But doesn’t the same logic lead me to conclude that pain isn’t aversive? (That is: if pain were actually aversive, people wouldn’t do things that cause them pain. People do things that cause them pain, therefore pain is not aversive.)
The problem with that logic as it applies to pain is that pain can be aversive without completely preventing people from doing something. If a behavior B is N% likely ordinarily, and B becomes Y% likely if coupled to pain, and Y < X, that’s evidence for considering pain aversive even though we still do B. Relatedly, if B is always coupled to pain, then I never get to observe X.
Observing a nonzero Y is not evidence that pain is non-aversive.
It seems to me the same reasoning applies to guilt and other kinds of bad feelings. It’s certainly possible that they are non-aversive, but observing a nonzero frequency of the behaviors that cause it isn’t evidence of that.
There may be other evidence, though, which is why I asked Richard his reasons.
But doesn’t the same logic lead me to conclude that pain isn’t aversive? (That is: if pain were actually aversive, people wouldn’t do things that cause them pain. People do things that cause them pain, therefore pain is not aversive.)
The problem with that logic as it applies to pain is that pain can be aversive without completely preventing people from doing something. If a behavior B is N% likely ordinarily, and B becomes Y% likely if coupled to pain, and Y < X, that’s evidence for considering pain aversive even though we still do B. Relatedly, if B is always coupled to pain, then I never get to observe X.
Observing a nonzero Y is not evidence that pain is non-aversive.
It seems to me the same reasoning applies to guilt and other kinds of bad feelings. It’s certainly possible that they are non-aversive, but observing a nonzero frequency of the behaviors that cause it isn’t evidence of that.
There may be other evidence, though, which is why I asked Richard his reasons.