Actually, let me revise that: I made it more complicated than it needs to be. Unless I’m missing something (and this does seem too simple), you can easily resolve the dilemma this way:
Copying your upload self does multiply your identities but adds nothing to your anticipated probabilities that stem from quantum branching.
So here’s what you should expect:
-There’s still a 1 in a billion chance of experiencing winning the lottery.
-In the event you win the lottery, you will also experience being among a trillion copies of yourself, each of whom also have this experience. Note the critical point: since they all wake up in the same Everett branch, their subjective experience does not get counted in at the same “level” as the experience of the lottery loser.
-If you merge after winning the lottery you should expect, after the merge, to remember winning the lottery, and some random additional data that came from the different experiences the different copies had.
-This sums to: ~100% chance of losing the lottery, 1 in a billion chance of winning the lottery plus forgetting a few details.
-Regarding the implications of self-copying in general: Each copy (or original or instantiation or whatever—I’ll just say “copy” for brevity) feels just like you. Depending on how the process was actually carried out, the group of you could trace back which one was the source, and which one’s algorithm was instilled into an empty shell. If the process was carried out while you were asleep, you should assign an equal probability of being any given copy.
After the copy, your memories diverge and you have different identities. Merging combines the post-split memories into one person and then deletes such memories until you’re left with as much subjective time-history as if you one person the whole time, meaning you forget most of what happened in any given copy—kind of like the memory you have of your dreams when you wake up.
Actually, let me revise that: I made it more complicated than it needs to be. Unless I’m missing something (and this does seem too simple), you can easily resolve the dilemma this way:
Copying your upload self does multiply your identities but adds nothing to your anticipated probabilities that stem from quantum branching.
So here’s what you should expect:
-There’s still a 1 in a billion chance of experiencing winning the lottery.
-In the event you win the lottery, you will also experience being among a trillion copies of yourself, each of whom also have this experience. Note the critical point: since they all wake up in the same Everett branch, their subjective experience does not get counted in at the same “level” as the experience of the lottery loser.
-If you merge after winning the lottery you should expect, after the merge, to remember winning the lottery, and some random additional data that came from the different experiences the different copies had.
-This sums to: ~100% chance of losing the lottery, 1 in a billion chance of winning the lottery plus forgetting a few details.
-Regarding the implications of self-copying in general: Each copy (or original or instantiation or whatever—I’ll just say “copy” for brevity) feels just like you. Depending on how the process was actually carried out, the group of you could trace back which one was the source, and which one’s algorithm was instilled into an empty shell. If the process was carried out while you were asleep, you should assign an equal probability of being any given copy.
After the copy, your memories diverge and you have different identities. Merging combines the post-split memories into one person and then deletes such memories until you’re left with as much subjective time-history as if you one person the whole time, meaning you forget most of what happened in any given copy—kind of like the memory you have of your dreams when you wake up.