There is virtue theory in utilitarianism, that works out very similarly, yes. Note that “rule utilitarianism” usually refers to an ethical system in which following rules is valued for itself—I forget the name for the view amongst utilitarians that following rules is high-utility, which is what I think you mean to refer to.
What I’m thinking of is the theory that instead of trying to take the highest utility action at any given point, you should try to follow the highest utility rules that have been reflectively decided upon. ie, instead of deciding whether to kill someone, you just follow the rule “do not kill except in defense” or something along those lines.
Leaving aside the differences in moral justification, virtue ethics differs from rule utilitarianism in the practical sense that virtues tend to be more abstract than rules. For example, rather than avoiding unnecessary killing, becoming a kind person.
Right. But that’s a guide to action, not a description of the good (which utilitarianism purports to be). The utilitarian would justify that course of action with reference to its leading to higher expected utility. If the empirical facts about humanity were such that it is more efficient for us to calculate expected utility for every action individually, then those folks would not advocate following rules, while “rule utilitarians” still would.
I think a rule utilitarian might say that I should evaluate various algorithms for selecting a path and adopt the algorithm that will in general cause me to select paths with the highest overall net utility. Which, yes, is similar to the virtue ethicist (as described here) in that they are both concerned with selecting mechanisms for selecting paths, rather than with selecting paths… but different insofar as “virtuous” != “having high net utility”.
So the impression I get is that virture ethics is very similar to rule utilitarianism?
There is virtue theory in utilitarianism, that works out very similarly, yes. Note that “rule utilitarianism” usually refers to an ethical system in which following rules is valued for itself—I forget the name for the view amongst utilitarians that following rules is high-utility, which is what I think you mean to refer to.
What I’m thinking of is the theory that instead of trying to take the highest utility action at any given point, you should try to follow the highest utility rules that have been reflectively decided upon. ie, instead of deciding whether to kill someone, you just follow the rule “do not kill except in defense” or something along those lines.
Leaving aside the differences in moral justification, virtue ethics differs from rule utilitarianism in the practical sense that virtues tend to be more abstract than rules. For example, rather than avoiding unnecessary killing, becoming a kind person.
Well, “become a kind person” isn’t terribly useful instruction unless you already know what kind means to begin with.
Right. But that’s a guide to action, not a description of the good (which utilitarianism purports to be). The utilitarian would justify that course of action with reference to its leading to higher expected utility. If the empirical facts about humanity were such that it is more efficient for us to calculate expected utility for every action individually, then those folks would not advocate following rules, while “rule utilitarians” still would.
I think a rule utilitarian might say that I should evaluate various algorithms for selecting a path and adopt the algorithm that will in general cause me to select paths with the highest overall net utility. Which, yes, is similar to the virtue ethicist (as described here) in that they are both concerned with selecting mechanisms for selecting paths, rather than with selecting paths… but different insofar as “virtuous” != “having high net utility”.