I am curious how exactly would this aproach work outside of quantum physics, specifically in areas more simple or more close to our intuition.
I think we should be use the same basic cognitive algorithms for thinking about all knowledge, not make quantum physics a “separate magisterium”. So if the “no interpretation” approach is correct, seems to me that it should be correct everywhere. I would like to see it applied to a simple physics or even mathematics (perhaps even such as 2+2=4, but I don’t want to construct a strawman example here).
I was describing instrumentalism in my comment, and so far it has been working well for me in other areas as well. In mathematics, I would avoid arguing whether a theorem that is unprovable in a certain framework is true or false. In condensed matter physics, I would avoid arguing whether pseudo-particles, such as holes and phonons, are “real”. In general, when people talk about a “description of reality” they implicitly assume the map-territory model, without admitting that it is only a (convenient and useful) model. It is possible to talk about observable phenomena without using this model. Specifically, one can describe research in natural science as building a hierarchy of models, each more powerful than the one before, without mentioning the world “reality” even once. In this approach all models of the same power (known in QM as interpretations) are equivalent.
I am curious how exactly would this aproach work outside of quantum physics, specifically in areas more simple or more close to our intuition.
I think we should be use the same basic cognitive algorithms for thinking about all knowledge, not make quantum physics a “separate magisterium”. So if the “no interpretation” approach is correct, seems to me that it should be correct everywhere. I would like to see it applied to a simple physics or even mathematics (perhaps even such as 2+2=4, but I don’t want to construct a strawman example here).
I was describing instrumentalism in my comment, and so far it has been working well for me in other areas as well. In mathematics, I would avoid arguing whether a theorem that is unprovable in a certain framework is true or false. In condensed matter physics, I would avoid arguing whether pseudo-particles, such as holes and phonons, are “real”. In general, when people talk about a “description of reality” they implicitly assume the map-territory model, without admitting that it is only a (convenient and useful) model. It is possible to talk about observable phenomena without using this model. Specifically, one can describe research in natural science as building a hierarchy of models, each more powerful than the one before, without mentioning the world “reality” even once. In this approach all models of the same power (known in QM as interpretations) are equivalent.