualiaphobes, you would be into something … but it isn’t. Many scientists agree that we don’t have a satisfactory reductive explanation of consciousness.
I agree that we don’t have a satisfactory explanation of consciousness. As explained above, that does not justify taking seriously the position that there isn’t one in terms of the already known laws of physics.
And yet some things still can’t be explained in terms of our currentunderstanding. You are not advancing the argument at all.
This is not a point on which we disagree. The fact that we don’t currently have an explanation for some things is not a reason for thinking there isn’t one.
“Appear” is just an appeal to your own intuition.
No, it is an appeal to the inductive reasoning explained above.
I am appealing to the arguments made by Chalmers and other qualiphilic philosophers, as well as those by by qualiaphilic scientists. You have not refuted any of them. You have so far only made a false claimthat theyn dont exist.
You have yet to actually appeal to any such argument, or to even name a scientist who you think is “qualiaphilic”. Present one, and we can talk about why it is wrong. As I have said before, the burden is on you.
It may be more difficult to get evidence about another person’s experiences than about their hair color, but there is no fundamental epistemic difference.
You have the intuition that there is not, others have the intuition that there is. You keep stating opinions as facts.
But they are never literally true statements about what a person can know or how they can know it.
Where’s the science behind that? You can’t prove that an experience has ever been fully communicated. We don’t have qualiometers.
Why on earth do you presume that we need to know how in order to know that?
Because otherwise reductionism is just a dogma. We need to know how A B or C is reducible in order to have evidence for that reduction has ever worked.
Of course we almost never have quark-level or even atom-level reductions. So what? Why on earth would that mean that we need intuition to accept that something can be explained in terms of known physics?
We don’t have quark level reductions , so it is an intuition that the kind of incomplete , hand-wavy inductive explanations we have actually work.
We use induction just like we do on many other things in science—most stuff that people have tried to explain in terms of known physics has turned out to be explainable, therefor we infer that whatever phenomenon we are looking at is also explainable. There is no intuition involved in that reasoning, just classic textbook inductive reasoning.
Given that you already have reductive explanations of A,B ,C, you can infer that there is a probility of having reductive explanations of D and E in the future. Not a certainty, because induction doesnt work that way.
So you haven’t shown that intuition isn’t needed to accept the validity of a reductive explanation.
Also, it’s it true that there is an inductive argument to the effect that everything is explicable by exactly the same physics. As I have said, physics is revised from time to time and that happens when it encounters a phenomenon that cannot be explained, and that would not have happened following a rule that unexplained phenomena are always to be derided and dismissed.
How can intuition be more or less informed on something like experience?
The topic was reduction.
And if it were then case that 100% of scientists were qualiaphobes, you would be into something … but it isn’t. Many scientists agree that we don’t have a satisfactory reductive explanation of consciousness.
I agree that we don’t have a satisfactory explanation of consciousness. As explained above, that does not justify taking seriously the position that there isn’t one in terms of the already known laws of physics.
As explained above, it does, because physics is not static and unrevisable.
And yet some things still can’t be explained in terms of our currentunderstanding. You are not advancing the argument at all.
This is not a point on which we disagree. The fact that we don’t currently have an explanation for some things is not a reason for thinking there isn’t one.
The fact that we do have explanations in term of current physics for some things is not certain proof that we will have explanations for everything. Induction is probablistic.
You have yet to actually appeal to any such argument, or to even name a scientist who you think is “qualiaphilic”. Present one, and we can talk about why it is wrong. As I have said before, the burden is on you.
The burden isn’t on me, because I am not making an extraordinary claim.
Given that you already have reductive explanations of A,B ,C, you can infer that there is a probility of having reductive explanations of D and E in the future. Not a certainty, because induction doesnt work that way.
So you haven’t shown that intuition isn’t needed to accept the validity of a reductive explanation.
So because something is based on induction and therefor probabilistic, it is somehow based on intuition? That is not how induction and probability theory work. Anyone with a physics education should know that. And if it were how that worked, then all of science would rely on intuition, and that is just crazy. You have devolved into utter absurdity. I am done with you.
I can’t see any alternative that is not based on intuition.
The alternative is a presumption that everything we observe in the universe is explainable by the laws of physics as we know them, until someone presents a logical argument, starting from the laws of physics as we know them, not relying on intuition, and leading to the conclusion that the observed thing cannot exist. I would have thought this presumption was part of basic scientific literacy. You seem to have been against it all along, how do you not see it? If we didn’t have this presumption, we would have to question whether the existence of chairs was explainable within the known laws of physics, since there is no chair term in any of the equations, and it is not intuitively apparent how you can get something as complicated and useful as a chair from such simple equations. The silliness and wasted intellectual effort of Chalmers and his ilk has no more substance to it.
You are treating the presumption as infallible, as a fixed dogma. Not as a capable of being defeated, in at least some cases. But fallibilism is central to science. Consider the possibilitiy that those you are arguing against are being scientific.
If the claim that they every thing has a scientific explanation is capable of being refuted, by some observation..what would that look like?
It wouldn’t look like rejecting the observation out of hand
As a falsifiable presumption it is, as a fixed dogma, it isn’t.
It is in fact highly intuitive that you can explain a chair in terms of the laws of physics and it’s component parts. Chalmers thinks so, too. If he were saying something like chairs are reductively explicable ,but tables aren’t, then that would be a problem.
But he isn’t. And his arguments, are based on intuition. And yours aren’t? If they are not, they are based on dogma.
There is no meaningful difference between a table and a qualia here, so yes, what Chalmers is doing is exactly like that.
Is the presumption falsifiable? In principle, yes. But consider what that falsification would look like. It would look like trained physicists (at the very least, possibly many more people) being able to look at a new phenomenon and immediately intuitively see how it falls out of the laws of physics. And we know that they can’t do that. One of Einstein’s greatest achievements was explaining Brownian motion, which he did purely in terms of the laws of physics that were already well known and accepted at the time. It was a great achievement because none of the other great physicists of the time could see how the observed phenomenon could be explained. This sort of thing happens repeatedly in the history of physics. So yes, in principle, the presumption is falsifiable, just as the presumptions that pigs don’t fly and that the moon isn’t made of cheese are in principle falsifiable. For all practical purposes though, it is still correct to laugh at people who reject the presumption.
There is a difference . One is objective and of describable, the other is subjective and ineffable.
I don’t see how that’s a falsification of reductionism.
You keep talking about understanding phenomena in ternpns of laws alone. As I tried to emphasize last time, that doesn’t work, because you also need facts about how things are configured, about starting states. And then you can intuitively see how reductive expanations work...where they work. The basis of reductionism, as a general claim, is the success of specific instances, not an act of faith.
And another was overturning the laws of physics of the time. Of you retroactively apply the rule that “any phenomenon iwhich appears inexplicable I terms of the currently known physics must be rejected out of hand”, you don’t get progress in physics.
Calling experience “subjective” and “ineffable” isn’t doing any work for you—experiences are subjective only in the sense that hair color is subjective—mine might be different from yours—but there is an objective truth about my hair color and about your hair color. And yes, experiences are effable, a lot of language is for describing experiences. You seem to be using the words to do nothing more than invoke an unjustified feeling of mysteriousness, and that isn’t an argument.
I’m not sure if reductionism is exactly the right word, I don’t find it useful to think in the vocabulary of philosophers. But your basic argument is that because you can’t intuitively see how human experience can be explained in terms of the laws of physics, therefor we should take seriously the idea that it can’t be. That would only make sense in a world where intuition was a good guide to what is explainable in terms of the laws of physics, which is the hypothetical falsification I presented. My point is that intuition is a terrible guide to what is explainable in terms of the laws of physics, as anyone who has spent any time studying those laws knows.
You are the one who seems to be going on unjustified faith in your intuitions.
I never rejected considering starting states of a system. Where I disagree, as I keep trying to point out, is with “then you can intuitively see how reductive explanations work”—NO YOU CAN’T! Even when you understand the laws and the starting states, it is still usually very very unintuitive how the reductive explanations work. It often takes years of study, if you can get there at all. This is what scientists spend their lives on. Do you not see how incredibly arrogant it is for you to think that you can just intuit it?
I am not suggesting such a rule. The point I was making was that the trained physicists of the time couldn’t intuitively see how the laws of physics that they knew could explain Brownian motion. If they had done what you want to do with qualia, to conclude that it couldn’t be explained in terms of the known laws of physics, they would have been wrong. Not seeing how a phenomenon can be explained is not a reason for thinking it can’t be, most explanations are not apparent. We don’t have a reason for thinking a phenomenon can’t be explained in terms of the laws of physics until someone points out “the laws of physics say that this thing can’t exist, and here is my reasoning...”.
I am simply pointing out that the phenomenon in question, human experience, does NOT appear inexplicable in terms of the currently known laws of physics. You seem to take as a given that it is, without presenting any argument that it is, and that is what I have been objecting to this whole time.
Hair colour merely belongs to a subject..and that’s not the usual meaning of “subjective”. Experiences are only epistemically accessible by a subject .. and that is the usual meaning of “subjective”.
A lot attempts to, but often fails. Where it succeeds, it is because both speaker and hearer have had the same experience. Describing novel experiences is generally impossible...”you don’t know”, “you had to be there”. and so on.
Yudkowsky uses the word. Is he a philosopher?
And my argument is, still, that intuition is always involved in accepting that some high level phenomenon is reductively explicable,because we never have fully detailed quark-level reductions.
All you are doing there is contrasting naive, uninformed intuition with informed intuition. And if it were then case that 100% of scientists were qualiaphobes, you would be into something … but it isn’t. Many scientists agree that we don’t have a satisfactory reductive explanation of consciousness.
You’re assuming I’m not a scientist. Why? Because I disagree with you? Actually. I have a physics degree. So I am not arrogantly disagreeing with the scientists...twice over.
And yet some things still can’t be explained in terms of our currentunderstanding. You are not advancing the argument at all.
“Appear” is just an appeal to your own intuition.
I am appealing to the arguments made by Chalmers and other qualiphilic philosophers, as well as those by by qualiaphilic scientists. You have not refuted any of them. You have so far only made a false claim that theydont exist.
It may be more difficult to get evidence about another person’s experiences than about their hair color, but there is no fundamental epistemic difference. You can in principle, and often in practice, learn about the experiences of other people.
Taken literally, those kinds of statements are just false. Sometimes they come from people who just want to be overly dramatic. Sometimes they really mean “explaining it would take more time than I want to invest in this conversation.” But they are never literally true statements about what a person can know or how they can know it.
Why on earth do you presume that we need to know how in order to know that? Of course we almost never have quark-level or even atom-level reductions. So what? Why on earth would that mean that we need intuition to accept that something can be explained in terms of known physics? We use induction just like we do on many other things in science—most stuff that people have tried to explain in terms of known physics has turned out to be explainable, therefor we infer that whatever phenomenon we are looking at is also explainable. There is no intuition involved in that reasoning, just classic textbook inductive reasoning.
How can intuition be more or less informed on something like experience? That doesn’t even make sense to me.
I agree that we don’t have a satisfactory explanation of consciousness. As explained above, that does not justify taking seriously the position that there isn’t one in terms of the already known laws of physics.
This is not a point on which we disagree. The fact that we don’t currently have an explanation for some things is not a reason for thinking there isn’t one.
No, it is an appeal to the inductive reasoning explained above.
You have yet to actually appeal to any such argument, or to even name a scientist who you think is “qualiaphilic”. Present one, and we can talk about why it is wrong. As I have said before, the burden is on you.
You have the intuition that there is not, others have the intuition that there is. You keep stating opinions as facts.
Where’s the science behind that? You can’t prove that an experience has ever been fully communicated. We don’t have qualiometers.
Because otherwise reductionism is just a dogma. We need to know how A B or C is reducible in order to have evidence for that reduction has ever worked.
We don’t have quark level reductions , so it is an intuition that the kind of incomplete , hand-wavy inductive explanations we have actually work.
Given that you already have reductive explanations of A,B ,C, you can infer that there is a probility of having reductive explanations of D and E in the future. Not a certainty, because induction doesnt work that way.
So you haven’t shown that intuition isn’t needed to accept the validity of a reductive explanation.
Also, it’s it true that there is an inductive argument to the effect that everything is explicable by exactly the same physics. As I have said, physics is revised from time to time and that happens when it encounters a phenomenon that cannot be explained, and that would not have happened following a rule that unexplained phenomena are always to be derided and dismissed.
The topic was reduction.
And if it were then case that 100% of scientists were qualiaphobes, you would be into something … but it isn’t. Many scientists agree that we don’t have a satisfactory reductive explanation of consciousness.
As explained above, it does, because physics is not static and unrevisable.
And yet some things still can’t be explained in terms of our currentunderstanding. You are not advancing the argument at all.
The fact that we do have explanations in term of current physics for some things is not certain proof that we will have explanations for everything. Induction is probablistic.
The burden isn’t on me, because I am not making an extraordinary claim.
But anyway, here’s Witten and Schrodinger.
https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/cross-check/world-s-smartest-physicist-thinks-science-can-t-crack-consciousness/
https://www.hendrik-wintjen.info/consciousness/erwin-schroedinger-one-mind/#:~:text=Austrian physicist Erwin Schrödinger is,in the universe is one.&text=Schrödinger also stated that “consciousness,in terms of anything else”.
So because something is based on induction and therefor probabilistic, it is somehow based on intuition? That is not how induction and probability theory work. Anyone with a physics education should know that. And if it were how that worked, then all of science would rely on intuition, and that is just crazy. You have devolved into utter absurdity. I am done with you.
That’s not what I said.
You substituted “inductive” for “reductive”.
Perhaps you could tell me what your science background is before we continue.
Same as you, physics degree. I’m curious why you picked now to bring that up. I don’t think anything I’ve said particularly depends on it.