I actually thought this argument was quite poor. There are lots of possible features in different cases of a type, and to claim some are vitally important seems to beg the question. Murdering a homeless loner estranged from any family or friends may lack many of the features mentioned, but there’s little dispute it would qualify. And preventing the creation of a new life prevents the relationships that person would eventually develop. Pointing out that an example falls into a commonly understood category seems a pretty good starting point before delving into what features of that category are important (which isn’t something universally agreed on or even consciously thought about). My preferred approach is what you said for eugenics: just admit that I’m alright with murder some of the time, as per the economically efficient amount of crime (such as theft!).
I also think it is a good thing there is a general norm against breaking laws (even stupid ones) and that it is highly questionable whether George Washington & other “patriot” actions did more good than harm, requiring actual justification in each case against an initial presumption.
And preventing the creation of a new life prevents the relationships that person would eventually develop.
Really? An appeal to counterfactual consequences? By this line of reasoning, each day you’re not having sex with the intent to procreate is tantamount to murder, starting from the moment you hit puberty until you’re no longer fertile. There are no remaining schelling points in-between, AFAICT. All that remains is cold hard utilitarian multiplication. Cold hard utilitarian multiplication is, well, hard—and it might not agree with you.
My preferred approach is what you said for eugenics: just admit that I’m alright with murder some of the time, as per the economically efficient amount of crime (such as theft!).
You’re hitting Cooperate and telling this the other player (whose game habits you have no information on) on a one-shot P.D. Are you sure you really want to do that?
Here’s a fictive example of the “argument”:
Blue: X is good! Green: But X can in theory be defined as an element of Y! Audience: *gasp!* Ys are bad! Green: Indeed, Ys are bad! Blue: Ys are bad because of K, P, Z, C and G. 50% of the badness comes from G, 40% from K, P and Z, and the remaining 10% is C. X only has C. Moreover, X also has B, which is very good, more than twice the amount of C. Green: But all Y is bad, and X is in Y¹, so X is bad! Audience: (ignores math) Agreed! *clap for Green*
ETA: ¹. I realized afterwards that this might not be obvious, but it is expected that an informed reader understands that X might not be exclusively part of Y, which Green leaves out (either intentionally, or out of ignorance or concern for efficient communication or whatever other reason). The rest and what follows from this is covered in the main article.
The cold hard utilitarian calculus is hard in many cases because it aims to maximize rather than satisfice. In many ways that seems a feature rather than a bug. Deontological ethics tend to rely heavily on the act-omission distinction, which I must admit I would prefer as the bar I have to pass. But if, as Kant suggested, I ask how I would prefer others to behave, I would want them to act to increase utility. From a contractarian perspective, we can indicate to others that we will increase their utility if they increase ours. It’s hard to make contracts with beings that don’t exist yet, but there can still exist incentives to create them in the case of farm animals now (which I believe are produced through insemination rather than sex in factory farms) or ems in the future.
My preferred approach also includes not bothering to argue with a great many people. The folk activism of argument is not going to be very effective at changing anything for most people (I definitely include myself in that set). Like Stirner, I instead converse for my own benefit. This actually makes points in disagreement more valuable because it’s more likely to tell me something I don’t already know.
Yes, I intentionally linked to a post critiquing the actual argument I am relying on.
I actually thought this argument was quite poor. There are lots of possible features in different cases of a type, and to claim some are vitally important seems to beg the question. Murdering a homeless loner estranged from any family or friends may lack many of the features mentioned, but there’s little dispute it would qualify. And preventing the creation of a new life prevents the relationships that person would eventually develop. Pointing out that an example falls into a commonly understood category seems a pretty good starting point before delving into what features of that category are important (which isn’t something universally agreed on or even consciously thought about). My preferred approach is what you said for eugenics: just admit that I’m alright with murder some of the time, as per the economically efficient amount of crime (such as theft!).
I also think it is a good thing there is a general norm against breaking laws (even stupid ones) and that it is highly questionable whether George Washington & other “patriot” actions did more good than harm, requiring actual justification in each case against an initial presumption.
Really? An appeal to counterfactual consequences? By this line of reasoning, each day you’re not having sex with the intent to procreate is tantamount to murder, starting from the moment you hit puberty until you’re no longer fertile. There are no remaining schelling points in-between, AFAICT. All that remains is cold hard utilitarian multiplication. Cold hard utilitarian multiplication is, well, hard—and it might not agree with you.
You’re hitting Cooperate and telling this the other player (whose game habits you have no information on) on a one-shot P.D. Are you sure you really want to do that?
Here’s a fictive example of the “argument”:
Blue: X is good!
Green: But X can in theory be defined as an element of Y!
Audience: *gasp!* Ys are bad!
Green: Indeed, Ys are bad!
Blue: Ys are bad because of K, P, Z, C and G. 50% of the badness comes from G, 40% from K, P and Z, and the remaining 10% is C. X only has C. Moreover, X also has B, which is very good, more than twice the amount of C.
Green: But all Y is bad, and X is in Y¹, so X is bad!
Audience: (ignores math) Agreed! *clap for Green*
ETA: ¹. I realized afterwards that this might not be obvious, but it is expected that an informed reader understands that X might not be exclusively part of Y, which Green leaves out (either intentionally, or out of ignorance or concern for efficient communication or whatever other reason). The rest and what follows from this is covered in the main article.
The cold hard utilitarian calculus is hard in many cases because it aims to maximize rather than satisfice. In many ways that seems a feature rather than a bug. Deontological ethics tend to rely heavily on the act-omission distinction, which I must admit I would prefer as the bar I have to pass. But if, as Kant suggested, I ask how I would prefer others to behave, I would want them to act to increase utility. From a contractarian perspective, we can indicate to others that we will increase their utility if they increase ours. It’s hard to make contracts with beings that don’t exist yet, but there can still exist incentives to create them in the case of farm animals now (which I believe are produced through insemination rather than sex in factory farms) or ems in the future.
My preferred approach also includes not bothering to argue with a great many people. The folk activism of argument is not going to be very effective at changing anything for most people (I definitely include myself in that set). Like Stirner, I instead converse for my own benefit. This actually makes points in disagreement more valuable because it’s more likely to tell me something I don’t already know. Yes, I intentionally linked to a post critiquing the actual argument I am relying on.