It simply means Darwinian processes have no limits that matter to us.
Not true! Roughly speaking, we can in principle just decide to not do that. A body can in principle have an immune system that doesn’t lose to infection; there could in principle be a world government that picks the lightcone’s destiny. The arguments about novel understanding implying novel values might be partly right, but they don’t really cut against Mateusz’s point.
In which way would the infection-resistant body or the lightcone destiny-setting world government pose limits to evolution via variation and selection?
To me it seems that the alternative can only ever be homeostasis—of the radical, lukewarm-helium-ion-soup kind.
I mean, I don’t know how it works in full, that’s a lofty and complex question. One reason to think it’s possible is that there’s a really big difference between the kind of variation and selection we do in our heads with ideas and the kind evolution does with organisms. (Our ideas die so we don’t have to and so forth.) I do feel like some thoughts change some aspects of some of my values, but these are generally “endorsed by more abstract but more stable meta-values”, and I also feel like I can learn e.g. most new math without changing any values. Where “values” is, if nothing else, cashed out as “what happens to the universe in the long run due to my agency” or something (it’s more confusing when there’s peer agents). Mateusz’s point is still relevant; there’s just lots of different ways the universe can go, and you can choose among them.
do you think stable meta-values are to be observed between australopiteci and say contemporary western humans? on the other hand: do values across primitive tribes or early agricultural empires not look surprisingly similar? third hand: what makes it so that we can look back and compare those value systems, while it would be nigh-impossible for the agents in questions to wrap their head around even something as “basic” as representative democracy?
i don’t think it’s thought as much as capacity for it that changes one’s values. for instance, aontogeny recapitulating phylogeny: would you think it wise to have @TsviBT¹⁹⁹⁹ align contemporary Tsvi based on his values? How about vice versa?
do you think stable meta-values are to be observed between australopiteci and say contemporary western humans?
on the other hand: do values across primitive tribes or early agricultural empires not look surprisingly similar?
I’m not sure I understand the question, or rather, I don’t know how I could know this. Values are supposed to be things that live in an infinite game / Nomic context. You’d have to have these people get relatively more leisure before you’d see much of their values.
A start of one critique is:
Not true! Roughly speaking, we can in principle just decide to not do that. A body can in principle have an immune system that doesn’t lose to infection; there could in principle be a world government that picks the lightcone’s destiny. The arguments about novel understanding implying novel values might be partly right, but they don’t really cut against Mateusz’s point.
In which way would the infection-resistant body or the lightcone destiny-setting world government pose limits to evolution via variation and selection?
To me it seems that the alternative can only ever be homeostasis—of the radical, lukewarm-helium-ion-soup kind.
I mean, I don’t know how it works in full, that’s a lofty and complex question. One reason to think it’s possible is that there’s a really big difference between the kind of variation and selection we do in our heads with ideas and the kind evolution does with organisms. (Our ideas die so we don’t have to and so forth.) I do feel like some thoughts change some aspects of some of my values, but these are generally “endorsed by more abstract but more stable meta-values”, and I also feel like I can learn e.g. most new math without changing any values. Where “values” is, if nothing else, cashed out as “what happens to the universe in the long run due to my agency” or something (it’s more confusing when there’s peer agents). Mateusz’s point is still relevant; there’s just lots of different ways the universe can go, and you can choose among them.
let’s try it from the other direction:
do you think stable meta-values are to be observed between australopiteci and say contemporary western humans? on the other hand: do values across primitive tribes or early agricultural empires not look surprisingly similar? third hand: what makes it so that we can look back and compare those value systems, while it would be nigh-impossible for the agents in questions to wrap their head around even something as “basic” as representative democracy?
i don’t think it’s thought as much as capacity for it that changes one’s values. for instance, aontogeny recapitulating phylogeny: would you think it wise to have @TsviBT¹⁹⁹⁹ align contemporary Tsvi based on his values? How about vice versa?
It would be mostly wise either way, yeah, but that’s relying on both directions being humble / anapartistic.
I’m not sure I understand the question, or rather, I don’t know how I could know this. Values are supposed to be things that live in an infinite game / Nomic context. You’d have to have these people get relatively more leisure before you’d see much of their values.