So… your Bayesian answer to the grue problem is to become a frequentist? You’re doing it wrong.
As has been pointed out to you, “grue” is a description of a perfectly consistent prior on observations. The reason that “green” is preferable is its simplicity (in terms of basic predictions of physical events) and specificity (i.e. if T is unspecified, then the “green” hypothesis makes more specific predictions than “grue”, while if it is specified, then the complexity of the number T comes into play).
So… your Bayesian answer to the grue problem is to become a frequentist? You’re doing it wrong.
As has been pointed out to you, “grue” is a description of a perfectly consistent prior on observations. The reason that “green” is preferable is its simplicity (in terms of basic predictions of physical events) and specificity (i.e. if T is unspecified, then the “green” hypothesis makes more specific predictions than “grue”, while if it is specified, then the complexity of the number T comes into play).