So, I (as casebash) originally wanted to bite the first horn of the dilemma, then I wanted to bite different horns depending on assumptions.
Suppose we embrace physical continuity. Then all we’ve done by create copies is manage the news. Your original is just as likely to be in any state, but you now no longer know if you are the original or a clone. But even putting this aside, the ability to merge copies seems to contradict the idea of additional copies being given extra weight. If we embrace this idea, it seems more accurate to say that we can only add or delete copies.
On the other hand suppose we reject it. What would psychological continuity mean? Imagine a physical agent A and a clone C which undergo identical experiences over 10 seconds. Now we use A and C as our psychologically continuous agents, but there’s no reason why we couldn’t construct an psychologically continuous agent that is A during the even numbered seconds and C during the odd numbered seconds. In fact, there are a ridiculous number of overlapping, psychologically continuous agents, all of which ought to be equally valid. This seems absurd, so I’d go so far as to suggest that if we reject physical continuity, we ought to reject the notion of continuity altogether. This would led us to take the third horn.
So, I (as casebash) originally wanted to bite the first horn of the dilemma, then I wanted to bite different horns depending on assumptions.
Suppose we embrace physical continuity. Then all we’ve done by create copies is manage the news. Your original is just as likely to be in any state, but you now no longer know if you are the original or a clone. But even putting this aside, the ability to merge copies seems to contradict the idea of additional copies being given extra weight. If we embrace this idea, it seems more accurate to say that we can only add or delete copies.
On the other hand suppose we reject it. What would psychological continuity mean? Imagine a physical agent A and a clone C which undergo identical experiences over 10 seconds. Now we use A and C as our psychologically continuous agents, but there’s no reason why we couldn’t construct an psychologically continuous agent that is A during the even numbered seconds and C during the odd numbered seconds. In fact, there are a ridiculous number of overlapping, psychologically continuous agents, all of which ought to be equally valid. This seems absurd, so I’d go so far as to suggest that if we reject physical continuity, we ought to reject the notion of continuity altogether. This would led us to take the third horn.