Having goals: In our natural state, humans do not have goals in any very useful sense. This art would change that.
The link take us to an earlier essay by Anna in which she wrote:
It also seems that having goals… is part of what “rational” should mean, will help us achieve what we care about …
Anna seems to suggest that a person who goes through life with no goals more significant than a day-by-day maximization of utility is somehow ‘wasting their potential’ (my choice of words). But what arguments exist for the superiority of a life spent pursuing a few big goals over a life spent pursuing a multitude of smaller ones? Arguing that having goals will “help us to achieve what we care about” is pretty clearly circular.
It is easy to come up with arguments against being driven by largish goals and in favor of working for smallish ones. Less risk of having to scrap a work-in-progress inventory should circumstances change. Less danger of becoming a ‘by whatever means necessary’ megalomaniac who is a danger to the rest of mankind.
Is it equally easy to come up with non-question-begging arguments for setting significant goals for oneself?
Anna seems to suggest that a person who goes through life with no goals more significant than a day-by-day maximization of utility is somehow ‘wasting their potential’ (my choice of words).
That’s not what I was trying to say at all. I was trying to note that we pursue even most of our day-to-day goals ineffectively, such that the result looks like a lack of coherent action rather than like choosing a satisfying smallscale life.
For example, I’ll often find myself automatically blurting out a correction to something someone said in conversation, even in cases where such argument will decrease my enjoyment, the other person’s enjoyment, and the relationship I’m trying to build. Or I’ll find myself replaying worries as I walk home, instead of either enjoying the walk, thinking about something fun, or thinking about something useful. Or, as Eliezer notes, procrastinating with a process that is less fun as well as less productive. These automatic behaviors serve neither my day-to-day nor my larger scale goals; and automatic action-patterns like these seem to be more common than is coherent action toward (local or any other) purpose.
Correction accepted. Yes, the techniques that you advocate are effective at all scales. And a hunter-gatherer looking ahead no further than his next meal needs to think and act strategically just as much as does a philosopher looking ahead to the next singularity.
If, as you imply, you find it compelling that being a danger to the rest of humankind is something to avoid, then presumably you should also find it compelling that reducing other such dangers is something to seek out.
And it’s pretty clear that projects that require more than a day’s effort to show results will never be undertaken by a system with no goals larger than day-to-day optimization.
It seems to follow from there that if there exist dangers to humankind that require more than a day’s effort to measurably reduce, it’s a good idea to have goals larger than day-to-day optimization.
The link take us to an earlier essay by Anna in which she wrote:
Anna seems to suggest that a person who goes through life with no goals more significant than a day-by-day maximization of utility is somehow ‘wasting their potential’ (my choice of words). But what arguments exist for the superiority of a life spent pursuing a few big goals over a life spent pursuing a multitude of smaller ones? Arguing that having goals will “help us to achieve what we care about” is pretty clearly circular.
It is easy to come up with arguments against being driven by largish goals and in favor of working for smallish ones. Less risk of having to scrap a work-in-progress inventory should circumstances change. Less danger of becoming a ‘by whatever means necessary’ megalomaniac who is a danger to the rest of mankind.
Is it equally easy to come up with non-question-begging arguments for setting significant goals for oneself?
That’s not what I was trying to say at all. I was trying to note that we pursue even most of our day-to-day goals ineffectively, such that the result looks like a lack of coherent action rather than like choosing a satisfying smallscale life.
For example, I’ll often find myself automatically blurting out a correction to something someone said in conversation, even in cases where such argument will decrease my enjoyment, the other person’s enjoyment, and the relationship I’m trying to build. Or I’ll find myself replaying worries as I walk home, instead of either enjoying the walk, thinking about something fun, or thinking about something useful. Or, as Eliezer notes, procrastinating with a process that is less fun as well as less productive. These automatic behaviors serve neither my day-to-day nor my larger scale goals; and automatic action-patterns like these seem to be more common than is coherent action toward (local or any other) purpose.
Correction accepted. Yes, the techniques that you advocate are effective at all scales. And a hunter-gatherer looking ahead no further than his next meal needs to think and act strategically just as much as does a philosopher looking ahead to the next singularity.
One possible line of argument:
If, as you imply, you find it compelling that being a danger to the rest of humankind is something to avoid, then presumably you should also find it compelling that reducing other such dangers is something to seek out.
And it’s pretty clear that projects that require more than a day’s effort to show results will never be undertaken by a system with no goals larger than day-to-day optimization.
It seems to follow from there that if there exist dangers to humankind that require more than a day’s effort to measurably reduce, it’s a good idea to have goals larger than day-to-day optimization.