Wait, the case for extreme costs seems to include both the crime, and the price of the reaction. If the expected cost of deterrence (that is the sum of individualized deterrence), is much greater then the expected actual harm from the crime, that seems like a market inefficiency. That is, insuring everybody against the harm, is cheaper than preventing it. (this seems like a bad policy, but it is the approach taken towards credit fraud)
That is, in this model most of the costs come from social (not market) reactions to crime. (because you cannot just pay people back socially the way you can with money/​resources). (If most costs are monetary, they are insurable, and insurance is mostly efficient (that is close to the expected costs, in most instances)
That is, the framing as crime being about criminals and the model that generates disproportionate costs (where we divide the total opportunity cost of the best policy for people when they expect ~0 crime and the current state of affairs by the number of crimes) are not the same model. The uninsurable costs come from living in a society where crime is a thing that happens. There is no guarantee that those costs are at all linear with crime, because they are dependent of perception, and game theoretic behavior.
That is to say, dike races cost more than flood insurance
Wait, the case for extreme costs seems to include both the crime, and the price of the reaction. If the expected cost of deterrence (that is the sum of individualized deterrence), is much greater then the expected actual harm from the crime, that seems like a market inefficiency. That is, insuring everybody against the harm, is cheaper than preventing it. (this seems like a bad policy, but it is the approach taken towards credit fraud)
That is, in this model most of the costs come from social (not market) reactions to crime. (because you cannot just pay people back socially the way you can with money/​resources). (If most costs are monetary, they are insurable, and insurance is mostly efficient (that is close to the expected costs, in most instances)
That is, the framing as crime being about criminals and the model that generates disproportionate costs (where we divide the total opportunity cost of the best policy for people when they expect ~0 crime and the current state of affairs by the number of crimes) are not the same model. The uninsurable costs come from living in a society where crime is a thing that happens. There is no guarantee that those costs are at all linear with crime, because they are dependent of perception, and game theoretic behavior.
That is to say, dike races cost more than flood insurance