This seems isomorphic to the mainstream debate, in academic philosophy, over whether one can be harmed by things happening after one’s death; in other words, precisely how do one’s preferences (for certain states of affairs) after one’s death work?
“Third, what is the case for and the case against the harm thesis, the claim that death can harm the individual who dies, and the posthumous harm thesis, according to which events that occur after an individual dies can still harm that individual?”
Good point. I think the main similarity derives from a specific understanding/definition of harm that holds that harming another is acting counter to another’s preferences, in some sense. In that way then, it’s similar to (the OP’s trouble in getting his interlocutors to understand) preferences being sustained after one’s death.
This seems isomorphic to the mainstream debate, in academic philosophy, over whether one can be harmed by things happening after one’s death; in other words, precisely how do one’s preferences (for certain states of affairs) after one’s death work?
See: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/death/
“Third, what is the case for and the case against the harm thesis, the claim that death can harm the individual who dies, and the posthumous harm thesis, according to which events that occur after an individual dies can still harm that individual?”
Hm. I think worrying about whether something can “harm” a dead person carries much more semantic baggage, so the key ideas will probably be different.
Good point. I think the main similarity derives from a specific understanding/definition of harm that holds that harming another is acting counter to another’s preferences, in some sense. In that way then, it’s similar to (the OP’s trouble in getting his interlocutors to understand) preferences being sustained after one’s death.