## How ChatGPT Rates This Moral Model Compared to Major Religions (Seeking Critique)
My name is Tom Jump, I am the original creator of this model of morality. Full discloser I did use chat GPT to help me write this post (I am dyslexic and autistic, clear communication is not my strong suit).
I’m sharing a moral framework for open critique, not promotion. The goal here is to see whether this model actually works, where it breaks, and whether it’s redundant with something that already exists.
The hook for this framework is:
When asked to compare moral systems like Christianity, Islam, Judaism, Hinduism, Buddhism, utilitarianism, deontology, and virtue ethics, ChatGPT repeatedly rates this model unusually high on internal consistency, clarity about what counts as moral wrongness, and its ability to explain tragedy without assigning false moral guilt.
That doesn’t mean the model is correct. But it does raise a real question: why does it score that way?
This post explains the framework in straightforward terms so it can be evaluated as a worldview, not just a technical proposal.
---
## The Core Idea
The framework is built on a single foundational claim:
All involuntary imposition on the will of a conscious being is immoral. All voluntary assistance of the will of a conscious being is moral.
There are no other primitive principles.
No outcome maximization. No divine commands. No moral rules handed down by authority. No virtue scoring.
Everything reduces to one question:
Was a conscious being forced against their will, or not?
---
## What “Imposition” Means Here
An involuntary imposition is any state or action that overrides, constrains, or frustrates the will of a conscious agent without their consent.
This includes obvious cases like assault, theft, coercion, and non-consensual use of someone’s body.
It also includes cases people usually don’t label as moral at all, like a rock falling on someone.
That sounds strange at first, but it leads to an important distinction.
---
## Moral Valence vs Moral Blame
This framework separates two things that are often mixed together.
Moral valence is about whether a state of affairs involves a violation of will. Moral blame is about whether an agent is responsible for that violation.
If a rock falls on someone, their will is violated. That is morally bad in this framework. But there is no agent responsible, so no one is morally blameworthy.
This allows the model to say, clearly and consistently:
Something can be morally bad without anyone being morally guilty.
Many moral systems struggle to say both at once.
---
## Why Outcomes Don’t Justify Coercion
In this framework, killing one non-consenting person to save five others is still immoral.
Even if total suffering is reduced. Even if the intention is good. Even if the outcome looks better on balance.
Why?
Because someone’s will was used as a means.
Reducing harm can matter in comparisons, but it does not transform coercion into moral action. Less bad does not become good.
---
## What This Model Explains Cleanly
This framework often scores well in comparisons because it cleanly explains things that other systems handle awkwardly or inconsistently:
Why consent feels morally fundamental Why good intentions do not excuse violations Why tragic outcomes can be morally bad without implying moral failure Why nature can produce immoral states without being evil Why many moral disagreements collapse into disputes about coercion versus permission
It also avoids common internal tensions found elsewhere, like conflicts between outcomes and rights, rule exceptions, aggregation problems, or appeals to authority.
---
## What This Model Is Not
This framework is not utilitarian. It is not deontological. It is not virtue-based. It is not religious. It is not nihilistic.
It also does not claim that the world can be made perfect, that tragedy can always be avoided, or that agents are obligated to optimize outcomes.
It does not issue commands.
It describes what morality is, not what must be enforced.
---
## Direction Without Obligation
If morality has a direction, it points toward fewer forced interactions, more voluntary cooperation, and less will-frustration.
But this matters:
No one is morally required to impose on others in order to move the world closer to that ideal.
Even moral goals do not justify coercion.
---
## What I’m Asking For
I’m explicitly looking for criticism.
Logical contradictions Counterexamples Hidden assumptions Redundancy with existing theories Cases where the framework produces intuitively unacceptable results Pointers to prior work that already does this better
If you think the core axiom fails, I want to know exactly where and why.
A Consent-Based Moral Framework: A Comparative Evaluation
## How ChatGPT Rates This Moral Model Compared to Major Religions (Seeking Critique)
My name is Tom Jump, I am the original creator of this model of morality. Full discloser I did use chat GPT to help me write this post (I am dyslexic and autistic, clear communication is not my strong suit).
I’m sharing a moral framework for open critique, not promotion.
The goal here is to see whether this model actually works, where it breaks, and whether it’s redundant with something that already exists.
The hook for this framework is:
When asked to compare moral systems like Christianity, Islam, Judaism, Hinduism, Buddhism, utilitarianism, deontology, and virtue ethics, ChatGPT repeatedly rates this model unusually high on internal consistency, clarity about what counts as moral wrongness, and its ability to explain tragedy without assigning false moral guilt.
That doesn’t mean the model is correct.
But it does raise a real question: why does it score that way?
This post explains the framework in straightforward terms so it can be evaluated as a worldview, not just a technical proposal.
---
## The Core Idea
The framework is built on a single foundational claim:
All involuntary imposition on the will of a conscious being is immoral.
All voluntary assistance of the will of a conscious being is moral.
There are no other primitive principles.
No outcome maximization.
No divine commands.
No moral rules handed down by authority.
No virtue scoring.
Everything reduces to one question:
Was a conscious being forced against their will, or not?
---
## What “Imposition” Means Here
An involuntary imposition is any state or action that overrides, constrains, or frustrates the will of a conscious agent without their consent.
This includes obvious cases like assault, theft, coercion, and non-consensual use of someone’s body.
It also includes cases people usually don’t label as moral at all, like a rock falling on someone.
That sounds strange at first, but it leads to an important distinction.
---
## Moral Valence vs Moral Blame
This framework separates two things that are often mixed together.
Moral valence is about whether a state of affairs involves a violation of will.
Moral blame is about whether an agent is responsible for that violation.
If a rock falls on someone, their will is violated. That is morally bad in this framework.
But there is no agent responsible, so no one is morally blameworthy.
This allows the model to say, clearly and consistently:
Something can be morally bad without anyone being morally guilty.
Many moral systems struggle to say both at once.
---
## Why Outcomes Don’t Justify Coercion
In this framework, killing one non-consenting person to save five others is still immoral.
Even if total suffering is reduced.
Even if the intention is good.
Even if the outcome looks better on balance.
Why?
Because someone’s will was used as a means.
Reducing harm can matter in comparisons, but it does not transform coercion into moral action.
Less bad does not become good.
---
## What This Model Explains Cleanly
This framework often scores well in comparisons because it cleanly explains things that other systems handle awkwardly or inconsistently:
Why consent feels morally fundamental
Why good intentions do not excuse violations
Why tragic outcomes can be morally bad without implying moral failure
Why nature can produce immoral states without being evil
Why many moral disagreements collapse into disputes about coercion versus permission
It also avoids common internal tensions found elsewhere, like conflicts between outcomes and rights, rule exceptions, aggregation problems, or appeals to authority.
---
## What This Model Is Not
This framework is not utilitarian.
It is not deontological.
It is not virtue-based.
It is not religious.
It is not nihilistic.
It also does not claim that the world can be made perfect, that tragedy can always be avoided, or that agents are obligated to optimize outcomes.
It does not issue commands.
It describes what morality is, not what must be enforced.
---
## Direction Without Obligation
If morality has a direction, it points toward fewer forced interactions, more voluntary cooperation, and less will-frustration.
But this matters:
No one is morally required to impose on others in order to move the world closer to that ideal.
Even moral goals do not justify coercion.
---
## What I’m Asking For
I’m explicitly looking for criticism.
Logical contradictions
Counterexamples
Hidden assumptions
Redundancy with existing theories
Cases where the framework produces intuitively unacceptable results
Pointers to prior work that already does this better
If you think the core axiom fails, I want to know exactly where and why.
Strong criticism is more useful than agreement.
Thanks for reading.
You can copy all of the relevant parts of the morality from here to give to Chat GPT:
https://www.churchofthebestpossibleworld.org/askchatgpt