Futarchy’s can’t distinguish between ‘values’ and ‘beliefs’.
It takes domain knowledge and discovery research to realise which values can actually be reduced to belief.
For instance, someone might value ‘healthcare’, thinking that the associated beliefs are ‘activity-costing’ of health budgets on the departmental secretaries recommendations v.s. throwing it all into bednets (for an absurd but illustrative example).
In actual fact, the underlying value may not be healthcare depending on whether the person believes healthcare maximises some confounded higher order value—i.e. health.
“A recent survey conducted by Research Australia found that 91% of Australians considered that ‘improving hospitals and the health system’ should be the highest priority for the Australian Government.
The related topics of more funding for HMR and increasing funding for preventive healthcare were the 9th and 10th priorities.”
However
“simply increasing health-care expenditure does not necessarily lead to improved health outcomes. For developed countries, there is little correlation between total health system expenditure and health outcomes such as life expectancy. A more strategic investment approach is required to improve outcomes and control costs.”
One area of opportunity for improvement is the cost of inefficiency and adverse events in the health system. In the United States, this is estimated at between 20% and 30% of health expenditure. And while the equivalent Australian number is not known, it is likely to be significant. Health services research on the Australian health system must be a priority to identify and target more efficient ways to deliver health outcomes.
”A more strategic investment approach can improve outcomes and control costs. The health system comprises millions of separate clinical interventions, each with different levels of productivity and cost-effectiveness. Some of these interventions are based on sound evidence of effectiveness, but since many are not, Exhibit 5 is indicative of the economics of the health system as a whole. A more strategic approach would place greater emphasis on high-value interventions, such as vaccine development, and reducing adverse events that consume resources and reduce life expectancy. Health services research on the Australian health system must be a priority for identifying opportunities such as full compliance with hand-washing protocols (Case Study 1) that, by itself, could save up to $2bn p.a. Research is an essential component of the Australian Government’s health reforms that should be focused on healthcare productivity and effectiveness”
It’s also strategic in an international context
”Medicinal and pharmaceutical products have grown at 12% p.a. over the last 20 years and isnow Australia’s largest manufacturing export sector”
Depending on what someone believes, they may or may not be trying to maximise for strategy!
In actual fact, the underlying value may not be healthcare depending on whether the person believes healthcare maximises some confounded higher order value—i.e. health.
First of all, I think it would be a good idea to avoid use of the word “confounding” unless you use it with its technical definition, ie, to discuss whether Pr(X|Y) = Pr(X| do(Y); or informally to describe the smoking lesion problem or Simpson’s paradox. I don’t think that is what you are referring to in this case.
Certainly, if you use prediction markets with contracts on G instead of G, people will bet based on their true beliefs about G instead of their true beliefs about G. In this case, futarchy will end up optimizing for G* instead of G (assuming you can find a solution to the confounding problem). I don’t disagree with this criticism of futarchy, but I’m not sure I see the relevance to my post
Futarchy’s can’t distinguish between ‘values’ and ‘beliefs’.
It takes domain knowledge and discovery research to realise which values can actually be reduced to belief.
For instance, someone might value ‘healthcare’, thinking that the associated beliefs are ‘activity-costing’ of health budgets on the departmental secretaries recommendations v.s. throwing it all into bednets (for an absurd but illustrative example).
In actual fact, the underlying value may not be healthcare depending on whether the person believes healthcare maximises some confounded higher order value—i.e. health.
However
It’s also strategic in an international context
Depending on what someone believes, they may or may not be trying to maximise for strategy!
I’m learning more here
First of all, I think it would be a good idea to avoid use of the word “confounding” unless you use it with its technical definition, ie, to discuss whether Pr(X|Y) = Pr(X| do(Y); or informally to describe the smoking lesion problem or Simpson’s paradox. I don’t think that is what you are referring to in this case.
I think what you’re getting at is an example Goodhart’s law. See for instance http://lesswrong.com/lw/1ws/the_importance_of_goodharts_law/
Certainly, if you use prediction markets with contracts on G instead of G, people will bet based on their true beliefs about G instead of their true beliefs about G. In this case, futarchy will end up optimizing for G* instead of G (assuming you can find a solution to the confounding problem). I don’t disagree with this criticism of futarchy, but I’m not sure I see the relevance to my post