Easy. First, you clarify what you mean about the effectiveness of prediction markets being highly speculative, in such a way that it can be measured, and then you make a bet. For example, you could bet that the odds ratio of bets in prediction markets have historically not aligned with their probability, making their use as an indicator of probability for current propositions suspect. If you are right, you could earn a lot of money! And even more money if you think that people will bet against you inefficiently.
Or I could bet that a teapot isn’t orbiting the Sun.
If you have evidence that prediction markets are effective in broad scenarios, show it. Trying to reverse the burden of proof by proposing a bet is not going to work.
Who said anything about burden of proof? If you’re right, you could be making a lot of money by betting that you are right. Not only would your opponents lose money, but losing money is a great way to learn a lesson that won’t be trivialized or forgotten.
Really? Their effectiveness at, say, running countries or other practical applications, sure; but their effectiveness at collating information, as was referred to in the article?
It seems to me that the article referred to practical applications:
But by now we should know very well that we would get more accurate estimates more cheaply on most widely discussed issues of fact by creating (and legalizing), and if need be subsidizing, speculative betting markets on such topics.
Ah, I assumed they were referring to political discussions (elections and so on) due to the reference to punditry immediately afterwards? I suppose I can see how either interpretation could result due to different emphases, so this is useful information to the OP regardless.
Prediction markets are a bad example since their effectiveness is still highly speculative.
How much/at what odds would you be willing to bet about that?
About the effectiveness of prediction markets being still highly speculative?
How do you exactly bet about that?
Easy. First, you clarify what you mean about the effectiveness of prediction markets being highly speculative, in such a way that it can be measured, and then you make a bet. For example, you could bet that the odds ratio of bets in prediction markets have historically not aligned with their probability, making their use as an indicator of probability for current propositions suspect. If you are right, you could earn a lot of money! And even more money if you think that people will bet against you inefficiently.
Or I could bet that a teapot isn’t orbiting the Sun.
If you have evidence that prediction markets are effective in broad scenarios, show it. Trying to reverse the burden of proof by proposing a bet is not going to work.
Who said anything about burden of proof? If you’re right, you could be making a lot of money by betting that you are right. Not only would your opponents lose money, but losing money is a great way to learn a lesson that won’t be trivialized or forgotten.
Really? Their effectiveness at, say, running countries or other practical applications, sure; but their effectiveness at collating information, as was referred to in the article?
It seems to me that the article referred to practical applications:
Ah, I assumed they were referring to political discussions (elections and so on) due to the reference to punditry immediately afterwards? I suppose I can see how either interpretation could result due to different emphases, so this is useful information to the OP regardless.